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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The objectives of this report 
This report seeks to inform UK and international policy and practice that has the objective of 
reducing levels of armed conflict and building sustainable post-war transitions.   
 
The report synthesizes the findings of 21 desk-based case studies, commissioned by the Stabilisation 
Unit and written by country experts. This provides an evidence base for examining the relationship 
between elite bargaining, the dynamics of armed conflict and the effects of external interventions 
on these processes.  
 
It demonstrates that interventions can be ineffectual, or counter-productive, when interveners fail 
to analyse and engage effectively with underlying configurations of power and processes of elite 
bargaining in conflict-affected states. Addressing this concern, the report provides a framework to 
guide analysts and policymakers in deciphering patterns of elite authority, trajectories of transition, 
and the effects of external interventions on these dynamics.   
 
The centrality of elite bargaining as a mechanism to stabilise violent conflict  
The report finds that though an understanding of underlying power relations is an essential starting 
point for effective policy and practice, this is frequently lacking amongst external interveners.  
 
Interventions are focused on brokering peace agreements and strengthening the formal institutions 
of government – constitutional reform, the rule of law, electoral democracy – in the hope that these 
will provide a mechanism for ‘taming’ political behaviour and managing violent conflict. However, in 
many contexts, power and violence are not contested or managed through such formal mechanisms. 
 
Rather, violent conflict stabilises only when the allocation of benefits, opportunities and resources 
(such as political positions, business prospects) is consistent with how power is distributed in society. 
Where powerful elites are excluded or their interests ignored, the prospects for stabilising violent 
conflict and sustaining peace diminish.   
 
This report focuses on elite bargains – defined as discrete agreements, or a series of agreements, 
that explicitly re-negotiate the distribution of power and allocation of resources between elites. 
Such agreements play a crucial role in managing violence and shaping post-war transitions. 
  
A framework for analysing elite bargaining 
Transitions from war to peace are shaped by the interaction between three dynamics: (1) the 
underlying distribution of power – or political settlement – on which a society is based; (2) elite 
bargains, and (3) formal peace agreements. The extent to which elite bargains, peace processes and 
political settlements (mis)align is a critical factor in shaping the trajectory and outcomes of post-war 
transitions. Where the distribution of benefits set out in a formal peace agreement does not reflect 
the underlying political settlement, the foundations for transition will be highly unstable and the risk 
of renewed violence will be high.  
 
Political settlements are dynamic processes rather than static entities. In post-war moments, the 
underlying distribution of power may be unclear or contested and the new ‘rules of the game’ about 
how power is distributed have yet to be negotiated. Formal peace agreements (emphasising rules-
based mechanisms) are often preceded and followed by complex processes of elite bargaining 
(underwritten by deals-based mechanisms). Future stability is therefore determined by the dynamics 
and outcomes of elite bargaining and the extent to which they build confidence in the formal peace 
agreement and bolster the underlying political settlement.  
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Elites are defined as those with significant power to make decisions and implement policies that 
affect wider populations. They may hold formal political positions and/or exercise control over 
informal structures of authority and they command constituencies – i.e. groups of followers – whose 
interests they claim to represent. In conflict-affected countries elites are integral to shaping 
transitions from war to peace. These elites have agency, particularly in moments of flux or rupture, 
but their actions are also shaped – and constrained – by a set of wider structures and institutional 
frameworks including belief systems, ideologies and notions of legitimacy. This report provides a 
framework for analysing the interplay of structures, institutions and individual agency that shape 
elite bargains.  
 
The characteristics of elite bargaining  
The report focuses on three characteristics of elite bargaining: (1) the types of violence surrounding 
elite bargaining; (2) how resources and ‘rents’ are allocated between elites; and (3) who is included 
and excluded, and on what basis. 
 
Disaggregating violence 
Policymakers and practitioners need to think more critically about the different types of violence 
they seek to address. It should not be assumed that stabilising large-scale armed conflict would 
necessarily reduce all forms of violence. Three distinct but inter-connected forms of violence are 
identified: 
 
Competitive violence is deployed by warring elites to contest or defend the existing distribution of 
power. Stabilising large-scale armed conflict is primarily about ensuring that elites no longer deploy 
violence to compete for power. However, violence may also be embedded in how a political 
settlement works, as the deals agreed between elites may revolve around who has the ‘right’ to use 
violence. Elite bargains may also perpetuate forms of permissive violence, which result from the 
state’s inability to monopolize control over violence, but do not directly challenge the political 
settlement.  
 
Ending war is not the same as ending violence; a stable political settlement – in which power is no 
longer contested through competitive violence – may still expose populations to significant levels of 
embedded and permissive violence, including criminal, gender-based and domestic violence. 
 
Rent-sharing arrangements are central to elite bargaining  
In highly unstable and conflict-affected contexts where the state does not command a monopoly of 
violence, providing elites with preferential access to political privileges and economic opportunities 
(‘rents’) can provide the ‘glue’ to hold together fragile coalitions between elites. These rent-sharing 
arrangements can stabilise violent conflict by providing a mechanism through which powerful 
challengers to state authority are co-opted into stable coalitions. However, this may create baleful 
legacies. Political stability based on rent-sharing arrangements can undermine other policy goals 
such as economic growth, poverty reduction, and good governance. Significant trade-offs exist 
between stabilising violent conflict, promoting economic development, tackling illicit economies and 
organised crime, and pursuing poverty reduction. 
 
Forms of inclusion and exclusion play a major role in determining the feasibility of elite 
bargaining to reduce levels of violence 
Inclusion operates along a dual axis: ‘horizontal inclusion’ is concerned with the relationship 
between and across different elites, while ‘vertical inclusion’ involves the relation between elites and 
their constituencies. The prospects for elite bargaining to establish the foundations for more stable 
and inclusive political settlements are determined by the type of conflict, by who is included in elite 
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bargains, and by how they are included. Four major challenges are identified for policymakers in this 
regard: 
 
First, ‘indivisible’ conflicts – defined as those fought over territory, secession, or cultural politics 
where issues of ethnicity or identity have hardened into deep social divisions – are much harder to 
stabilise than ‘divisible’ conflicts fought over access to the state, resources, political rights and rent-
sharing arrangements. Divisible conflicts offer greater scope for negotiation and compromise and 
the emergence of political settlements that are more inclusive of competing interests. However, 
‘indivisible’ conflicts are zero-sum games in which satisfying the interests of certain warring parties is 
not possible without directly excluding the interests of opposing groups. Successful conflict 
resolution may involve reframing what appear to be indivisible conflicts as divisible – so for example 
a conflict around secession shifts to being one that can be resolved through state reform.   
 
Second, the exclusion of certain elites, who are linked to terrorism, crime, or human rights abuses 
may be deemed necessary to achieve a more ‘developmental peace’, but their exclusion can also 
make political settlements volatile and unstable since it means that the interests of powerful elites 
are not represented. 
 
Third, the sharing of political and economic rents may provide a more stable basis for elite inclusion 
than more formal power-sharing measures or a common political agenda.  However, there is no 
guarantee that such deals will develop into more comprehensive negotiations or build vertical 
inclusion and may instead exacerbate inequality and grievances. Therefore significant trade-offs 
exist between the forms of horizontal inclusion required to stabilise violent conflict and attempts to 
achieve a more developmental peace founded on broad-based inclusion.  
 
Fourth, formalised power sharing is likely to institutionalise, politicise and entrench social divisions 
and political identities rather than overcome them. This has kept alive, and in some cases, 
reinvigorated conflict fault-lines, rather than provide the foundations for a more developmental and 
inclusive post-war transformation. 
 
Elite bargaining and pathways out of violent conflict 
The case studies do not support the idea of a linear war-to-peace transition, with elite bargaining 
leading to a formal peace process, and culminating in a developmental political settlement.   
 
Instead, the cases reveal divergent outcomes of elite bargaining along three broad trajectories: (1) 
Return to violence: where elite bargains do not hold and there is a return to large-scale competitive 
violence; (2) Elite capture: where elite bargains hold and successfully secure a reduction in levels of 
armed violence, but where elites monopolise the benefits of peace and leave little scope for 
sustained progressive change; and (3) developmental peace: where elite bargains sustain and 
facilitate a move towards a more stable and inclusive political settlement.  
 
The risk of a return to violence is driven not only by the volatility of fragile political settlements but 
also by attempts to push for significant change too quickly. This is likely to increase the misalignment 
between formal institutions and the underlying configuration of power.  
Where elite bargains do hold, the most common outcome is a form of ‘elite capture’. This should not 
be viewed as an unfortunate outcome of flawed peace negotiations. Rather, it is often the very 
reason why efforts to stabilise violent conflict are feasible in the first place: elites’ realisation that 
they stand to benefit from peace may be what enables a transition from war to peace. Again, this 
highlights the trade-off between stabilising violent conflict and establishing the foundations for a 
more developmental post-conflict transition. 
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None of the case studies offer a clear example of an immediate post-war transition to 
developmental peace. This warns against unrealistic expectations for transformational change to 
occur within a short timeframe. Shifts towards a more stable and developmental peace in the initial 
post-conflict period may be less about initiating large-scale transformational outcomes – due to the 
risk of creating a destabilising disjuncture between the formal peace and the underlying political 
settlement. Rather, such shifts are likely to be grounded in a series of evolving mini-bargains or 
temporary ‘fixes’ that shift the parameters of negotiations, and work towards the conditions likely to 
make inclusive development possible.  
 
The effects of external interventions 
The cases cover a wide range of diplomatic, military, economic, and legal interventions operating 
across different time periods and geographical contexts. The cases call into question the assumption 
that formal, internationally-backed peace processes will stabilise large-scale armed violence and 
create the foundations for more inclusive and developmental pathways out of violent conflict. 
Instead, the evidence points to the need to engage more deeply with how interventions shape and 
are shaped by the underlying configurations of power. This explains why similar types of 
interventions can have very different impacts and legacies across cases. Rather than concentrating 
analysis on the internal ‘qualities’ of interventions – their style, content and timing – we emphasise 
the need to develop a relational approach that focuses on the interactions between interventions, 
elite bargaining and the underlying configuration of power.  
 
Tensions and trade-offs exist between the role that interventions play in supporting peace-building 
efforts versus the damage they cause by blocking emerging domestic bargains and in further 
destabilising volatile power dynamics. The tendency of interveners to believe they need ‘to do 
something’ in the face of violent conflict needs to be counter-balanced against more rigorous 
analysis of how such interventions are likely to impact on existing power dynamics and elite 
behaviour.   
 
There is also a need to foreground analysis of the linkages between the political settlements (and 
elite bargaining) of intervening powers and those of the countries in which they are intervening. 
International interventions in violent conflicts are rarely determined only, or even primarily, by 
assessments of the context with which they engage; they are also shaped by domestic interests and 
are partly the outcome of complex processes of elite bargaining within intervening countries. 
 
The pathways of external interventions 
The Report shows how external interventions impact upon the dynamics of elite bargaining and lead 
to three different pathways out of, or back into, large-scale armed violence: 
 
Pathway 1: Destabilising 
Outcomes: fragmented political settlement; conditions for a return to violence 
Examples: Sri Lanka 2002-06, South Sudan 2011, Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, Vietnam 
Conflicts that are highly internationalised and where external actors wield extensive influence – 
often bringing about significant moments of rupture – but where this influence has had a deleterious 
impact by inadvertently undermining or purposely fragmenting the underlying political settlement. 
This fragmentation increased the potential for renewed violence, which has occurred in many cases, 
notably Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam. Commonly, this phenomenon has occurred in contexts 
where external actors have used their high degree of leverage to pursue their own agendas, bringing 
a further set of interests to bear on fragile political settlements and exacerbating the challenges 
facing bargaining processes. 
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Pathway 2: Consolidating 
Outcomes: Stability, elite capture   
Examples: Tajikistan, Mozambique, Guatemala 
Where external actors have a fair degree of leverage in contexts where elite power structures are 
relatively entrenched and the post-war transition has largely embodied a continuation of pre-
war/wartime structures rather than a significant rupture. International actors play a role in 
influencing the peace process, and levels of large-scale armed violence decline. However, bargaining 
processes result in elite capture of the benefits of peace and may perpetuate forms of embedded 
and permissive violence.  
 
Pathway 3: Transforming 
Outcomes: Moves towards more developmental peace 
Examples: Nepal post-2006; Aceh; Mozambique 1992-2002, Northern Ireland 
Where bargaining processes surrounding war-to-peace transitions embody a significant moment of 
rupture in which pre-war or wartime structures of power have been weakened, creating emerging 
political space to contest previously exclusionary political and economic power structures. 
International actors have been able to support inclusive agendas or forms of transformational 
leadership contributing to the emergence of a more inclusive political settlement, which is reflected 
in visible changes in state policies and service delivery to previously excluded groups. 
 
These pathways reveal the tensions between ‘working with the grain’ of power structures versus 
efforts to promote more transformational post-war outcomes. The cases suggest that a 
transformative shift towards a more developmental peace requires pushing negotiations to the 
limits of misalignment with the underlying political settlement; yet they also show that such 
misalignment is the major factor that destabilises elite bargaining processes and can lead to a strong 
elite push back and/or renewed outbreaks of armed violence. On the other hand, prioritising 
stabilisation over transformational change means bringing the peace process into closer alignment 
with the underlying political settlement, at the likely cost of elite capture. The challenge for 
diplomatic and political interventions is to find ways that create space for meaningful political 
dialogue and can support momentum for more developmental post-war outcomes without pushing 
too hard against the existing political settlement and against the kinds of deal-based mechanisms 
upon which elite bargains are founded.    
 
Implications for policy and practice 
All good things do not come together: Acknowledging difficult trade-offs 
Interventions in fragile and conflict-affected states are often based on an assumption that policies 
aimed at stabilising large-scale armed conflict and those aimed at dismantling war economies, 
promoting inclusive economic development, democratisation and good governance reforms are 
mutually reinforcing and can enable countries to escape the ‘conflict trap’. The cases, however, 
reveal significant tensions and trade-offs between securing short-term stability and addressing 
longer-term drivers of violence and poverty.    
 
Precautionary principles and restraint 
The invocation that interventions should ‘do no harm’ is unrealistic; winners and losers are 
inevitably created. The challenge is therefore one of developing an approach that is more attuned to 
risks: What are the risks? What is their magnitude? Who bears them and at what cost? 
Precautionary principles that address these challenges are necessary so as to restrain the impulse to 
automatically ‘do something’, but also to provide clear guidelines for action. These guidelines should 
be less about how to micro-manage or engineer bargains, than about how to shape the risk 
environment in order to nudge elite bargaining processes in a more developmental direction.  
 
 
6 
 
Assessing the costs of intervention against non-intervention 
Whilst numerous examples of deleterious external interventions have been identified, the costs of 
not intervening to address escalating conflict and growing humanitarian crises may also be very 
grave. Greater emphasis must be placed on the tensions and trade-offs regarding the scope that 
interveners have in supporting efforts to reduce violent conflict versus the damage they may cause 
by blocking or distorting domestic bargaining processes and in further destabilising volatile power 
dynamics. Furthermore, there is a need to widen understandings of the influence that external 
actors have on conflict-affected countries beyond the parameters that usually frame conflict analysis. 
This emphasises the need for greater engagement in how policies related to trade, development, 
migration and so forth impact upon elite interests and conflict dynamics and how they work in 
tandem with – or at cross-purposes to – interventions directly aimed at reducing violent conflict. 
  
Working towards doorstep conditions for a developmental peace 
Shifts towards a more stable developmental peace in the initial post-conflict period are less about 
initiating large-scale transformational outcomes – due to the risks this entails of creating a 
destabilising disjuncture between the formal peace and the underlying political settlement. Rather 
they are grounded more in instigating a series of evolving mini-bargains or temporary ‘fixes’ that 
begin to shift the parameters of negotiations and work towards establishing the ‘doorstep 
conditions’ that may make more equitable and inclusive development possible. These doorstep 
conditions revolve around extending the issues up for negotiation, the scope for what can be 
demanded, and expanding the circle of interests taken into consideration, while at the same time 
ensuring that the failure of negotiations does not entail the risk of renewed violence.  
 
Moving beyond state-based frameworks  
Understanding the characteristics of elite bargaining and pathways out of conflict necessitates a 
frame of reference that goes beyond the borders of the nation state. In many countries, borderlands 
embody zones of persistent violent conflict, organised crime and are home to some of the world’s 
most vulnerable populations. An explicit focus on borderland dynamics – often overlooked in state-
based frameworks – is needed to understand why these regions may be prone to violence and 
instability.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Engaging with violent conflict 
1. Approximately two billion people live in parts of the world affected by violent conflict and 
fragility. By 2030 the World Bank estimates that 50% of the world’s population will live in 
countries affected by violence and instability.1 
 
2. Since the end of the Cold War, conflict resolution and peacebuilding have been essential 
components of international interventions in conflict-affected states. There has been a shift 
from more traditional peacekeeping operations to increasingly complex and multi-dimensional 
strategies aimed at achieving sustainable peace through ambitious stabilisation, peacebuilding 
and state building programmes. At the international level, the creation of the UN Peacebuilding 
Commission and a number of UN integrated missions are a reflection of that trend.  
 
3. However, understanding of what works is still limited and partial.2 Many violent conflicts remain 
intractable, new conflicts continue to erupt, and violence and instability regularly recur even in 
countries where international donors have invested heavily in trying to engineer peace. Half of 
the world’s current conflicts have lasted for more than 20 years and an estimated 60% of all 
armed conflicts ending in the early 2000s relapsed within five years.3 Even in countries where 
armed conflict has ended, levels of post-war violence often remain high – especially forms of 
gender-based and sexual violence – and in some cases, such as Guatemala, the incidence of 
violent deaths has been higher in the years after peace agreements were signed than in the 
years prior. Following a steady decline in levels of global organised violence since the end of the 
Cold War, in recent years there has been a rise, with a significant increase since 2010, which 
holds even when Syria is exempted from the data.4  
 
1.2 Developing the UK’s approach to stabilising violent conflict 
4. In light of these challenges there has been renewed emphasis on the need to address insecurity 
and violent conflict, rather than attempt to work ‘around’ it.5 The UK government has 
recognised the need for greater integration of diplomatic, defence and developmental activities 
in the pursuit of “structural stability” in its flagship policy, the Building Stability Overseas 
Strategy (BSOS).6  The UK government’s 2015 Security and Defence Review (SDSR) commits the 
UK to working with “partners to reduce conflict and to promote stability, good governance and 
human rights”.7 This commitment is underscored by the 2015 UK Aid Strategy, in which 
strengthening global peace, security and governance is one of its four strategic objectives. This 
is also reflected in the government’s current commitment to allocate at least 50% of DFID’s 
                                                          
 
1
 World Bank (2017). Social Service Delivery in Violent Contexts: Achieving Results Against the Odds: A Report from 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Nepal. 
2
 For a detailed analysis of the relevant trends and debates in the academic literature on this subject, see: Meehan, P. 
(2016). What are the key factors that affect the securing and sustaining of an initial deal to reduce levels of armed conflict? 
Literature Review. London: Stabilisation Unit.    
3
 DFID. (2010). Building Peaceful States and Societies. London: DFID. p.10; Human Security Report. (2012). Sexual Violence, 
education and war: Beyond the mainstream narrative. Vancouver: Human Security Press. p.172-3; von Einsiedel, S. (2017). 
“Civil War Trends and the Changing Nature of Armed Conflict”, United Nations University Centre for Policy Research, 
Occasional Paper 10; Gates, S., Nygård, H.M., Trappeniers, E. “Conflict Recurrence”, PRIO Conflict Trends 02/2016.   
4
 Melander, E. (2015). ‘Organized Violence in the World 2015. An Assessment by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’, 
Uppsala Conflict Data Programme Paper 9. 
5
 DFID. (2010). Building Peaceful States and Societies. London: DFID. p.6; United Nations; World Bank. (2017). Pathways for 
Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
6
 DFID, FCO, MOD. (2011). Building Stability Overseas Strategy.  
7
 HM Government (2015) National Security and Defence Review.  
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budget to fragile states and regions.8 The UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) include a 
commitment to significantly reduce all forms of violence and related deaths through promoting 
peace, justice and strong institutions (Goal 16).  
 
5. Against this backdrop, the Stabilisation Unit is seeking to develop an evidence base on the 
effectiveness of external interventions that aim to contribute to a sustained reduction in 
violence in fragile and conflict-affected states. In current UK government policy, the aim of any 
UK stabilisation intervention is to “support local and regional partners in conflict affected 
countries to reduce violence, ensure basic human security and facilitate political deal-making, 
all of which provide a foundation for building long term stability”.9  
 
6. This evidence base that underpins this report has been generated through a set of 21 desk-
based case studies written by country experts.10 The selection of cases was made to capture 
variation across historical time periods, types and levels of conflict, forms of conflict settlement, 
different modalities of intervention and varying trajectories of post-war transition. Although the 
cases are very different, each author addressed a common set of questions/issues. The cases 
selected include civil wars (Sri Lanka, Nepal, South Sudan), regionalised conflict systems11 
(Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, DR Congo), inter-state conflicts (Ethiopia-Eritrea) and insurgencies in 
response to foreign occupation across post-colonial (Malaya), Cold War (Vietnam) and post-
Cold War contexts (Iraq, Bosnia) (See Annex 1). 
 
The project addresses the following core questions: 
 
1) In countries experiencing violent conflict, under what conditions and why have 
processes of elite bargaining led to a reduction in levels of large scale armed conflict?  
 
2) Why have processes of elite bargaining had sustained impacts on peacebuilding in some 
contexts but not in others?  
 
3) How have external interventions impacted upon the instigation, durability and longer 
term consequences of elite bargaining? 
 
7. This Synthesis Paper presents the emerging findings from this body of research. Its target 
audience is the UK government and other international actors working in fragile and conflict-
affected states, with the aim of improving understanding of, and support for, efforts to reduce 
levels of armed conflict and build sustainable post-war transitions.12 
 
                                                          
 
8
 HM Treasury and DFID. (2015). UK aid: Tackling global challenges in the national interest. 
9
 This definition will be used in the forthcoming ‘UK Approach to Stabilisation 2018’ paper, which will supersede the 
existing version.    
10
 These cases are: Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia-Eritrea, 
Guatemala, Indonesia (Aceh), Iraq, Libya, Malaya, Mali, Mozambique, Nepal, Northern Ireland, Philippines, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Vietnam.   
11
 Regional conflict systems are defined as “situations where neighbouring countries experience internal or interstate 
conflicts, and with significant links between the conflicts”. These interdependent violent conflicts involve an array of 
subnational and transnational actors, interests and dynamics creating regionalised conflict dynamics that are not easily 
addressed through national-level processes. Wallensteen P. & Sollenberg, M. (1998). “Armed Conflict and Regional Conflict 
Complexes 1989-97”, Journal of Peace Research 35(5): 621-634. 
12
 See DFID. (2016). Building Stability Framework. London: DFID. 
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1.3 Stabilisation and the centrality of elite bargaining 
8. In recent years there has been a growing focus amongst policymakers on the pivotal role that 
power relations and political contestation between competing elites, and between elites and 
their followers, play in shaping the trajectories of violent conflict and development.13 This 
Report builds upon this emerging body of work by providing an evidence base and analytical 
framework to guide policymakers and practitioners in; understanding the dynamics of elite 
bargaining; addressing the role that processes of elite bargaining play in securing and sustaining 
a reduction in levels of violence; assessing the impact that external interventions have had on 
these processes.   
 
9. A growing body of evidence suggests that for countries at war, reducing levels of armed conflict 
typically involves processes of ‘elite bargaining’ aimed at addressing underlying security 
dilemmas, minimising challenges to the restoration of security, and building confidence in a 
negotiated settlement.  
 
10. The focus of this research is on a specific moment of conflict stabilisation and concentrates on 
efforts to reduce large-scale armed violence, rather than an assessment of the broader 
spectrum of peacebuilding and state building initiatives deployed to resolve conflicts and 
support post-conflict transformation. This report addresses the structures, institutions and 
forms of agency that shape these deal-making processes as well as the dynamics of violence, 
rent-sharing arrangements and forms of inclusion/exclusion surrounding them in order to 
assess the divergent trajectories revealed by the case studies. The project is particularly 
interested in the factors that determine whether or not initial commitments to reduce large-
scale armed violence can hold and eventually be transformed to be more inclusive and address 
the deep-seated grievances that initially gave rise to the conflict. 
 
1.4 Structure of the Report 
11. The rest of the Report is divided into four chapters: 
 
Chapter 2 sets out the Project’s conceptual approach to analysing processes of elite bargaining.  
 
Chapter 3 presents the emerging findings from the research to address the Project’s first two 
research questions by addressing the dynamics that shape processes of elite bargaining, and 
the factors that influence the outcomes of these processes, especially regarding the extent to 
which they contribute to sustained processes of peacebuilding, or whether violent conflict 
recurs. 
 
Chapter 4 analyses external interventions from across the cases in order to assess the impact 
that they have had on the processes and outcomes of elite bargaining, thereby addressing the 
project’s third research question. 
 
Chapter 5 sets out the emerging implications from these findings for policymakers. 
                                                          
 
13
 World Bank. (2017). World Development Report 2017: Governance and the law. Washington, D.C.: World Bank; DFID. 
(2010). The Politics of Poverty: Elites, Citizens and States Findings from ten years of DFID-funded research on Governance 
and Fragile States 2001–2010: A Synthesis Paper. London: DFID. 
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Chapter 2: Defining the Project’s approach 
 
2.1 Introduction 
12. This chapter sets out a framework for analysing elite bargains and their relationship to the 
dynamics of large-scale armed violence. This framework demonstrates how transitions from 
war to peace are shaped by the interaction between: (1) the underlying distribution of power – 
or political settlement – on which a society is based; (2) the dynamics of elite bargaining, and (3) 
formal peace agreements. The chapter begins by providing definitions of key terms. It then 
explains why the (mis)alignment between elite bargains, peace processes and political 
settlements is a critical factor in shaping the trajectory and outcomes of post-war transitions.         
 
2.2 Defining key terms: Elites, political settlements, elite bargains, peace 
processes 
Elites 
13. Elites are defined as: those within society that control a disproportionate amount of political 
power, wealth and/or privilege and are thus able to make or influence decisions and 
implement policies that affect wider populations.  
 
14. They may hold formal political positions and/or exercise control over informal structures of 
authority. Elites command constituencies – i.e. groups of followers – which they are able to 
mobilize. The size of these constituencies varies widely as does the nature of the relationship 
between elites and their followers. The relationships between elites and followers – in terms of 
how elite-controlled resources are distributed, how elites maintain their authority, and how 
non-elites are able to contest this authority – determine how elite behaviour impacts upon 
society as a whole. 14  
 
Political Settlements 
15. Political settlements are defined as: The distribution of power on which a polity and society is 
based, which results from conflict and negotiation between contending elites.15 
 
16. The political settlement underpins the formal and informal institutional arrangements through 
which resources (e.g., positions of power within government and informal institutions, control 
over natural resources, trade and licenses) are negotiated and distributed. The political 
settlement refers not only to the resources that people control but also the legitimacy they 
have in exercising this control. Political settlements are dynamic processes rather than static 
entities that are historically specific to each state. Although they shape national structures (such 
as political and legal systems, tax structures and how national resources are distributed), they 
are likely to be influenced by actors and interests beyond national borders. 
 
                                                          
 
14
 This definition draws upon: Putzel, J. & Di John, J. (2012). Meeting the Challenges of Crisis States. London: Crisis States 
Research Centre.; Denney, L. & Barron, P. (2015). ‘Beyond the Toolkit: Supporting Peace Processes in Asia’, Working 
Politically in Practice Series, Case Study No.4, San Francisco: The Asia Foundation, p.2. 
15
 This definition draws upon the work of: Di John, J. (2008). ‘Conceptualising the Causes and Consequences of Failed 
States: A Critical Review of the Literature’, LSE/DESTIN Crisis States Research Working Paper, No: 25. (Series 2). London: 
LSE; Di John, J. & Putzel, J. (2009). ‘Political Settlements’. Issues Paper. Birmingham: Governance and Social Development 
Resource Centre, International Development Department, University of Birmingham; Khan, M. (2010). Political Settlements 
and the Governance of Growth-Enhancing Institutions. (Unpublished). Available at http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/9968/. 
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Elite bargains 
17. Elite bargains are defined as: A discrete agreement, or series of agreements, that explicitly 
sets out to re-negotiate the distribution of power and allocation of resources between elites.16  
 
18. Whereas political settlements can be understood as on-going and dynamic processes through 
which power is organised and exercised, elite bargains represent specific attempts to re-
negotiate the distribution of power between elites, which cumulatively shape and change the 
overarching political settlement. Thus, elite bargains are the product of conscious, calculated 
behaviour to determine who holds political office, governs economic resources and controls the 
means of violence. In contrast political settlements are the outcome of ongoing processes, 
which both reflect and reinforce the balance of forces in society at a given time.  
 
Peace agreements 
19. Following Wallenstein and Sollenberg, peace agreements are defined as: Arrangements 
entered into by warring parties to explicitly regulate or resolve their basic incompatibility.17  
 
20. Historically, more wars ended through military victory than through negotiated peace 
agreements. However, since the end of the Cold War, peace agreements have become more 
common, and they have also become more ambitious in scope, commonly including conditions 
related to power sharing, human rights, transitional justice and inclusive development.18 The 
effectiveness of peace agreements in providing the foundations for sustainable peace is 
contested in the academic and policy literatures.19 
 
2.3 How political settlements, elite bargains and peace agreements interact 
21. Our underlying hypothesis is that the interactions and (mis)alignments between political 
settlements, elite bargaining and peace agreements may explain whether and how wars are 
terminated and differing trajectories of post-war transition. Donors and policymakers have 
typically sought to end wars through peace agreements that aim to regulate violent conflict, 
through a combination of formal settlements and institutional design (e.g., constitutional 
reform, elections, power-sharing arrangements). Yet such approaches tend to be blind to the 
informal structures of power that may work at odds with the legal text of a peace agreement or 
the newly created institutions. A focus on formal institutions fails to explain why the same 
institutions can lead to diverging stabilisation and peacebuilding outcomes in different contexts. 
 
                                                          
 
16
 This definition draws upon the work of: Putzel, J. & Di John, J. (2012). Meeting the Challenges of Crisis States, Crisis States 
Research Centre Report. London: LSE; Laws, E. (2012). ‘Political Settlements, Elite Pacts, and Governments of National Unity: 
A Conceptual Study’. Background Paper 10, Developmental Leadership Program. Birmingham: DLP. 
17
 Wallenstein, P. & Sollenberg, M. (1997). ‘Armed Conflicts, Conflict Termination, and Peace Agreements, 1989-96’, 
Journal of Peace Research 34(3): 342.  
18
 Human Security Report. (2013). The Decline in Global Violence: Evidence, Explanation, and Contestation. (Vancouver: 
Human Security Press). 
19
 See: Call, C. (2012). Why Peace Fails: The Causes and Prevention of Civil War Recurrence. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press; Human Security Report Project. (2009). Human security report 2008/9. New York: Oxford University Press; 
Kreutz, J. (2010) ‘How and when armed conflicts end: Introducing the UCDP conflict termination data set’, Journal of Peace 
Research 47 (2) pp. 243-250; Licklider, R. (1995) ‘The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993’, 
American Political Science Review 89(3), pp. 681-90; Meehan, P. (2016). ‘What are the key factors that affect the securing 
and sustaining of an initial deal to reduce levels of armed conflict?: Literature Review.’ London: Stabilisation Unit.  
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Figure 1: Assessing political settlements, elite bargains and peace agreements 
 
 
 
22. In contrast, political settlements analysis, which has become increasingly influential amongst 
international actors engaging in conflict-affected states20, focuses explicitly on how power is 
organised in society in order to understand (and address) drivers of violent conflict. Rather than 
a technical focus on designing the ‘right’ interventions, this approach emphasises that any 
intervention will be shaped by power relations and political interests and must be aware of and 
resilient to these pressures.  
 
23. The starting point for analysing large-scale violence is an understanding of how the state works. 
In most of these conflict-affected countries the state is not an autonomous institution that 
wields uncontested sovereignty or has a monopoly over the means of coercion but faces 
competing sources of power, legitimacy, ideology and violence. In such contexts, stability may 
be dependent less on how well formal government institutions perform and more on the 
‘bargaining equilibrium’ that emerges between elites to ensure that they cooperate and engage 
with each other rather than attempt to pursue their interests through the use of violence. One 
model, which brings these ideas together, is that of the ‘limited access order’.21 This is defined 
                                                          
 
20
 Political settlements analysis has been at the forefront of DFID’s work on peacebuilding and governance in fragile states 
as well as a key focus of major DFID-funded research projects, notably the Political Settlements Research Programme 
based at Edinburgh, the Crisis States Research Centre at LSE, and the Effective States and Inclusive Development (ESID) 
programme based at the University of Manchester. The concept has also been embraced by the OECD, The International 
Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, various government development agencies (e.g., AusAID) and peacebuilding 
and conflict resolution NGOs (e.g., Conciliation Resources). See: DFID. (2010). The Politics of Poverty: Elites, Citizens and 
States Findings from ten years of DFID-funded research on Governance and Fragile States 2001–2010: A Synthesis Paper. 
London: DFID; OECD. (2011). From power struggles to Sustainable Peace: Understanding Political Settlements; AusAID. 
(2011). Framework for working in fragile and conflict-affected states: Guidance for staff. Canberra: AusAID. 
21
 North, D. Willis, J. & Weingast. B. (2009). Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded 
Human History. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
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as a system in which the state uses its control over the political and economic system to create 
‘rents’ by manipulating access to certain political privileges and economic opportunities (such as 
political positions, import licenses, state procurement contracts). In limited access orders the 
violence problem is managed through the sharing of rents between powerful elites, who have 
the potential to challenge state authority, in order to gain their loyalty and forge a stable 
coalition.22  
 
24. In contexts where the formal peace agreement and the distribution of resources do not reflect 
the underlying balance of power, then the risk of instability and violence is high.  Since formal 
mechanisms for redressing grievances are often weak, elites may deploy violence in order to 
renegotiate the existing political settlement.23 Large-scale violence will only stabilise “when the 
distribution of benefits in a society, supported by its institutions (e.g., political positions, 
business opportunities) is consistent with the distribution of power in society, and the economic 
and political outcomes of these institutions are sustainable over time”.24 A political settlements 
approach warns that stabilisation efforts are likely to be ineffective, or harmful if the interests 
of powerful elites are ignored. 
 
25. This particularly applies in post-war moments, which can be understood as points of rupture 
when the new ‘rules of the game’ are being negotiated. Formal peace agreements (rules-based 
mechanisms) are often preceded and followed by complex processes of elite bargaining (deals-
based mechanisms) between and within (international and domestic) groups. These are ‘turning 
points’ when the stakes are high and the problems of elite polarisation and fragmentation are 
likely to be most acute. Yet future stability may be determined by the dynamics and outcomes 
of elite bargaining and the extent to which they build confidence in the formal peace agreement 
– the public event or ‘grand bargain’ – and bolster the underlying political settlement.  
 
26. Therefore elite bargains are pivotal to stabilisation efforts, yet they are the least easily 
understood and studied point on the triangle.25 This report attempts to understand and explain 
the relationship between elite bargaining, peace agreements and political settlements. In order 
to do this, our starting point is to situate elites within an analytical framework that combines an 
understanding of structure, institutions and agency, and how these interact in specific conflict-
affected settings. As shown in Figure Two (below) elites are embedded within – and their 
actions are constrained by – a set of wider structures and institutions at the subnational, 
national and international level that shape their behaviour and determine the dynamics and 
outcomes of elite bargaining.  
 
o Structures: refer to long-standing and slow-changing factors that shape the environment 
in which violent conflict is taking place. These may include demographics (e.g., levels of 
unemployment, population pressure), natural resource endowments, climatic pressures, 
                                                          
 
22
 Ibid, p.30. 
23
 The extent to which violence is deployed by elites to renegotiate the distribution of power is also shaped by an array of 
factors including the capacity of informal arrangements and agreements to contain violence and notions of the legitimacy 
of using violence.   
24
 Khan, M. (2010). Political Settlements and the Governance of Growth-Enhancing Institutions. (Unpublished). Available at 
http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/9968/. p.1. 
25
 Reasons for this include; the sensitivity of the topic, and ethical concerns about consent and attribution; the difficulties 
of gaining access to key players; the dynamism of the processes being studied and the difficulty of capturing these changes 
through longitudinal research; the tendency in the peacebuilding literature to focus on the formal peace process, and 
official narratives that are shaped by international players and government officials; disciplinary orientations and 
limitations within the social sciences – for example the bias towards big N approaches within political science and IR and 
the traditional focus within anthropology towards non-elite populations. 
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the regional neighbourhood in which a conflict is situated, and legacies of long-running 
wars (e.g., social divisions, the emergence of powerful elites, such as within the military). 
 
o Institutions: refer to the institutional frameworks that elites operate within. This 
includes both formal and informal institutions that determine the ‘rules of the game’ 
governing elite behaviour and interests. Institutional arenas are shaped by a country’s 
regime type, the degree of state consolidation (over territory, the means of violence and 
legitimacy), the extent to which power is managed in personalised ways (such as 
clientelism) or through impersonal institutions and the beliefs and ideologies that shape 
political behaviour (such as religious beliefs, traditions, forms of nationalism, visions of 
development and cultural norms of hierarchy). These institutional frameworks have a 
history; they reflect and embody longstanding contests over power and the distribution 
of assets, and are not just sets of rules that can be refashioned by those who wield 
political authority.26  
 
o Agents: refers to the interests and actions of individuals, which in this Report focuses on 
the actions of elites. This relates to the relationship between elites and their 
constituents, the role of leadership, personal incentives, ideological and emotional 
factors that govern elite actions, including perceptions of fear and insecurity and forms 
of envy, rivalry, hatred, prejudice, solidarity and loyalty.27  
 
27. The interplay of structures, institutions and agents shape both the ‘horizontal’ relationships 
between elites and the ‘vertical’ relationships between elites and their constituents. As the 
cases explored in Chapters three and four demonstrate, the interests and actions of interveners 
are also shaped by structural factors (such as the post-colonial, Cold War and post-Cold War 
contexts in which interventions took place), the institutional arenas in which interveners’ 
decision-making takes place (institutionalised ideologies, the influence of domestic politics and 
electoral considerations), the economic and geopolitical interests of interveners and also the 
hubris, rivalries, ambitions and loyalties within intervening organisations. These issues may play 
a significant, although almost entirely overlooked, role in determining the impact of external 
interventions on elite bargains. 
  
                                                          
 
26
 Putzel, J. & Di John, J. (2012). Meeting the Challenges of Crisis States. London: Crisis States Research Centre. p.1; Hudson, 
D. & Leftwich, A. (2014). ‘From Political Economy to Political Analysis’. DLP Research Paper 25. Birmingham: DLP, p.96. 
27
 Darby, J. & Mac Ginty, R. (2008). ‘Introduction: What Peace? What Process?’ In: Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, 
Peace Processes and Post-War Reconstruction, J. Darby and R. Mac Ginty (eds). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p.5; 
Cramer, C. (2002). ‘Homo Economicus Goes to War: Methodological Individualism, Rational Choice and the Political 
Economy of War’, World Development 30(1): 1845–64; Cramer, C. (2006). Civil War Is Not a Stupid Thing: Accounting for 
Violence in Developing Countries. London: Hurst & Company. Richards, P. (ed). (2005). No War No Peace: An Anthropology 
of Contemporary Armed Conflicts. 
 
 
15 
 
 
Figure 2: Processes and dynamics that shape violent conflict and its stabilisation 
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2.4 Conclusion 
28. Current conflict resolution strategies predominantly seek to address violent conflict through 
securing formal peace agreements. This, it is believed, will create the foundation for 
(re)establishing formal institutions that can manage social conflict and the transition of power. 
This approach typically includes good governance reforms designed to support democratisation, 
strengthening of the rule of law and free market institutions. The alternative framework set out 
in this chapter, is based upon a different set of assumptions about the nature of violent conflict 
and post-war transitions; it emphasises the centrality of power relations and focuses on the 
relationships between political settlements, elite bargains and peace agreements. The degree 
and type of (mis)alignment between them helps explain variations in pathways out of conflict 
and the differing impacts of external interventions aimed at reducing large scale violence.  
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Chapter 3: The dynamics of elite bargaining and pathways 
out of conflict 
 
29. In the following chapter we analyse the findings from the case studies in relation to the first two 
research questions about factors that have shaped processes of elite bargaining and the extent 
to which these processes have contributed to sustained reductions in violence or conversely an 
escalation or return to large-scale violent conflict. We follow the structure set out in Figure Two, 
first mapping out how structures, institutions and agents set the context for elite bargaining in 
conflict-affected environments, before then expanding upon the specific dynamics of elite 
bargains. This leads to a concluding section that connects bargaining processes to different 
trajectories or pathways out of violent conflict. 
 
3.1 Setting the context for elite bargaining 
3.1.1 Structures 
Structural determinants of elite behaviour 
30. Elites may make history but not in contexts of their own choosing. The role that elites play in 
shaping trajectories out of violent conflict is shaped by pre-existing social structures, patterns of 
development and global and regional contexts – often themselves transformed through war. 
Elites are thus often operating in highly constrained contexts, creating a strong degree of path 
dependency surrounding elite interests and actions, which are not easily malleable to the kinds 
of ‘rational actor’ frameworks that underpin many conflict resolution strategies.28  
 
31. The case studies unsurprisingly demonstrate that the strategies and choices open to elites were 
shaped by their historical context. These varied widely, ranging from rising nationalism in the 
context of de-colonisation struggles (Malaya), Cold War imperial wars (Vietnam), post-colonial 
nation-state-building (Indonesia), post-Soviet collapse (Tajikistan) and the post-Cold War era of 
statebuilding, the global war on terrorism and the willingness of powerful states to intervene in 
‘fragile’ states (Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya). In each case, the options available to elites were 
different, shaped by the varying global, regional and national power structures they operated 
within, their access to material resources, and the sources of legitimacy and security available 
to them. For example in the post-Cold War period, peace agreements have become the 
expected form of conflict termination and they are associated with a set of standards related to 
rule of law, human rights, state reform and democratisation. This has created a very different 
context to the Cold War period during which elites were supported through transfusions of 
superpower funding and protection (e.g., Vietnam, Indonesia, pre-war Afghanistan, Tajikistan, 
Guatemala and the DRC (formerly Zaire), Sudan). 
 
32. The cases also demonstrate how elite interests and behaviour are shaped by underlying social 
structures. In many of the cases – and throughout much of the world – states are much 
‘younger’ than the societies they purport to govern.29 In such cases, the state order of things – 
                                                          
 
28
 Rational actor frameworks assume the behaviour, motivations and calculations of warring parties are driven by the 
narrow pursuit of self-interest and thus assume that the cost-benefit calculations of individuals can be manipulated. For 
example, efforts to change economic incentives in order make combatants view peace as more profitable than war, has 
become an influential conflict resolution tool (for a critical assessment of the influence of this notion on policymakers see: 
Keen, D. (2009). ‘Economic initiatives to tackle conflict: Bringing politics back in’, Crisis States Research Centre Occasional 
Paper 9. London: LSE.). 
29
 Goodhand, J. (2008). ‘War, Peace and the Places In Between: Why Borderlands are Central’. In: Whose Peace? Critical 
Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding, M. Pugh, N. Cooper & M. Turner (eds.). London: Palgrave. p.228. 
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i.e., bureaucratic practices, formal institutions – is only one of the structures of authority that 
shape and constrain elites. Elites are operating in contexts in which new structures of authority 
and governance operate alongside – rather than displace – pre-existing ones and continue to 
influence the social relations, norms, customs and legitimacy that govern elites. For example, 
tribal structures, identities and fault-lines in Afghanistan and Somalia continue to shape 
contemporary political mobilisation within and outside the state.    
 
33. Historical and geographical patterns of development have also shaped the character and 
composition of elites. For example, many post-colonial states, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, 
inherited and replicated patterns of development that were dependent upon controlling the 
interface between the domestic and international economy. Revenue in countries such as 
Sudan was derived primarily from taxes on imports and exports, issuing of trade licenses and 
resource concessions and the distribution of foreign aid. This created economic structures in 
which elite power was dependent upon control over central state institutions that governed the 
‘gate’ between the domestic and international economy.30 Elsewhere, patterns of uneven 
development have played an important role in elite formation and interaction. For example, 
uneven and centralised patterns of development and urbanisation in Nepal has strengthened 
the position of a Brahmin-Chetri hill-based elite centred in the Kathmandu valley and the middle 
hills; in Sri Lanka, elite formation has followed colonial patterns of development, leading to 
competing elites in the Sinhala south (Colombo and Kandy) and in the Tamil north (Jaffna). In 
Tajikistan, topography and Soviet development strategies (which favoured certain groups) 
crystalised to create regional-based elites, which became the main fighting fronts in the war 
period. In Northern Ireland, education and employment policies have exacerbated the conflict’s 
fault-lines and produced contesting elites and non-elites shaped by these structural inequalities.  
 
34. All of the factors outlined above – the historical context, social structures and patterns of 
development – that shape elites have important regional dimensions that extend beyond 
national borders. The patronage structures, support bases, economic resources and 
foundations of legitimacy that sustain elites and govern their behaviour are often based on 
regional networks and hierarchies. Regional elites in Afghanistan, for example, are shaped by 
tribal, sectarian, religious, ethnic and linguistic fault-lines that extend across the region, notably 
Pakistan and Iran.31 Political settlements are frequently shaped by those of neighbouring 
countries and must be analysed accordingly – for example Afghanistan’s political settlement is 
heavily shaped by its relationships with Pakistan, and the same applies to Eritrea’s position in 
relation to Ethiopia. 
 
35. The cases also clearly demonstrate how war transforms structures and processes of elite 
formation. In many cases war has swept aside older social structures – such as feudal 
authorities and khans in Afghanistan – and has paved the way for the emergence of new 
military, political and economic elites. These structures of authority are based upon forms of 
wartime accumulation and redistribution, and new sources of legitimacy (money, religion, 
security and service provision). For example Afghan and Tajik warlords have derived significant 
power from the drug economy during wartime, and in South Sudan the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA) commanders relied on international support from the outset, 
developing complex patronage networks that were funded by the war economy including 
through capture of humanitarian aid. War creates new forms of power that continue into the 
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 Cooper, F. (2002). Africa since 1940: The past of the present. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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 Sharan, T. 2012. ‘The Dynamics of Elite Networks and Patron-Client Relations in Afghanistan’. In: Elites and Identities in 
Post-Soviet Space, D. Lane (ed.). Abingdon: Routledge. 
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post-war period. For example, the militaries in Guatemala, Colombia, Sri Lanka, South Sudan 
and Nepal expanded significantly during the war and remained salient political actors after 
war’s end. In many contexts war also empowered irregular armed forces – militias, warlords, 
paramilitaries etc. often backed by the state or neighbouring powers (e.g., Colombia, Tajikistan, 
Indonesia, Mali, South Sudan) – that have also remained powerful post-war. This appears to 
have been most common in protracted low-intensity conflicts where paramilitary groups were 
cheaper to maintain than regular army units; they had better knowledge of local populations 
and terrain and often provided the state with a degree of plausible deniability for human rights 
abuses.32 In some cases, these irregular forces retained state backing after the war to enforce 
the peace or have proved able to withstand efforts to dismantle them.    
 
36. In many cases wars lead to geographical shifts in the distribution of power and resources. For 
example, the lucrative nature of cross-border trade during wartime – including illegal goods 
(heroin) and legal goods (basic commodities and consumer items) in Afghanistan and Tajikistan 
– and the subsequent emergence of border boom towns and military fronts can shift the locus 
of power away from the centre. In both these cases, controlling cross-border trade became an 
important mechanism through which to accumulate wealth and power to strengthen, or to 
challenge, elites at the centre. In many wars, borderlands have been a “privileged site of 
rebellion against the power of the state”33 due to: the revenue armed groups can derive from 
cross-border trade; access to goods (not least weapons); support from neighbouring countries; 
the utilisation of long-standing localised grievances against central states; and the sanctity of 
international borders which discourage governments from pursuing opposition into 
neighbouring territories. These borderland dynamics can generate long-running regional 
conflict systems fuelled by inter-connected disputes, networks and flows (of people, goods and 
weapons) that become extremely difficult to resolve.   
 
Structural shifts and opportunities for elite bargaining 
37. Although elites’ room for manoeuvre may be highly constrained, the cases also reveal how 
shifts in underlying structures play an important role in ‘opening’ space for elite bargaining 
processes aimed at reducing levels of armed conflict. Such shifts can create moments of rupture 
when structures become more fluid and contested, enhancing the agency of elites and creating 
new spaces for institutions (both formal and informal) to emerge that may be able to contain 
violence.  
 
38. In certain cases structural shifts have stabilised volatile political settlements and reduced levels 
of violence without the need for a formal peace agreement. For example, in Malaya, significant 
changes in property rights played an important role in ending the violent conflict between the 
Commonwealth armed forces and the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA), the armed 
wing of the Malayan Communist Party during the 1950s. The granting of land rights to the 
Chinese population was especially important and encouraged many to see their interests best 
pursued through political pressure for greater concessions and legal reforms, rather than 
through backing the MNLA’s armed struggle. This was despite the fact that government 
attempts to reach some kind of deal with the MNLA actually failed. Indeed, the MNLA 
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 Ahram, A. (2011). Proxy Warriors: The rise and fall of state-sponsored militias. Stanford, California: Stanford University 
Press. 
33
 Van Schendel, W. (2005). ‘Spaces of Engagement: How Borderlands, Illegal Flows, and Territorial States Interlock’, In: 
Illicit Flows and Criminal Things: States, Borders, and the Other Side of Globalization. W. Van Schendel and I. Abraham 
(eds.).  Bloomington: Indiana University Press.  
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insurgency petered out not because of a peace agreement forged between the MNLA and the 
central government, but in spite of it.   
 
39. Many of the cases reveal how changes in regional neighbourhoods and economic structures – 
especially how wealth is generated, who controls wealth and how it is distributed – are integral 
to creating, or closing off, space for elite bargaining processes. For example, with regards to the 
spill-over effect of broader regional dynamics, the gradual shift in Latin America away from 
violent struggle and towards democratic politics  (itself a consequence of national and global 
structural shifts) appeared to play an important role in strengthening the Colombian peace 
process. In Guatemala, the end of the Cold War and the US invasion of Panama in 1989 revealed 
a shift in global power structures and demonstrated the declining willingness of the US to back 
governments in the region in the same way it had done in previous decades. The successful end 
to hostilities in neighbouring countries (especially Nicaragua and El Salvador) and the 
mechanisms for dialogue created out of Latin American peace initiatives were also important. 
 
40. Gradual shifts in patterns of domestic accumulation and wealth were also important in cases 
like Colombia and Guatemala, where an emerging business class widened the state’s support 
base, which had historically depended upon the military and large landowners (both of which 
advocated a hard-line against revolutionary armed groups). This created greater – although still 
heavily contested – political space and political will for peace negotiations and strengthened the 
hand of the state in counteracting the ‘spoiling’ tactics of the military and large landowners. 
 
41. Across many of the cases, it is possible to observe a structural shift in armed conflicts, which 
involves a transition from a ‘war cycle’ to a ‘peace cycle’.34 This shift involves a growing 
recognition amongst elites, who have accumulated during war, that their interests may best be 
served through ‘capturing’ the benefits of peace rather than continued armed conflict. For 
example, the cases of Guatemala, Colombia, Tajikistan, Sierra Leone and Somalia all 
demonstrate that the same structural shifts that created opportunities for elite bargaining 
processes have also facilitated elite capture of the benefits of peace.  
 
42. Finally, peace processes themselves may have disruptive potential, inadvertently changing the 
underlying configurations and balance of power or generating legitimacy crises within the ruling 
regime. For example in Sri Lanka, the Norwegian brokered peace process shifted the balance of 
power in favour of Sinhalese nationalist elites and induced a split within the LTTE which 
transformed the military balance between the Sri Lanka military and LTTE. In South Sudan, the 
CPA shifted the balance of power and legitimacy to the SPLA and away from the SSDF. 
 
3.1.2 Institutions 
43. Although shifts in underlying structures can create incentives to end large-scale violent conflict 
and open up space for negotiations, the institutional framework in which elites operate is 
extremely important for understanding processes of elite bargaining and their varying 
trajectories. 
 
44. The cases span late-developing, low income countries (Afghanistan, Mali, DRC, Sierra Leone), 
middle income countries (Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Ethiopia, Colombia), and high income countries 
(Northern Ireland) and reveal huge diversity regarding the institutional arenas in which elites 
are located. This diversity operates along a number of different axes, including: the 
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effectiveness of the state – in terms of its territorial reach, its capacity to make and enforce 
decisions and its legitimacy; the nature of dispute-resolution mechanisms and the extent to 
which these are rule-based or deal-based mechanisms; the extent to which the mechanisms 
allocating benefits (such as political positions, land, business deals) are personalised or 
impersonal and are centralised or decentralised; the extent to which political, economic and 
judicial power are separated or vested in the same people/positions. 
 
45. Drawing upon the ‘limited access order’ framework discussed above (see: Section 2.2), the 
cases reveal quite different institutional frameworks that operate along a spectrum ranging 
from35: 
 
o ‘Fragile’ limited access orders – such as Afghanistan, South Sudan and Somalia - where 
state institutions are very weak and under-developed; the state is based on little more 
than the relationships forged between powerful elites; elites can mobilise violence easily 
through patron-client relationships; short timeframes before bargains are re-negotiated 
often through violence. 
 
o ‘Basic’ limited access orders – such as Ethiopia – where the state has a stronger 
institutional structure (e.g., there is a system of public law) allowing some bargains to be 
managed through these institutions (for example rules of succession). There is a greater 
set of shared beliefs and behaviour amongst elites although the distribution and 
contestation of resources remains personalised.  
 
o ‘Mature’ limited access orders such as Indonesia where state institutions are more 
durable and some function in consistent ways regardless of who is in charge; there is a 
clear system of public law and some private law; organisations independent of 
government control do exist but power continues to be shaped by the personal 
interaction between elites.  
 
46. Although this framework contains certain limitations – not least that the boundaries between 
these various types of regimes are often blurred and contested and that there may be distinct 
sub-national variations across state territory – it reveals the diversity of institutional 
environments across the cases. These variations play a key role in shaping elites’ room for 
manoeuvre, the relationship between competing elites and between elites and their followers, 
and their interests and incentives for stability. 
 
47. The cases reveal several mechanisms through which formal institutions shape elite behaviour 
and interests. First, the institutional arena influences how elites interact with the state and the 
extent to which they perceive their interests as best pursued through empowering or 
subverting formal state institutions. In some cases, elites have sought to preserve or strengthen 
their power through becoming embedded in the state. For example, in Malaysia, class and 
communal tensions and the wider context of the Cold War embodied a set of threats that 
encouraged various elite groups to forge a ‘protection pact’ that aimed to construct a strong 
authoritarian state with the capacity to manage these threats.36 In Tajikistan, the violent conflict 
that erupted after the collapse of the Soviet Union unfolded within a context of a relatively 
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strong and consolidated state, in which elites sought to wrestle control over state institutions 
and the benefits this offered. This can be contrasted with Afghanistan and Somalia where elites 
viewed state-building as a threat to their interests and pursued bargaining strategies designed 
to circumvent formal state institutions. In these cases of ‘fragile limited access orders’ elite 
strategies were aimed at intentionally keeping formal institutions weak since elites have viewed 
the institutionalisation of power as a threat to their interests and limiting their room for 
manoeuvre.  
 
48. Second, elite bargaining processes are also affected by the extent to which power-sharing is 
institutionalised in state structures and how far democratic processes, bureaucratic structures, 
legal frameworks and systems of checks and balances on executive power are embedded prior 
to the outbreak of violent conflict. In Sri Lanka and Nepal, for example, there had been 
experience prior to the war of elections, separation of powers, and some checks and balances 
on the executive; even though patronage politics continued in parallel, institutions still 
mattered. Elites are often astutely aware of the details of constitutional provisions, 
parliamentary procedures, institutional mandates and how the legal system operates, and these 
institutions shape the ‘rules of the game’ regarding how elites operate. In such cases it is 
important to understand where power is concentrated and how the location of elites within 
institutions shapes power dynamics. In highly centralised states, power may be concentrated in 
the President’s office rather than in Parliament. Or in more decentralised systems, there may be 
certain ‘power ministries’ such as interior, border affairs or finance where there are strong 
concentrations of power. In other cases power may oscillate between different government 
ministries or between the executive, legislature and judiciary.37 In contexts such as Afghanistan 
and Iraq where state structures and democratic process have remained to a large extent a 
façade, the locus of power tends to be located in parallel structures of non-formal authority.   
 
49. Third, the cases demonstrate significant variation in how institutions operate across a state. At 
least half of the cases reveal the specific challenges that borderland regions pose to the 
penetration and legitimacy of state institutions.38 Many are sites of institutional hybridity and 
legal pluralism, shaped by the fluctuating penetration of state institutions, pre-existing 
structures of non-state authority and the influence of cross-border political and economic 
networks and institutions. For example, in the Terai region of the Nepal-India border, elite 
loyalties are shaped as much by networks across the border as those linked to Kathmandu.  
 
50. The cases reveal that the ‘fit’ between institutions and the underlying political settlement is 
very important in shaping the potential for elite bargains to significantly reduce levels of 
violence. In cases such as Malaysia where there was a strong fit between the underlying 
political settlement and the institutional frameworks constructed to mediate societal conflicts 
in the aftermath of the Malayan emergency, stability was more durable (albeit in this case also 
authoritarian). However, in other cases, the disjuncture between formal institutions and the 
underlying political settlements has exacerbated instability and diminished the scope for 
durable elite bargains. In Afghanistan, for example, the centralised presidential system is ill-
equipped to manage the country’s highly fragmented structures of authority. The country’s 
‘winner-takes-all’ electoral system has placed further pressure on the fragile agreements 
between the country’s elites by shortening the timeframes in which elite bargains need to be 
re-negotiated and creating sudden shocks that have destabilised the country’s fragile political 
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settlement. Afghanistan reveals clearly the difficult trade-offs surrounding elite bargaining 
processes and pressures on governments to pursue a good governance agenda of institutional 
reform. Efforts to promote democratisation, reduce corruption, strengthen judicial autonomy 
and tackle the country’s illicit drug economy have clashed with strategies deployed by the 
Afghan government to govern the country’s highly fragmented power structures because these 
reforms threaten to destabilise the system of rents upon which elite bargains are constructed.  
 
3.1.3 Agents: mapping and understanding elites 
51. Having set out the structures and institutions which shape the arenas in which elites operate, 
this section now concentrates on the elites themselves. As explained in Chapter 2, elites can be 
defined as those with significant power to make decisions and implement policies that affect 
wider populations.39 They may hold formal political positions and/or exercise control over 
informal structures of authority. Elites command constituencies – i.e. groups of followers – 
whose interests they claim to represent. The relationships between elites and their 
constituencies is an important determinant of elite authority; whether the relationship is built 
upon direct coercion, fear, active support or passive acquiescence will shape how far elites are 
able to make and enforce decisions independently or whether their position is dependent on 
delivering the demands of those they represent. Elites’ ability to pursue their interests is 
defined by their ‘holding power’, which refers to how long elites can hold out in conflict against 
the state or other elites in order to pursue their interests. Holding power may be founded upon 
organisational capacity, revenue, ideological power, legitimacy, the ability to mobilise and 
maintain support (domestically and internationally), the capacity to absorb costs inflicted by 
opponents and the capacity to inflict costs on others.40 
 
52. The cases reveal that the characteristics of elites and their foundations of power vary 
considerably. Elites may derive power through control over valuable resources and economies, 
which enable them to accumulate wealth, finance extensive patronage networks, mobilise 
violence and shape policies that protect their interests. In Guatemala political and economic 
power has long been concentrated in a narrow elite of large plantation owners or Finqueros. In 
South Sudan, the SPLA derived power through controlling humanitarian aid and then, after the 
CPA, controlling revenue from oil. Elite power may also be founded upon controlling key 
interfaces between the domestic and international levels, as in the case of national elites who 
mediate between the domestic and global economies and control inflows of investment and aid, 
or between the national and local levels, as in the case of peripheral elites who are able to 
broker how state institutions, businesses and NGOs gain access to territory they control. In 
Tajikistan, for example, regional elites have derived significant power from controlling strategic 
borderland territories and the trade routes that traverse them. Adjudicating over how 
resources are distributed and regulated (such as property rights, business licenses, government 
budgets, access to services) is another important source of power.41 In Indonesia the military 
has become a state within a state as a result of the legacies of war and military elites derive 
huge power and wealth from the allocation of on-budget and off-budget resources. In many 
cases during wartime, power is rooted in controlling the means of violence and the ability to 
wage war.  
 
                                                          
 
39
 Denney, L. & Barron, P. (2015). ‘Beyond the Toolkit: Supporting Peace Processes in Asia’, Working Politically in Practice 
Series, Case Study No.4, San Francisco: The Asia Foundation, p.2. 
40
 Khan, M. 2010. Political Settlements and the Governance of Growth-Enhancing Institutions. 
41
 Hickey, S. 2013. ‘Thinking about the politics of inclusive development: towards a relational approach’, ESID Working 
Paper No. 1. Manchester: ESID. 
 
 
24 
 
53. However, elite power is not only shaped by access to material resources; across the cases, other 
sources of authority linked to ideology, religion and identity are clearly significant. This includes; 
the role of religious and nationalist discourse in relation to Taliban mobilisation in Afghanistan; 
Somalian elites garnering support through clan loyalties and the threat posed by al-Shabaab; 
Eritrean elites use of the existential threat posed by neighbouring Ethiopia to build their 
legitimacy; the ability of the SPLA to gain ideological and ethnic support in Sudan and then to 
deliver as liberators the promise of Southern independence. Elites also operate at different 
levels. The focus of elite bargains and formal peace processes is often concentrated on national 
politics, which underplays the importance of transnational sources of power and the 
importance of subnational elites in shaping trajectories of violence and peace. Authority can 
also be derived from international support and legitimation. This may create a dual legitimacy 
problem for domestic elites; for example, the new SPLA-dominated Government of South 
Sudan focused on international opinion and gained its legitimacy through international support, 
leaving many South Sudanese feeling disenfranchised, insecure and with no space to express 
grievances against the SPLA. 
 
54. These various foundations of power (by no means exhaustive) are not mutually exclusive and 
may be interlinked in the sense that one source of power can help gain access to others sources. 
In Afghanistan and Tajikistan, for example, coercive power in wartime has translated into 
formal political power, which in turn has provided elites with opportunities to establish 
businesses. The cases show that the holding power of warring elites can be based on very 
different foundations. It may range from solid rural ‘support’42 (e.g., the FARC in Colombia), 
control over lucrative resources, cross-border trade (e.g., the RUF in Sierra Leone) or inflows of 
foreign aid (e.g., in Somalia), control over formal state institutions (such as Shia elites in Iraq 
and dominant castes in Nepal) and/or foreign backing (e.g., the M23 movement in the DRC).  
 
55. Patterns of elite authority are shaped by the ‘horizontal relationships’ between different elites 
and the ‘vertical relationships’ between elites and their constituencies. Although attention is 
often concentrated on the horizontal contests between competing elites, the vertical 
relationships between elites and their followers are extremely important in determining how 
elite behaviour impacts upon society as a whole. These relationships vary considerably across 
cases according to a range of factors: how strong is the authority and legitimacy of elites in the 
eyes of their followers? What norms and expectations govern elites’ relationships with their 
followers? Is their legitimacy widely accepted and strongly founded, or is it conditional upon 
delivering promises to followers and in constant need of legitimation? How much autonomy do 
elites have when negotiating? To what degree and under what circumstances do elites consult 
their constituents to ensure buy-in on bargains and pacts? How much power do elites have to 
convince their constituencies to accept deals they have made?   
 
56. This brief overview of the diversity of elites across the cases emphasises the need for 
contextually-attuned understandings of who an elite is, what shapes elite interests and 
behaviour, what determines relationships and hierarchies between different elites and between 
elites and their followers, and how such relationships change over time. They demonstrate that 
elite behaviour is shaped by the context-specific histories of state formation and state capacity, 
institutional governance structures, cultures, resource endowments and regional 
neighbourhoods that elites operate within.  
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57. At the same time the cases reveal the significance of elite agency, particularly during moments 
of rupture – including peace processes, or contingent events such as natural disasters (the 
tsunami in Aceh and Sri Lanka or the earthquake in Nepal) or external shocks (the end of Soviet 
funding in Tajikistan, shifts in commodity prices, such as gas in Aceh, drugs in Afghanistan, the 
Eritrean mining boom). The cases show many examples of transactional leadership, in which 
elites compete and collaborate according to the existing rules of the game and a few rarer cases 
of transformational leadership where individuals have attempted to capitalise on structural 
shifts or moments of rupture to transcend or transform the rules of the game and then re-
define the scope for what can be negotiated, such as Santos’s leadership of the Colombian 
peace process.   
 
58. A number of the cases – Colombia, Northern Ireland, Malaysia, Philippines and Tajikistan – 
reveal the significant role that leaders can play in managing tensions and factional interests 
within the organisations they represent and also in establishing a narrative around negotiations 
that is palatable to all sides and can enable elites to ‘sell’ negotiations to their supporters. There 
are also instances where elites played a role in derailing bargaining processes. In some cases, 
such as in Mozambique, this resulted from the challenges (or transition costs) that leaders faced 
in making the transition from fighters to negotiators. In other cases, incumbent elites actively 
resisted the implementation of peace agreements that diluted their powers – as for example in 
Nepal, in which central state elites reasserted their control during a prolonged period of 
transition, reversing many of the gains made as a result of the 2006 Comprehensive Peace 
Accord.   
 
59. In other cases, negotiations were derailed as a result of how elites used negotiations to shore 
up support or shift the balance of power within a conflict, especially in highly unstable contexts. 
For example, in the 1973 Paris Peace Accords during the Vietnam War, leaders on both sides 
sought to use the negotiations instrumentally. The North came to view the negotiations and 
temporary ceasefires as an opportunity to regroup and consolidate their military strength after 
the failure of earlier offensives, rather than to secure a more comprehensive bargain. The South 
Vietnamese government also looked to manipulate the negotiations, using the large-scale 
shipments of war material provided by the US – intended to placate the south Vietnamese 
leadership into accepting a deal – to launch offensives against Communist forces in the south. 
South Vietnam’s leader, Thiệu, also used the negotiations to call for early elections after the 
Paris Accords, aware that the North would try to defer elections until it had built a stronger 
grassroots administrative structure in the south, and could thus be portrayed as undemocratic. 
In Sudan, the CPA was used by both Government of Sudan and the SPLA to shore up their 
dominance of the north and south respectively and to exclude their rivals.  
 
60. The role of brokers comes out strongly in a number of cases, although typically this is an 
overlooked dynamic in shaping elite bargains, especially the interconnections between 
subnational, national and international actors and interests. Brokers are defined as ‘network 
specialists’ able to navigate across borders and between different political systems (such as 
between national-level politics and local politics, between different ethnic groups, and across 
international borders). The role of brokers becomes particularly salient in contexts where there 
is a misalignment between peace agreements and political settlements – this opens up points of 
friction and contestation, which create new spaces for brokerage. For example in Sri Lanka, the 
peace process generated new anxieties amongst important groups that were excluded including 
Muslims and nationalist groups from the south, which in turn facilitated the rise of southern 
politicians (including the Rajapaksas) and Muslim politicians and go-betweens. Brokers, as 
mediators between different levels of negotiations, can have an instrumental role in escalating 
or reducing violence – as for example with clan leaders in Somalia or tribal elites in Helmand; 
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violence may be deployed as a way of extracting concessions from the state, ‘unsettling’ 
political settlements or shifting the dynamics of elite bargaining. 
 
3.2 Elite bargains in the context of war to peace transitions 
61. The interplay between structure, institutions and agency shapes the spaces for, and the 
dynamics of elite bargaining, and variations in these dynamics lead to different pathways out of 
conflict. The cases reveal three particularly important characteristics of elite bargaining: (1) the 
types of violence surrounding processes of elite bargaining; (2) how resources/rents are 
allocated between elites; and (3) who is included and excluded from elite bargains. 
 
3.2.1 Levels of violence 
62. This report is interested specifically in violence that immediately precedes or follows a peace 
agreement and how this violence relates to the processes of elite bargaining surrounding these 
agreements. At these critical junctures – or moments of rupture – the cases reveal three broad 
forms of violence: competitive, embedded and permissive.  
 
Competitive violence 
63. Competitive violence refers to violence that is deployed to contest the distribution of resources 
and power. Since formal mechanisms for mediating social conflict and for redressing grievances 
(such as the rule of law, democracy) are weak in fragile and conflict-affected states, violence 
can become a mechanism through which elites attempt to renegotiate the existing political 
settlement. This kind of violence may be deployed prior to or during negotiations in order to 
strengthen elites’ bargaining position, or it may occur in the aftermath of an agreement that is 
adjudged by certain elites to have failed to fulfil their interests and expectations.   
 
64. Competitive violence often encompasses large-scale violence and can be divided into two 
related forms:  
  
o ‘conservative’ competitive violence, which is deployed by those looking to preserve 
their existing position and power. It represents the use of violence by those in power 
against those excluded from power in order to prevent their entry into the system. The 
Tajik state’s violent dismantling of autonomous centres of power following the 1997 
peace agreements offers a clear example.  
 
o ‘transformative’ competitive violence, which is initiated by those aiming to renegotiate 
the ‘terms’ (i.e., the distribution of economic, political and social benefits) of the existing 
political settlement. This may be violence deployed by actors excluded from existing 
negotiations or by actors within these negotiations that are looking to renegotiate their 
position and power. This kind of violence may be deployed by actors with a relatively 
limited aim to improve their position and power, or by actors aiming to fundamentally 
challenge the political settlement.   
 
65. Negotiating an elite bargain (or more commonly a set of interrelated elite bargains43) that is 
able to redistribute resources in a way that more accurately reflects the underlying distribution 
of power is commonly understood as the first step in stabilising competitive violence. This is in 
part because such processes are seen as a way to disincentivise violence as a mechanism to 
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enforce change. However, elite bargains do not necessarily bring an end to violence, even in 
cases where they stabilise violent conflict in the short term. Warring parties are not monolithic 
but typically contain different factions. Decisions over whether to enter into negotiations or to 
continue fighting is often a key fault-line, as shown in the cases of the IRA in Northern Ireland, 
the FARC in Colombia and the RUF in Sierra Leone. 
 
66. The failure of negotiations (either formal or informal) to secure an elite consensus, or even an 
informal set of elite bargains, may empower hardliners within warring parties by delegitimising 
those advocating negotiation and strengthening calls for more militant approaches. Therefore 
flawed negotiation processes, which lead to bargains secured in bad faith, may be more 
detrimental than no agreement. The cases reveal that the collapse of an elite bargain can do 
enormous damage to an actor’s credibility and legitimacy, and can provide the justification for a 
return to violence. For example, the original M23 soldiers who rebelled against the Congolese 
government in Eastern DRC in 2012-13 cited the failure to uphold the terms of an earlier deal as 
a key factor. Similarly, in Afghanistan, the failure to defend the Sangin Accord precipitated the 
return of Taliban control and insurgent violence, and undermined those commanders who had 
been advocating a deal. In Iraq, the failure of the US to uphold the terms of the Sunni 
Awakening set the scene for the subsequent phase of Sunni insurgency. 
 
67. Elite bargains may also be used instrumentally by warring parties – a continuation of war by 
other means – to escalate violence before then seeking the renegotiation of a political 
settlement after having become more dominant. For example in Sri Lanka the Rajapaksa 
government’s strategy was based on a series of elite bargains (including southern nationalist 
parties, India and China, but excluding the LTTE and Western countries), which enabled it to 
pursue the war more brutally and effectively. Though many other cases demonstrate this 
phenomenon on a lesser scale – how initial bargains were subsequently utilised to escalate 
conflict, but this preceded and indeed enabled the renegotiation of a political settlement, or the 
imposition of a victor’s peace. 
 
Embedded violence 
68. The examples above show how failed negotiations can lead to more violence. However, the 
cases also reveal how violence often continues even where elite bargains hold, with violence 
becoming embedded in how a political settlement works. The cases reveal how negotiations 
revolve not only around economic privileges (control over certain resources, import licences) or 
political privileges (government positions), but also around the ‘right’ to use violence. These 
‘violence rights’ determine who has the ‘right’ to enact violence, upon whom, for what reasons, 
and with what level of impunity.  
 
69. The cases reveal a number of reasons why this often occurs. In Guatemala the peace 
agreements forged in the mid-1990s were founded upon elite bargains that were highly 
exclusionary, concentrating wealth and opportunities in the hands of a small elite, with violence 
becoming a key mechanism of holding dissent in check. Violent strategies learnt and deployed 
in war became mechanisms for securing the unequal benefits of ‘peace-time’. This 
phenomenon is clearly evident in other cases such as Sri Lanka, where brutal counter-
insurgency tactics became an important part of post-conflict policing. This phenomenon has 
been exacerbated in certain cases such as Indonesia, where elite bargains have been based on 
giving certain elites impunity for wartime atrocities and preserving the size and powers of 
security forces. In Guatemala, although there were efforts as part of the peace deal to instigate 
Security Sector Reform (SSR), notably to establish a new police force, this had little success as 
the police and military were able to resist budget cuts and reforms. 
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70. Greater stability may also open up former conflict-affected regions to forms of state power – 
especially militarisation – and resource extraction that are underpinned by new forms of 
‘peace-time’ violence. In many cases, the extraction of resources from former warzones has 
been developed through alliances between wartime adversaries, who collude to secure wealth 
and to discipline and control local populations. 
 
71. Embedded violence can also have highly gendered dynamics, as the use of gender and sexual 
violence as a means to terrorise and enforce control during wartime subsequently becomes 
embedded in the peace-time tactics deployed by security forces. In Guatemala – a case 
remarkable for the fact that levels of violent deaths were higher in the years after the end of 
the war than during it – violence enacted by the police and the army was justified through 
narratives of continued insecurity and the need to police a general culture of violence. However, 
this disguised the ways in which such violence was used to systematically target political 
opposition and to secure and enforce deeply inequitable forms of wealth accumulation (often 
based on the alliances forced between security forces and organised crime). The same tactics of 
rape, torture and disappearances ubiquitous during the war became embedded in the 
foundation of post-war order.44       
 
Permissive violence 
72. The cases also reveal instances of violence that result from the state’s inability to monopolise 
control over violence, but that are neither directly aimed at contesting the political settlement 
(competitive violence) nor integral to how a political settlement stabilises (embedded violence). 
Violence occurs because the state is unable or unwilling to monopolise control over violence 
and has instead made selective decisions about how and where to allocate the limited coercive 
resources at its disposal. This creates opportunities for ‘permissive’ violence in the sense that a 
government ‘permits’ certain types of violence to happen in certain places because it has 
chosen to focus its limited coercive resources (i.e., police and military deployment) elsewhere. 
As well as including violence that is not aimed at destabilising the over-arching political 
settlement it may also encompass forms of criminal activity in which violence is a key 
component. Indeed, violent criminal actors may have a vested interest in upholding the status 
quo since it is within this system that they are able to operate. Stability may strengthen criminal 
organisations by creating a more secure and predictable environment within which to operate 
and/or by increasing recruits from former armed groups. For example, in Colombia the 
demobilisation of government-backed anti-insurgency paramilitary groups between 2003 and 
2006, known as the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), led to a reorganisation of criminal 
groups. Today, many of the country’s so-called ‘criminal bands’ have their roots in the AUC and 
some are large-scale drug traffickers, collect protection taxes and exert territorial control.   
 
73. These various types of violence are often closely interlinked and can mutate over time. Groups 
that accumulate power and wealth through forms of permissive violence may then look to 
challenge the state to demand greater inclusion into formal structures of power. The 
distinctions between forms of embedded and permissive violence may be particularly opaque. 
In Guatemala alliances between the police, military and criminal groups emerged in the late 
1990s after the end of the country’s long-running war. Violence, justified through narratives of 
insecurity, has been deployed by security forces as a result of partnerships between the 
traditional oligarchy and newly enriched elites – including entrepreneurs involved in criminal 
violence (especially drug-trafficking). However, the informality governing these agreements has 
                                                          
 
44
 McNeish, J. and López Rivera, O. (2012). “The Multiple Forms of Violence in Post-War Guatemala”, In: Suhrke, Astri and 
Mats Berdal (2012), The Peace In Between: Post-War Violence and Peacebuilding (London: Routledge). 
 
 
29 
 
made the ‘rules of the game’ surrounding these types of violence uncertain and volatile. It is 
unclear whether such violence is officially sanctioned - and has become embedded in the 
country’s political settlement – or is merely tolerated by the state. Governments may 
periodically seek to crack down on such forms of violence due to international pressure, efforts 
to improve their legitimacy, or fears of the growing power of potential competitors.  
   
Borderlands as sites of protracted violence 
74. Across the cases the significance of borderlands in shaping the dynamics of violence comes out 
strongly, whether in the cases of cross-border conflicts (Ethiopia-Eritrea, Sudan-South Sudan), 
subnational conflicts with strong trans-border dimensions (e.g. Nepal, Sri Lanka, Philippines) or 
in regionalised conflict systems in which cross-border dynamics are integral (e.g. DRC, 
Afghanistan, Tajikistan). This reflects a wider phenomenon, with borderland regions frequently 
cast as ‘black spots’ embodying zones of persistent violent conflict, unruliness and organised 
crime, and home to some of the world's most vulnerable and impoverished populations. 
 
75. In many cases, armed challenges to the existing political settlement have emerged from 
borderland regions. These regions frequently have a tradition of insurrection, and the 
acquiescence of borderland elites and populations cannot be guaranteed. Government efforts 
to incorporate borderlands are frequently predicated on suspending, rather than extending the 
rule of law; governance strategies in such zones diverge from idealised models of statecraft, 
resulting in borderland populations being subjected to exemplary violence and greater human 
rights abuses than citizens living at the centre. In Colombia and Afghanistan for example, the 
frontier regions have been subject to policies of indirect rule and violent policing through para-
military forces.   
 
76. In cases where border areas are resource rich or offer extensive economic opportunities (such 
as through trade), suspending the law and militarisation on national security grounds enable 
resources and wealth-generating opportunities to be secured through violence, and keeps 
resistance to highly inequitable forms of development in check. Post-war transitions often 
embody profound moments of rupture that enables the re-working of social relations; peace 
may ‘open up’ spaces for new actors to move into, and/or create competition over (the 
formalisation of) control of wartime economies. For example in Sri Lanka, the 2009 military 
victory opened up the frontier regions of the north and east to new economic opportunities, 
including tourism and fisheries, that went hand in hand with a military occupation and a 
counterinsurgency campaign. Across many of the cases, the primary aim of establishing order in 
borderland areas has been less about ending violence and more about (re)asserting who has 
the means to wield violence, for what purposes and with what authority/legitimacy. In 
Colombia, for example, the peace process and the disarmament of the FARC has been followed 
by renewed violence over control of land and resources in areas formerly controlled by the 
rebels.  
 
77. The cases also show that for those seeking to challenge state authority, borderlands confer a 
number of strategic and practical advantages, which enhance the disruptive potential of elites 
in these areas. Even relatively small armed groups can deploy competitive violence against the 
state in an attempt to renegotiate the terms of the existing political settlement. In many of the 
cases – notably Afghanistan, DRC, Sierra Leone – access to cross-border spaces provided armed 
groups with a means to resist and evade the state. Cross-border services, including medical 
services, education, and banking, can reduce the costs associated with fighting. Cross-border 
trade networks can also provide opposition groups with access to weapons, finance and 
information, whilst the presence of international borders typically prevents state authorities 
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from being able to directly curb activities beyond their boundaries. The RUF, for example 
established bases at the confluence of the border regions of Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea, 
an area that was inaccessible to state actors, as well as being a centre for alluvial diamond 
mining, and a key node in regional trade networks. 
 
78. A number of the cases also reveal how the challenges that states face in extending or 
consolidating authority in borderland regions can result in informal coalitions being forged 
between central government elites and local armed proxies, such as paramilitaries in Colombia. 
In such cases, elites from the centre are less interested in containing violence than franchising 
out the means of coercion to secure greater control over resources and populations. Forms of 
‘embedded violence’ are especially prevalent in the mechanisms through which elites seek to 
secure control in borderlands. Bargains struck between government elites and local armed 
proxies can also leave borderland populations vulnerable to forms of ‘permissive violence’ as 
the government turns a blind eye to the abuses conducted by local militias and paramilitaries to 
pursue their own private interests.  
 
79. Such violence can have distinctly gendered dynamics with borderlands becoming hyper-
masculinised environments that marginalise women’s voices and make forms of physical and 
sexual violence integral to these forms of ‘embedded’ and ‘permissive’ violence.  This was 
notably the case in Colombia’s frontier regions; there is a long history of state neglect and 
indirect rule, and during the war state protection afforded to paramilitaries enabled them to 
commit acts of violence – notably sexual and gender-based violence – on populations to further 
entrench their control over drug trafficking and to silence or punish dissenting voices from 
social activists, campesinos, and indigenous leaders.45  
 
80. A focus on borderland dynamics – often overlooked in state-based frameworks – offers 
important insights into understanding why these regions are prone to violence and instability.46 
Although borderland violence is often viewed as indicative of a lack of state penetration, in 
many cases such violence arises not from a lack of state presence but out of the tensions that 
commonly emerge between the logic of the nation-state – predicated on firm borders, single 
national identities – and dynamics in borderland areas where populations are more fluid and 
have multiple forms of loyalty and belonging. These tensions can make borderlands particularly 
difficult contexts in which to manage violence through building stable coalitions.  
 
Conclusions: Re-considering the relationship between violence and elite bargaining 
81. Violence may be a result of a political settlement breaking down, but may also become 
embedded in elite bargains and be integral to how a new political settlement operates. In such 
cases, processes of elite bargaining may stabilise ‘competitive violence’ but may be 
underpinned by forms of ‘embedded violence’ and allow certain forms of ‘permissive violence’. 
This warns against the assumption that negotiations to stabilise large-scale conflict will 
necessarily end violence and reveals that a stable political settlement may still expose 
populations to significant levels of violence. The signing of the Comprehensive Agreement on 
Bangsamoro (CAB) by the Philippines government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in 2014, 
may have brought an end to large scale competitive violence, but not to other forms of violence 
linked to a thriving shadow economy and long standing inter-communal and clan-based 
conflicts. In contrast to the kinds of institution-building envisioned by the good governance 
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agenda, institutions that develop in periods of transition – notably regarding property rights and 
the rule of law – may often be about disguising and taming violence and securing and 
legitimising forms of wealth and power accumulated through violence. 
 
3.2.2 Rent-sharing arrangements 
Introduction  
82. A second key dynamic of elite bargaining relates to how resources and rents are allocated 
between elites. As already outlined in Chapter 2, in many fragile and conflict-affected countries, 
the state does not command a monopoly over the means of violence and manipulating access 
to material resources can be an important mechanism upon which stability is founded.47 Elites 
with the capacity to challenge state authority can be provided with privileged access to material 
resources, so as to bind them into a stable coalition. The dynamics of rent-sharing 
arrangements varies across the cases and are shaped by the nature of resource endowments, 
their geographical dispersion and the institutional frameworks that govern access to and 
control over resources. This section analyses how variations in the material base over which 
elites compete and the nature of rent-sharing arrangements shape processes of elite bargaining. 
 
War economies and new elites 
83. Protracted armed conflict, as noted earlier, has transformative effects, the types and magnitude 
of which vary across the cases according to a range of factors including the duration, 
geographical spread, intensity and destructiveness of conflict, the capacity, reach and 
legitimacy of the state, the country’s resource endowments, level of development and 
demographic features. In long running, regional conflict systems – such as Somalia, Afghanistan, 
Mali, Sierra Leone, South Sudan and the DRC – where accumulation strategies depend on 
controlling key nodes and linkages to external markets and outside funders, the mechanisms 
through which elites mobilise resources to entrench their power are heavily dependent upon 
their ties with the global, rather than domestic, political and economic system, resulting in weak 
downward ties to their domestic support bases.48 In contrast, where rebel groups have 
depended to a greater extent on domestic support and local revenue generation and have 
invested in state-like structures – as in the cases of the Viet Cong, GAM in Aceh, the LTTE in Sri 
Lanka and the CPN(M) in Nepal – this may translate into a relatively loyal constituency, and an 
elite whose power depends in part on the provision of public resources and a level of vertical 
inclusion in the context of a war to peace transition.  
 
84. Shifts in control of key (internal and external) resources or sectors of the economy may tilt the 
balance of power in favour of a negotiated settlement (e.g., reduced gas revenues to GAM) or 
an outright victory (e.g., cutting of Rwandan support to M23). Or the promise of increased 
resources may incentivise elite negotiations – as for example in the failed Lomé Accord in Sierra 
Leone, which made significant concessions to the RUF and in South Sudan, where the SPLA 
gained access to the oil revenues by agreeing to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. In 
contrast, in Malaya, there was no formal peace agreement, but peace was forged by building 
elite economic and political inter-dependencies. 
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Peace agreements and rent sharing 
85. Peace agreements have increasingly included provisions that deal with the economic 
dimensions of conflict – often approached under the topic of ‘resource sharing’ – with the 
stated aim of generating a peace dividend, promoting inclusion and addressing economic 
grievances. These economic provisions are common to almost all the cases, but the 
operationalisation and impacts of these provisions vary greatly. 
 
86. Where the state commands a monopoly of violence and there are functioning state institutions, 
then elite bargains revolve primarily around access to formal political power, public funds and 
the provision of services to their constituencies. In Northern Ireland, there was a positive 
relationship between the peace agreement and economic reforms. Arguably, the promise of 
major infrastructure and investment programmes created further incentive for peace. 
 
87. In other functioning albeit less established democracies – such as Sri Lanka, Nepal, Philippines, 
Colombia – elite bargaining in the context of peace negotiations is strongly shaped by concerns 
over the control and provision of public resources and the mobilisation of societal support. 
Economic provisions can be deployed as a form of confidence building and normalisation, as for 
example with the Bangsamoro Transition Commission in the Philippines, which oversaw a quick 
impact socio-economic programme. Similarly, during the Sri Lankan peace process humanitarian 
assistance to the north and east was viewed as a vehicle for building trust between the two 
sides. In Aceh, negotiations around power sharing and regional autonomy were explicitly linked 
to fiscal policies, and shares of aid and gas revenues. In Sri Lanka, the 2002-08 peace process 
was explicitly linked to economic reforms which included trade liberalisation, cutting state 
subsidies and civil service reform – all of which adversely affected poor groups in the south and 
therefore undermined support for the peace process.  The elite bargain in this case was 
between a metropolitan, pro-western and pro-liberalisation political elite and a Colombo-based 
business community, alongside the Norwegians and key international donors. In Colombia on 
the other hand, there was a stronger and more broad-based domestic coalition for peace talks, 
which pitted the pro-reform and pro-talks urban elites against the traditional land-owning rural 
elites who resisted negotiations and concessions to FARC.    
 
88. In cases where the means of violence are fragmented, institutions are weak and efforts to forge 
stability are rooted in informal deals around political privileges and economic resources – as in 
Somalia, Sudan or Afghanistan – the public budget is largely a sideshow. The key to power is 
command of discretionary funds. In such contexts, as Alex de Waal notes, peace agreements 
can be understood less as formal legal texts than ‘rental agreements’ between political elites.49 
The 1997 Tajik peace agreement is a good example; underpinning the official settlement was a 
‘wicked deal’ in which elites divvied up control of the economy, and in particular access to rents 
generated by the drug economy. This resulted in a political settlement in which “warlords 
became the state”.50  In Colombia, in contrast to Tajikistan, the drug economy has been 
explicitly and formally linked to the peace agreement, including measures to transform the war 
economy into a peace economy through land reform and the provision of resources for 
alternative licit activities, although the extent to which these reforms will be implemented in 
Colombia remains questionable. In Afghanistan, there was a fundamental misalignment 
between the Bonn Agreement and the underlying political settlement. The peace agreement 
excluded the Taliban in spite of their coercive power and independent tax base, which was 
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linked to drugs and cross-border smuggling and resource flows from the Middle East.  The 
signing of a peace agreement may also trigger major infusions of international aid (as discussed 
further in Chapter 4), which raise the stakes and intensity of elite bargaining for control of aid 
flows.  
 
89. Therefore elite bargains can be understood as ‘provision pacts’51  held together by the 
distribution between elites of exclusive political privileges and economic opportunities (‘rents’), 
for example monopolies, import/export licenses. These rents provide the ‘glue’ that holds 
together fragile coalitions between elites by encouraging them to see the benefits of co-
operation rather than opposition to the state.52 The dynamics of these rent-sharing agreements 
varies according to their institutional and geographical setting and the characteristics of the 
resources. For example lootable and diffuse resources such as drugs in Afghanistan and alluvial 
diamonds in Sierra Leone are more difficult for state actors to monopolise and tax, commonly 
leading to ‘joint extraction’ agreements between state and non-state actors.53 In such cases, 
elite bargaining, mediated through brokers at the subnational level, may be pivotal to stability.  
The level of dependence on one particular resource heightens the stakes, intensity and 
deadliness of competition for its control – as for example in the case of oil in South Sudan, 
which amounts to its totality of exports and 60% of GDP; the shutdown of the oil flow in 2012 
deprived political elites of their main instrument for running the country, leading to the violent 
fragmentation of the political marketplace. 
 
90. ‘Provision pacts’ therefore provide incentives to manage violence, through the selective 
inclusion of key elites, i.e. those in possession of significant holding power. Yet holding power is 
not a fixed quality – where the means of violence are diffuse, and political relationships are 
volatile, the balance of power can change rapidly. Where elite time preferences are oriented 
towards the short term, no side is willing to credibly commit and defection is always a 
possibility. In post-2001 Afghanistan for example, regional strongmen perpetually hedge in their 
dealings with the central state – they make ‘spot bargains’ today in the expectation that they 
may be able to get a better deal tomorrow. Elections may, perversely, increase the incentives 
for short term predation as they can shorten the life cycles of elite bargaining and require large 
‘war chests’ of discretionary funding, which need to be recouped in the post-election period. 
 
91. Groups that do not have the capacity to engage in ‘competitive violence’ to challenge the 
national level political settlement may retain disruptive power. For example, in Afghanistan 
most of the top-level leaders of factions linked to the Northern Alliance were folded into the 
national or provincial government after the Bonn agreement, but mid- to low-level 
commanders were cut adrift by their former patrons, and with few opportunities in the licit 
economy, many found new niches within militias or the drug economy.    
 
92. Denying access to rents may be a vehicle for renegotiating a peace agreement. For example the 
blockade of the India-Nepal border was heavily supported by Madhesi political elites (with the 
tacit backing of India) in order to place pressure on central state elites by those opposed to 
parts of the country’s newly promulgated constitution, especially negotiations on federalism.  
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93. Indeed, many of the cases demonstrate how borderlands can create specific sets of dynamics 
around rent-sharing arrangements. Although borderland regions may be geographically 
peripheral, when viewed from state capitals, they are often linked into national and global 
networks of trade, capital and investment, and metropolitan centres are shaped by, or indeed 
dependent on, processes of resource extraction, territorial control and development in state 
margins. In Afghanistan and Tajikistan, for example, revenues generated from the drug 
economy have been invested in property markets in Kabul, Dushanbe, Dubai, and further afield.  
 
94. However, borderland regions often pose specific challenges to incumbent elites. This is because 
efforts to forge stability by establishing a ‘limited access order’ through manipulating economic 
opportunities is difficult in border regions because cross-border trade networks, potential 
investors, forms of patronage and access to alternative power centres break down the logic of 
limited access orders. Peripheral elites who control border crossings and trading corridors have 
a great deal of bargaining power – borrowing from de Waal, the costs of buying the loyalty of 
such actors is extremely high. These challenges are magnified in cases such as Afghanistan and 
Tajikistan where the power of borderland elites is based on illegal cross-border economies, 
which because of their diffuse, fugitive qualities and their illegality make it difficult for state 
actors to control or monopolise. Because of these features, borderland areas can become 
especially prone to protracted war cycles in which the state’s determination to secure borders 
(and the challenges it faces in doing so) lead to forms of state violence, which in turn 
encourages borderland elites to view the state with distrust and apprehension and maintain 
cross-border networks that further undermine the scope for a more stable limited access order 
to emerge.  
 
95. Power sharing and rent sharing agreements may create problematic legacies. First, peace 
agreements may reinforce the rules of the game and elite divisions forged in wartime. For 
example the Dayton Agreement recognised and entrenched the power of ethno-political 
entrepreneurs, as positions and resources were divvied up between the key ethnic groups.    
 
96. Second, they may increase the holding power of groups who block moves towards more 
inclusive political settlements. Military groups that emerge in the war may remain politically 
salient, even after losing access to the means of coercion; the legitimacy of leaders may be 
bound up with their ability to pay back their fighters for the sacrifices they have made in the 
war, as for example with Maoist cadres in Nepal or former ELF fighters in Eritrea.   
 
97. Third, though elite bargaining may create disincentives for violence by priming the patronage 
pump, in the longer term this may delegitimise political actors. The incorporation of the Maoists 
in Nepal into mainstream clientelist politics has diluted their political demands and damaged 
their credentials with their support base, contributing to a splintering of the movement.  Post-
war corruption may be stabilising in the short term but have long-term development costs 
leading to an ‘unproductive peace’. As noted in the previous section, there may be a shift from 
competitive to ‘embedded’ and ‘permissive’ violence, as seen in the growing levels of criminal 
violence in Colombia and Northern Ireland.  
 
Post-agreement stabilisation 
98. Stabilising violent conflict is typically viewed as an important first step towards improving levels 
of economic development and generating a peace dividend. Stability can reduce the disruption 
to national economies caused by war (e.g., the destruction of infrastructure, the use of revenue 
for military purposes rather than economic investment). Furthermore, forging more inclusive 
elite bargains, it is presumed, can ensure that economic decisions are not based on the 
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interests of a narrow set of elites (often focused on predation), but are founded upon a more 
broad-based “encompassing interest” in society that is likely to increase scope for improved 
welfare services, greater economic competition and more productive allocation of resources.54  
 
99. However, rent-sharing arrangements pose two major challenges to efforts at promoting more 
developmental or productive peace. First, the distribution of economic opportunities is based 
upon a political logic of how to minimise threats to the state, rather than a meritocratic logic of 
how such opportunities could be distributed to maximise economic growth or reduce poverty. 
Second, such arrangements may create a dominant coalition of elites that are aligned against 
democratisation, market liberalisation, and the rule of law because such reforms threaten to 
destabilise the system of rents upon which stability is built.  
 
Conclusion 
100. The case studies challenge the assumption that elite bargains will necessarily promote stability 
and economic development simultaneously and reveal the trade-offs that often exist between 
peace promotion, economic growth and equitable development. They show that stability is 
often predicated upon rent sharing arrangements that are very problematic in terms of 
providing foundations for other policy goals such as economic growth, poverty reduction and 
good governance. Thus, the evidence warns against the assumption that ‘all good things come 
together’ and reveal that very significant trade-offs may exist between different policy goals of 
stabilising violent conflict, promoting economic development and tackling illicit economies and 
organised crime.       
 
3.2.3 The politics of inclusion 
Introduction 
101. Many armed conflicts are fought to contest forms of exclusion. In Nepal and Sri Lanka the 
Maoists and the LTTE mobilised around a narrative of grievances linked to state-based exclusion. 
In these contexts – and many others including Mali, Indonesia (Aceh), the Philippines, Sudan – 
rebel groups emerged as a direct challenge to the centralised power of metropolitan elites. 
Issues of inclusion and exclusion have thus become a major policy concern surrounding how to 
stabilise violent conflict and to promote more developmental political settlements.55  The 
extent to which elite bargains accommodate competing elite interests is understood as a key 
determinant of their durability, and policymakers have explicitly aimed to use peace 
negotiations as “windows of opportunity” to promote “inclusive politics” designed to forge new 
political settlements that address the interests of vulnerable and marginalised groups.56 
However, the scope for reaching more inclusive political settlements is shaped by the nature of 
the conflict – i.e. what is being fought over – and the tensions that often exist between elite 
inclusion and broader social inclusion. This section assesses the patterns of inclusion and 
exclusion surrounding processes of elite bargaining (and how these change over time) in order 
to analyse the impact that elite bargaining has on reducing levels of violence and providing the 
foundations for sustained peacebuilding. It emphasises the importance of analysing what are 
the interests over which struggles for inclusion are fought (i.e. the type of conflict), who is 
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included in elite bargains, and how competing interests are included. It also emphasises the 
importance of analysing both ‘horizontal inclusion’ between elites and ‘vertical inclusion’ 
between elites and wider society.  
 
The type of conflict: Divisible and indivisible conflicts 
102. The prospects for elite bargaining to establish the foundations for more stable and inclusive 
political settlements are shaped by the types of interests over which conflict is fought. Broadly, 
conflicts can be understood as ‘divisible’ or ‘indivisible’ in nature.57 ‘Divisible’ conflicts are those 
where competing interests and grievances revolve around contestation over access to 
resources, political rights and rent-sharing arrangements. Tajikistan’s civil war between 1992 
and 1997, for example, was fought over a set of ‘divisible’ interests regarding the share of 
political and economic power and opportunities in the new post-Soviet Republic. In contrast, 
‘indivisible’ conflicts are over territory, secession, or cultural politics where issues of ethnicity or 
identity have hardened into deep social divisions.58 In these conflicts, satisfying the interests of 
certain warring parties is not possible without directly excluding the interests of opposing 
groups. For example, demands for secession by the LTTE in Sri Lanka and in Aceh, and the ethnic 
conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina epitomise these kinds of indivisible conflicts. 
 
103. Divisible conflicts offer greater scope for negotiation and compromise and the emergence of 
political settlements that are more inclusive of competing interests. Furthermore, the fact that 
these kinds of conflicts are never finished – for example, there is always scope to renegotiate 
who is given access to natural resources or how the public budget is divided – creates a sense of 
impermanence that can open space for ongoing rounds  of negotiations and compromise rather 
than a return to war. The kinds of ‘provision pacts’ and ‘transactional’ elite bargains (outlined 
above) most common to efforts to stabilise violent conflict offer greater scope to negotiate 
forms of inclusion in ‘divisible’ conflicts. In contrast, it is much harder to accommodate the 
polarised interests characteristic of ‘indivisible’ conflicts through these kinds of transactional 
bargaining processes.  
 
104. Although rent-sharing arrangements have often been deployed in an attempt to stabilise 
indivisible conflicts, for example efforts to ‘buy-off’ secessionist groups or to accommodate 
polarised social groups through consociational political systems (see below), the scope for such 
bargains to hold is limited where underlying divisions remain unaddressed. This is especially the 
case where such rent-sharing arrangements have primarily focused on the ‘horizontal inclusion’ 
of elites and failed to address ‘vertical inclusion’ between elites and societal groups. In such 
cases, notably Bosnia and Herzegovina, efforts to forge ‘horizontal inclusion’ based on rent-
sharing arrangements have not been enough to bind elites into lasting stable coalitions where 
the constituencies of these elites (whose support they must maintain) continue to view their 
interests and grievances in zero-sum terms. In contrast, where the drivers of violent conflict 
shift over time away from indivisible to divisible claims, there may be more scope for elite 
bargains to pave the way for more durable inclusive political settlements. For example, in Aceh, 
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the gradual shift in the framing of grievances of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) away from a 
demand for outright secession to demands for greater political rights, the withdrawal of non-
Aceh government troops from the region, the right to establish local political parties and the 
division of resource revenue, marked a shift from an indivisible to a divisible conflict. This 
offered greater scope for negotiations to establish a political settlement viewed as inclusive 
enough for GAM without the need to satisfy demands for independence that would not be 
acceptable to the Indonesian government.    
 
Who is included?  
105. Many of the cases show that inclusion is an important factor in determining the feasibility of 
elite bargaining to reduce levels of violence. This is especially significant in contexts where there 
has been a history of previous attempts to negotiate deals that excluded (or were perceived to 
marginalise) key players. For example, the fact that the Northern Ireland peace process was 
largely inclusive of all major actors and constituencies was instrumental in leading to the Good 
Friday Agreement, in contrast to earlier peace processes that had failed because a major actor 
had been excluded. In Somalia, where there is great sensitivity surrounding the clan 
composition of any government or assembly, the so-called 4.5 formula – which assigns the 
country’s four major clans with equal representation and assigns half of the share of one major 
clan for what are termed minor clans – has become an important (though controversial and 
contested) foundation for a series of elite bargains. 
 
106. In political settlements analysis the notion of ‘inclusiveness’ tends to refer to whether powerful 
elites are included or excluded from a political settlement. Political settlements where elites 
with significant ‘holding power’ are excluded are likely to be unstable and prone to violence, 
whereas those that incorporate the interests of all powerful elites are likely to be stable – 
although not necessarily developmental. However, this emphasis on inclusion also creates 
certain tensions. The exclusion of certain unpalatable elites, such as organisations linked with 
terrorism, human rights abuses or crime – the Taliban in Afghanistan for example – may be 
deemed essential to delivering a more ‘developmental peace’ (e.g., promoting gender rights 
and equality and democratisation).  However, their exclusion may also make political 
settlements volatile and unstable since it means that the interests of powerful elites are not 
represented and it exacerbates the risk that bargains are misaligned with the underlying 
configuration of power. In other cases the exclusion of certain groups, such as al-Shabaab in 
Somalia, has served as an important unifying principle amongst other disparate elites. These 
contrasting examples emphasise the importance of a context-specific analysis of the 
relationship between inclusion, elite bargaining and instability.  
 
Horizontal and vertical inclusion 
107. The cases also reveal the need to consider inclusion along two axes: ‘horizontal inclusion’ 
between different elites and ‘vertical inclusion’ between elites and those that they represent. 
These relationships vary considerably across different contexts and play a definitive role in 
shaping processes of elite bargaining. 
 
108. Horizontal inclusion of powerful elites is often viewed as the most important mechanism 
through which to secure an initial reduction in levels of armed conflict. There is often the 
assumption that once a degree of stability is created, space will open for more concerted peace 
negotiations able to promote social inclusion. However, many cases warn against this perceived 
assumption. Even a peace agreement that is inclusive of all competing elites may very quickly 
prove unsustainable if it is impossible for elites to ‘sell’ these deals to the constituencies they 
represent and do not incorporate some form of ‘vertical inclusion’ that includes the interests of 
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these constituents. For example, the quick breakdown of the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement 
(DPA) signed by the Government of Sudan and one faction of the SPLA was partly attributable 
to the fact that pressure on elites to sign the agreement quickly under heavy international 
scrutiny resulted in a deal that became increasingly disconnected from realities on the ground 
and became impossible for elites to impose in the areas they governed.  
 
109. In some cases the stability of elite bargains is explicitly founded upon incentives/rents provided 
to elites that exploit less powerful groups in society. For example, in many cases the rent-
sharing arrangements that underpin elite bargaining have included large-scale land concessions 
– such as for mining, hydropower dams and export agriculture in Guatemala – that have 
dispossessed and impoverished smallholders. Such cases starkly reveal how the kinds of 
‘horizontal inclusion’ deployed to address competitive violence can embed violence in political 
settlements that works to exclude certain societal groups from the benefits of peace.  
 
110. In other cases, such as Nepal, an inclusive elite bargain has subsequently enabled certain elites 
to use their position within the political system to protect their historical ‘distributional 
advantages’ and to resist attempts to instigate a more inclusive political settlement, revealing 
the costs of inclusion.  
 
111. These dynamics are also often highly gendered. The prioritisation given to forms of horizontal 
elite inclusion invariably marginalises, or excludes entirely, the voices and interests of women. 
Where the interests of women and other marginalised groups are not an important factor in 
how elites mobilise support and maintain legitimacy, stabilising conflict through forms of 
horizontal inclusion are likely to (re-)entrench inequalities and conservative attitudes and 
reverse gains made during conflict (such as how wartime roles undertaken by women may have 
challenged the pre-conceptions underpinning pre-war gender relations and opened political 
space to challenge gender inequalities).   
 
How are competing interests included? The mode of inclusion  
112. It is widely understood that more inclusive elite bargains are more likely to stabilise armed 
conflict and to provide the foundation for sustainable political settlements by ensuring that all 
powerful elites develop vested interests in supporting the political and economic system rather 
than trying to challenge it. However, the relationship between inclusion/exclusion and stability 
is determined not only by who is included but also by how they are included. Importantly, the 
cases warn that formal institutional arrangements designed to promote inclusion (such as 
democracy or forms of power-sharing) can result in very different patterns of inclusion and 
exclusion.59 
  
113. As shown above, the cases reveal that bargaining processes are more commonly founded upon 
a sharing of spoils through what are effectively ‘pay-off deals’ or ‘provision pacts’. Deals that set 
out to promote political inclusion through political power-sharing and a shared political agenda, 
such as political ideology or a shared post-conflict national development agenda are less 
common. This appears to reflect the fact that ‘pay-off deals’ may be more palatable to states 
and may offer an easier mechanism through which to provide warring elites with tangible 
immediate benefits than attempts to address long-standing tensions over political ideologies, 
formal power-sharing and visions of development. 
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114. However, the cases reveal the trade-offs that often exist between securing stability in the short-
term and addressing longer-term drivers of violent conflict. They show that there is no 
guarantee that such ‘pay-off deals’ will develop into more comprehensive negotiations, but 
instead often leave underlying political grievances unaddressed. The failure to address such 
grievances can create in-built weaknesses in the foundations upon which stability is built and 
exacerbate the risk of war recurring. This is a finding corroborated in other studies on civil war 
recurrence.60 
 
115. In some cases, such as Iraq, Nepal, Bosnia and Northern Ireland, where negotiations have been 
founded upon mechanisms of formalised political power sharing, this has often been through 
forms of consociational politics, in which efforts to include a wider array of political actors have 
been mediated through a system which guarantees parties a certain degree of power and 
influence. This serves to alleviate the unpredictability created by entering into democratic 
politics and political power-sharing. Although these arrangements have provided a mechanism 
through which to initiate political power-sharing, and have insulated transitions to more open 
political systems from the risks of instability, this mode of inclusion has also served to 
institutionalise, politicise and entrench social divisions and political identities rather than 
overcome them. This has kept alive, and in some cases reinvigorated conflict fault-lines, rather 
than provide the foundations for a more developmental post-conflict transformation.  
 
116. Forms of exclusion are often central to the dynamics of conflict in borderland areas. Although 
there is often an assumption that such exclusion is driven by the marginalisation of border areas 
from centres of power, the cases reveal that borderland grievances – and the violent responses 
they inspire – are often driven as much by state encroachment as by state absence. Attempts to 
establish stronger state authority in borderland areas are not simply about extending state 
bureaucracies and service delivery but also entail dismantling pre-existing non-state structures 
of authority, and creating new client groups and new systems of exploitation and extraction. In 
Sri Lanka, for example, efforts by the state to extend control and to ‘integrate’ Tamil areas in 
the north and east of the country have involved the movement of Sinhalese populations into 
these regions and the re-allocation of land to these groups that are loyal to the state. Where 
efforts to integrate borderland areas are founded primarily upon ‘provision pacts’ and the co-
option of borderland elites (for example through resource concessions, political positions at the 
centre), the resulting horizontal inclusion generates heightened vertical exclusion, as 
borderland elites become more detached from their constituencies. For example the political 
demands of Madhesi politicians in Nepal for devolution and development in the Terai were, 
over time, blunted by their co-optation into Kathmandu-centred clientelist politics.  
 
Shifting trajectories of inclusion and exclusion 
117. As the cases clearly show, the politics of inclusion and exclusion are not static but shift over 
time, representing ongoing wars of manoeuvre around who is included and excluded. These 
shifts may be usefully mapped using the matrix presented below. It captures changing levels of 
horizontal inclusion between elites, and vertical inclusion between elites and the wider 
population. 
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Figure 3: Mapping horizontal and vertical inclusion 
 
118. This matrix reveals the different trajectories of post-war inclusion and exclusion across the 
cases. For example, in Tajikistan, elite bargains have become more exclusionary, marginalising 
certain elites and concentrating power in a process that has, unsurprisingly, failed to promote 
greater vertical inclusion. In Nepal, elite push back amidst the peace process has blunted the 
scope for the initial peace accords to deliver the promises of greater vertical inclusion outlined 
in the 2006 Comprehensive Peace Accord. In Guatemala, the peace process was linked to 
greater horizontal inclusion of elites – as the state’s support base broadened from its narrow 
base of military and plantation elites to include new economic elites (including criminal 
organisations) – although their inclusion has resulted in emerging political and economic 
structures (e.g., around land ownership, legal impunity) that have worsened the exclusion of 
marginalised groups.61 There are also cases, like Northern Ireland, defined more by their 
relative stasis in which forms of horizontal and vertical inclusion established during initial 
negotiations have endured and provided a foundation for stability but have shown little 
movement towards more substantial inclusion and integration of divided societies.  
 
Conclusion 
119. Challenging much of the ‘win-win’ rhetoric in current policy analysis, our analysis warns of the 
tensions and trade-offs that commonly exist between elite inclusion and broader social 
inclusion, and between patterns of inclusion that underpin stability and those required to 
support more socially inclusive post-war development. The findings from the cases, presented 
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in this section, demonstrate how the trade-offs that exist between inclusion, stability and 
developmental peace reveal the need for a more nuanced understanding of what is meant by 
inclusion and exclusion, and the huge challenges of supporting political settlements that are 
both stable and socially inclusive.  
 
3.3 Elite bargains and trajectories of post-war transition 
Varying trajectories: Return to violence, elite capture and developmental peace 
120. There is often the assumption that once a degree of stability has been created, space will open 
for more concerted peace negotiations which will offer a ‘window of opportunity’ to promote 
more ambitious goals – of democratisation, good governance reform, social inclusion and 
poverty alleviation – in order to create the foundations for a more developmental peace. 
However, the findings of this study warn against this perceived linearity of an elite bargain 
followed by a formal peace process culminating in a developmental political settlement. The 
cases reveal divergent outcomes of elite bargaining along three broad trajectories:  
 
1. Return to violence: Where elite bargains do not hold and there is a return to large-scale 
‘competitive violence’. The cases reveal a number of reasons – often interlinked – why there 
may be a return to violence: 
 
(i) The underlying distribution of power is highly volatile and in flux. This makes it very 
difficult to secure any kind of stable elite bargain (e.g., Vietnam, Afghanistan, South 
Sudan, Libya). 
 
(ii) Exclusion destabilises elite bargains. This includes cases where negotiations exclude 
powerful elites (horizontal exclusion) who resort to violence as a means to challenge 
their exclusion (e.g. Afghanistan, Mali), and also cases where elite bargains fail to 
incorporate sufficient ‘vertical inclusion’ of elites’ constituents, making it impossible for 
elites to ‘sell’ such deals to their followers (e.g., Sudan). 
 
(iii) Failed negotiations delegitimise those advocating a deal and empower hardliners 
within warring parties. This can strengthen calls for more militant approaches (e.g., 
Vietnam, DRC). 
 
(iv) Negotiations are used instrumentally. Certain warring parties use negotiations as an 
opportunity to strengthen their position in order to subsequently escalate violence in 
an attempt to secure total victory, or to strengthen their position prior to further 
rounds of negotiations (e.g., Sri Lanka). 
 
2. Elite capture: Where elite bargains hold and secure a reduction in large-scale ‘competitive 
violence’, but elites control the trajectory of transition, providing little scope for sustained 
developmental change. A subsequent peace agreement may be non-existent, superficial or 
not implemented. Elite capture is a very common phenomenon across the cases, although it 
varies along five dimensions: 
 
(i) Extent to which the stability of an elite bargain is dependent on elite capture: In 
some cases (e.g., Guatemala), the feasibility of elite bargains is directly dependent 
upon the fact that elites are able to capture the benefits of stability. Elites enter into 
negotiations with the explicit belief that stability will provide a stronger foundation 
for their interests than war. This creates elite support for a transition from a ‘war 
cycle’ to a ‘peace cycle’. In other cases, elites’ ability to capture the benefits of the 
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peace appears to have been less a pre-condition of a deal and more a result of elites’ 
subsequent ability to use an elite bargain to secure their interests (e.g. Tajikistan). 
 
(ii) Levels of violence: In some contexts, significant levels of violence have been 
embedded within elite bargains and have provided an important mechanism 
through which elites are able to secure the benefits of ‘peace’ (such as Guatemala, 
Mali). In such cases, elite bargains have stabilised large-scale armed conflict but 
have still exposed populations to significant levels of violence. In other cases, elites 
have proved able to secure their interests without recourse to violence, creating less 
violent forms of elite capture (e.g., Aceh). 
 
(iii) Levels of economic development: Elite capture can result in varying levels of 
economic development. In some cases the ‘pay-off deals’ upon which processes of 
elite bargaining are based have resulted in pervasive economic mismanagement and 
corruption, stunting levels of economic growth. However, in other cases, forms of 
elite capture have had a more ambiguous impact on economic development, for 
example incorporating illegal trade into national economies in ways that have 
stimulated economic growth (e.g., Tajikistan).  
 
(iv) Distributional outcomes: Elite capture is founded on the ability of elites to retain 
control over political processes and the distribution of resources (e.g. business 
opportunities, the state budget, legal protection to expropriate resources). This can 
result in highly exclusionary post-war political settlements in which wealth and 
opportunities are concentrated in a narrow elite coalition. In other cases, the 
relationships between elites and their constituencies (which can be very large, such 
as groups of religious followers, inhabitants of large territories), and the need for 
elites to retain legitimacy amongst these constituencies can result in more 
distributional outcomes (often through patron-client relationships62), even though 
the mechanisms of power and distribution remain concentrated in the hands of 
elites. This emphasises the need to differentiate between processes and outcomes 
of elite capture and to acknowledge that even when elites capture political and 
economic processes, there can still be significant variation in levels of social 
exclusion.   
 
(v) Institutional settings: the autonomy of elites and hence the degree of elite capture 
varies according to the institutional setting. In fragile LAOs, where institutions are 
weak and easy to circumvent, total and predatory elite capture is more likely and 
indeed predictable (e.g. Afghanistan, South Sudan). On the other hand, in mature 
LAOs where there are more durable institutions and a clear system of public and 
private law, elites must act with greater restraint. There may be stronger incentives 
to deliver services to broader constituencies beyond narrow patron client lines. In 
such cases, elite capture is partial and kept in balance through the restraining 
influence of institutional and societal pressures (e.g. Aceh). This scenario may merge 
into a third more developmental pathway mapped out below. 
 
3. Developmental peace: Where an elite bargain holds and facilitates a move towards a more 
stable and inclusive political settlement, leading to longer-term developmental outcomes.  
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121. None of the cases offer a clear example of immediate post-conflict transitions to a 
developmental peace, warning against unrealistic expectations of transformational change to 
occur within short timeframes.  
 
122. What the cases do show is that the stronger the continuities between wartime and post-war 
power structures, the greater the likelihood there is of elite capture. Where the post-war 
transition embodies a more radical moment of rupture in which there is a significant departure 
from pre-war and war-time structures, the scope for a more developmental peace is greater. 
However, such transformational changes also run far greater risk of misalignment between the 
formal peace and the underlying political settlement, heightening the risk of instability and a 
return to large-scale violent conflict, such as in South Sudan.  
 
123. Shifts towards a more stable developmental peace in the initial post-conflict period may thus be 
less about initiating large-scale transformational outcomes – due to the risks this entails of 
creating a destabilising disjuncture between the formal peace and the underlying political 
settlement.  Rather they may be grounded more in instigating a series of evolving bargains that 
begin to shift the parameters of negotiations and work towards establishing the ‘doorstep 
conditions’ that may make more equitable and inclusive development possible. 
 
124. These doorstep conditions may revolve around extending the issues up for negotiation, the 
scope for what can be demanded, and expanding those whose interests are taken into 
consideration, while at the same time ensuring that the failure of negotiations does not entail 
the risk of renewed violence. Only a few of the cases demonstrate a gradual evolution from 
‘moderate’ elite capture to a developmental pathway. More of the cases show, less a process of 
‘transition’ than a steady state of ‘unsettlement’ in which there are exclusionary politics, a 
constant renegotiation of elite bargains and a perpetual deferral of institutional reforms that 
might lead to a more inclusive political settlement, all at the cost of limiting elites’ room for 
manoeuvre. Nothing is negotiated ‘once and for all’; the political settlement can be understood 
as a holding device – it is an agreement to disagree, to place constraints on violence and to 
maintain a foothold in ‘the game’ without credibly committing to an agreed new rules of the 
game. For instance in Nepal, political elites have engaged in protracted bargaining around, and 
perpetual deferral of, state reforms and transitional justice – because maintaining a state of 
unsettlement is preferable to either finding a solution that involves major compromises or a 
return to war. 
 
125. Many of the cases demonstrate processes of elite bargaining that straddle the line between 
forms of elite capture and scope for more sustained progressive change (for example, Nepal, 
Malaysia, Northern Ireland and Sierra Leone). In these cases, evolving bargaining processes 
appear to have facilitated a shift from straightforward ‘elite capture’ to the ‘capture of elites’. 
Although the interests of elites continue to dominate the political landscape, elites in these 
countries have become increasingly constrained and enmeshed within structures where power 
and legitimacy require wider societal support. This support is more robust when elites deliver 
economic growth, services and representation, rather than concentrating on their own 
enrichment or the exclusive pursuit of the interests of their constituents, and the resort to 
violence as a means of political contestation becomes less legitimate or feasible.63 
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126. The cases cover very different post-conflict scenarios in terms of the strength and capacity of 
the state, the strength of formal institutions and democratic practice, and the diversification of 
national economies, all of which shape the potential and pathways for these kinds of doorstep 
conditions to emerge. This re-emphasises the importance – outlined in Section 2 – of engaging 
with the structures and institutional frameworks within which processes of elite bargaining take 
place. 
 
127. Many of the cases also demonstrate multiple trajectories operating alongside each other in 
different areas of the same country. In a number of cases elite bargains have stabilised a 
political settlement at the national level but this has co-existed, or has even been dependent 
upon high levels of instability and violence in other regions of the country. This reveals the 
importance of moving beyond a focus on national-level bargaining processes in order to 
develop better understanding of how national, subnational and regional conflict dynamics and 
bargaining processes interact. It also demonstrates the difficulties, highlighted in other recent 
reports64, of how to engage with violent conflict in relatively ‘strong’ or resilient states where 
violence does not directly destabilise national politics. Addressing such violence may still be a 
high priority for international policymakers, either on humanitarian grounds or due to the spill-
over effects of such violence (refugees, transnational crime) onto neighbouring countries, and 
reveals the need to understand how and why the trajectories of processes of elite bargaining 
vary considerably within a single country. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
128. Drawing on case study material, this chapter has examined how the dynamics of elite 
bargaining shape the prospects for reduced levels of violent conflict and sustainable post-war 
transitions. This analysis reveals a number of key findings. First, it has demonstrated that 
patterns of elite authority and behaviour are shaped by the interplay of structures (such as 
social structures, resource endowments, patterns of development and global and regional 
contexts in which elites are operating), institutional frameworks (such as how the effectiveness 
of formal state institutions, the extent to which power is formalised in these institutions or 
operates through informal and personal institutions) and forms of elite agency (such as 
leadership, beliefs and ideology). It has shown how shifts in the interaction between these 
dynamics can open up or foreclose space for elite bargaining to reduce levels of violent conflict. 
The growing focus on the importance of elite dynamics has sometimes encouraged simplistic 
‘rational actor’ frameworks for analysing elite behaviour and the belief that elite calculations 
can be easily manipulated, for example by providing economic incentives for peace. This report 
warns against such approaches, emphasising the need for rigorous political economy analysis of 
the wider structural and institutional factors that shape and constrain elite behaviour, whilst 
also recognising that elites have agency and can influence events and structures, particularly 
during moments of rupture.  
 
129. Second, this chapter emphasises that in order to understand the impact of elite bargaining on 
conflict and peacebuilding, it is important to disaggregate forms of violence, engage with 
material interests and rent-sharing arrangements, and develop more nuanced understandings 
of patterns of inclusion and exclusion. Third, it warns against the idea of a linear war-to-peace 
transition and demonstrates that expectations of transformational change – from elite bargains 
to a formal peace process to a more inclusive political settlement – in short-frames are 
unrealistic. It warns that where elite bargains are misaligned with the underlying configuration 
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of power (for example when powerful elites are excluded), the risk of a return to violence is 
high. Even where elite bargains do hold, transitions are often underpinned by forms of elite 
capture of the benefits of peace. This reveals the complex and difficult tensions and trade-offs 
that exist between stabilising violent conflict and establishing the foundations for a more 
developmental post-conflict transition, and warns against the assumption of ‘win-win’ solutions 
in which all good things come together.  
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Chapter 4: The impact of external interventions on 
processes of elite bargaining 
 
4.1 Introduction 
130. In this chapter, we analyse the diverse types of interventions from across the cases in order to 
assess the impact that external actors have had on the processes and outcomes of elite 
bargaining. This chapter therefore addresses the project’s third core research question: How 
have external interventions impacted upon the instigation, durability and longer-term 
consequences of elite bargaining? In addressing this overarching question, the analysis 
presented here is also guided by two sub-questions:  
 
1) In countries experiencing large-scale armed violence, how have external interventions 
affected the degree of (mis)alignment between elite bargaining, formal peace agreements 
(where these occurred) and underlying political settlements? 
 
2) To what extent did external interventions contribute to (a) changes (reduction or escalation) 
in levels of large-scale armed violence? (b) a more stable and inclusive political settlement? 
 
131. The cases encompass a wide range of diplomatic, military, economic, and legal interventions 
operating across different geopolitical contexts, from the post-colonial and Cold War era, to the 
post-Cold War world and various post 9/11 conflicts. The cases also demonstrate significant 
variation in the magnitude and ambitions of interventions, ranging from wholesale regime 
change to limited forms of mediation and economic support for conflict resolution. They also 
cover interventions by a wide variety of external actors including: international organisations 
such as the UN, World Bank and NATO; regional and sub-regional actors, such as the Arab 
League, South Africa Development Committee (SADC), the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD) and neighbouring countries.  
 
132. This chapter is divided into three further sections. First, it briefly reiterates the paper’s 
analytical framework and explains how this will be applied in assessing the impact of external 
interventions on processes of elite bargaining. Second, it examines how different spheres of 
engagement (military, economic, political, legal/justice) have interacted with and shaped the 
dynamics of elite bargaining. These forms of engagement invariably operate alongside each 
other as part of multi-faceted interventions underpinned by a belief that these different strands 
are mutually reinforcing. Separating them out in our analysis is designed to reveal the logic that 
underpins different forms of intervention and to demonstrate the contradictions that are 
hidden between them and how they may work at cross-purposes. Third, this chapter explores 
how interventions impact upon the dynamics of elite bargaining (outlined in Chapter 3) and 
lead to three different pathways out of, or back into, large-scale armed violence. 
 
133. Two points of clarification are required at the outset of this chapter: first, the notion of 
‘external’ actors is a term used to denote those who position themselves as intervening from 
the outside in order to shift the incentives of those fighting. However, this term – which we use 
for simplicity – is not intended to disguise how such ‘external’ actors are embedded in the 
dynamics and power relations underpinning armed conflicts. Second, while the focus in this 
section is primarily on external actors’ efforts to stabilise violent conflict, some of the most 
important and influential external influences on conflict dynamics are not linked explicitly to 
this goal. These include international policies on structural adjustment, trade agreements and 
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migration, among many others. These issues are referenced briefly, but a discussion of their 
impact lies beyond the scope of this study.  
 
4.2 Framing external interventions 
134. The hypothesis underlying this report is that the interactions and (mis)alignments between 
political settlements, processes of elite bargaining and formal peace agreements are a critical 
factor in explaining whether and how wars are terminated and differing trajectories of post-war 
transition. As a starting point, this report warns against the assumption that formal, 
internationally-backed peace processes can necessarily stabilise large-scale armed violence and 
create the foundations for more inclusive and developmental pathways out of violent conflict. 
This assumption typically underemphasises the role of wider structural dynamics on the impact 
of interventions. Consequently, dominant analytical approaches treat conflict resolution efforts 
in isolation. Assessment is concentrated on the style, content and timing of interventions, 
leading to a focus on lesson learning exercises on how to design more effective ways of 
engaging in the future. 
 
135. In contrast, we emphasise the need to engage with how interventions shape and are shaped by 
the underlying configurations of power in order to understand why similar types of 
interventions can have very different impacts and legacies across cases. Rather than abstracting 
or internalising lessons from specific interventions (e.g. focusing solely on whether the timing or 
content of a deal was right) the point is to develop a relational approach that focuses on 
assessing the relationship between interventions and the wider power dynamics they interact 
with. 
 
136. Although policymakers have embraced political settlements analysis and have developed a 
greater focus on the pivotal role of elite power relations in shaping trajectories of violent 
conflict, there is a tendency to confine such conflict analysis to its internal dimensions. This has 
encouraged “the idea that political settlements are a ‘thing’ to be engaged with by external 
actors, [which] positions the external actor as outside the frame of analysis – a sort of deus ex 
machina that periodically leans in to tamper”.65 Perceiving intervening actors as external to the 
conflicts they are engaging with has meant that the focus of such interventions is typically on 
whether they can support formal negotiations and peace agreements between the warring 
parties. In contrast, we do not view interventions as an ‘external’ medicine to ‘internal’ 
problems. Rather, international actors and global power structures are instrumental to shaping 
the underlying distribution of power in conflict-affected countries and the structural and 
institutional context in which elites operate. The interests and actions of ‘external’ interveners 
are thus integral to the relationship between political settlements, elite bargaining and formal 
peace agreements. 
 
137. Our approach also emphasises the need to place at the centre of analysis the linkages between 
the political settlements of intervening powers and those of the countries in which they are 
intervening. We challenge the tendency to overlook how international interventions are rarely 
determined only, or even primarily by, assessments of the context with which they engage. 
Instead, we show how they are also shaped by domestic electoral considerations and the ways 
in which foreign interventions can be central to processes of elite bargaining within intervening 
countries. As Christine Bell notes, “the observation that ‘development is politics’, does not just 
point to the need for development actors to understand local political actors better, it points to 
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the fact that development actors will need to understand their own decisions as political and try 
to reconcile them with their normative commitments.”66  
 
138. This approach informs our analysis of external interventions in the remainder of the chapter in 
three ways. First, our analysis shows how elite decision-making is shaped by external influences, 
including flows of resources, ideas, and various political and economic pressures. Drawing upon 
the analysis presented in Section 3, we assess the role that international actors play in 
influencing the nature of rent-sharing arrangements, the dynamics of inclusion/exclusion, and 
the forms of violence surrounding elite bargaining. Second, we ‘turn the mirror inwards’ to 
explore the processes of elite bargaining that also take place within and between intervening 
actors. States, regional organisations, and international organisations are not monolithic but 
contain contradictory and at times competing interests that can also play a determining role in 
influencing the outcomes of an intervention. This emphasises the need for an explicit focus on 
the institutional interests, conflicts, and trade-offs that exist within and between external actors 
as they pursue multiple objectives when engaging in conflict areas. Third, we draw attention to 
how an intervener’s ability to influence the underlying political settlement is shaped by its 
evolving relationship with the conflict-affected country. This relationship changes over time due 
to structural shifts (such as post-colonialism, the transition to a post-Cold War world and 
emergence of the Global War on Terror). 
 
4.3 The impacts of external interventions 
4.3.1 Diplomatic and political interventions  
Introduction 
139. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a shift from more ‘traditional’ diplomatic 
approaches to increasingly complex and multi-dimensional interventions aimed at supporting 
more transformational forms of political change. This section explores the diversity of 
diplomatic and political interventions across the cases at three distinct stages of peace-making: 
(i) Bringing peace via peace processes and war termination; (ii) Crafting peace through peace 
agreements; and (iii) Consolidating peace by implementing and upholding a peace agreement. 
The overarching aim of political and diplomatic interventions has been to de-escalate violent 
armed conflict through dialogue and negotiation between warring parties.  
 
140. In this section we explore how political and diplomatic interventions impact upon elite 
behaviour and bargaining processes in highly volatile, conflict-affected contexts. Specifically, we 
examine the extent to which interventions have (de)stabilised fragile political settlements by 
facilitating or undermining transitions to non-violent mechanisms for addressing social conflict. 
We also assess the extent to which peace agreements have created greater political space for 
more developmental outcomes, or, conversely, whether interventions have exacerbated the 
misalignment between formal peace agreements and underlying configurations of power, 
destabilising political settlements.  
 
141. The cases demonstrate a wide range of diplomatic and political approaches involving a diversity 
of external actors. These include deliberate actions taken by external actors to encourage 
warring factions to negotiate. From the cases, these mechanisms have included: third-party 
mediation, as with American diplomacy in Bosnia; local mediation, as with the Sangin Accord in 
Afghanistan and the ‘Rencontres Communautaires in Mali; initiating dialogue, as with the 
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International Contact Group in the Philippines’ Bangsamoro Process; assisting with capacity 
building for mediation, as when Sant’ Egidio worked with RENAMO in Mozambique; shuttle 
diplomacy, as deployed by George Mitchell in Northern Ireland when the two parties refused to 
speak to each other; changing international rhetoric to make it easier for governments to begin 
negotiating, as with labelling Colombia’s FARC as terrorists; blocking particular actors or 
organisations from the table, as with Afghanistan’s Bonn Agreement; and acting as guarantors 
to peace processes, as when India served as guarantor in the Nepal peace process. It has also 
been the case that warring parties have strategically sought to manipulate an intervener in 
order to gain an advantage at the negotiating table, as with GAM in Aceh and the LTTE in Sri 
Lanka. 
 
Bringing peace: Peace processes and war termination 
142. In active armed conflicts, the logic of diplomatic and political interventions is to help overcome 
deficits of trust between warring parties and provide the expertise needed to support 
negotiations that will lead to political settlement that ends competitive violence. The cases 
show that interveners’ approaches to facilitating negotiations vary considerably. In some cases 
powerful states have used their leverage over warring elites to press for peace talks (for 
example US pressure in Guatemala and France’s role in Mali). In other cases, such as Norway’s 
mediation in Sri Lanka, more ‘disinterested’ interveners have played a facilitation or ‘weak’ 
mediation role in order to create a safe space for negotiations.  
 
143. The cases reveal both the importance of interventions in overcoming local deficits in 
commitment, coordination, and cooperation in order to support the mobilisation of peace 
processes, and the risks that such interventions play in undermining domestic elite bargaining 
processes and creating misalignment between formal peace agreements, elite bargains and the 
underlying political settlement.  
 
144. External actors may act as guarantors of the peace process, helping to build trust between 
opposing sides and confidence in the process. Where opposing parties are stuck in a security 
dilemma (such that neither side is willing to disarm for fear the other side will take advantage of 
a weakening in defences in order to deliver a military defeat), external actors can lower the cost 
of participating in the process by serving as guarantors. These can be understood as 
international ‘protection pacts’, enabling groups to participate in peace talks, but without 
risking military defeat in the event that talks break down or the peace agreement is not 
implemented. For example, in Nepal, India served as a guarantor to the peace process. In 
Guatemala, six ‘friendly country’ guarantors were assigned: Colombia, Mexico, Norway, Spain, 
Venezuela and the US. External actors also have a vital role to play as ‘trust proxies’. When 
warring parties cannot trust the opposition enough to even hold talks, friendly or ‘neutral’ 
parties can act as a bridge to the other side, particularly at the start of a peace process.  
 
145. However, the cases also demonstrate that external mediation is associated with specific risks 
and challenges; it can introduce further sets of interests, undermine the logic that underpins 
limited access orders, deepen divisions amongst and within external actors, and they are often 
instrumentalised by elites. 
 
146. First, the most common mediation strategy is to initiate and support top-down peace processes, 
where national negotiations are conducted only by the leaders of the warring parties. This 
imperative to get elites round the negotiating table is based on the assumption that the 
horizontal inclusion of elites is necessary to stabilise violent conflict. However, insufficient 
attention is paid to the potential trade-offs between horizontal and vertical exclusion. In Bosnia, 
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American power mediation helped bring an end to the conflict with the signing of the Dayton 
Accords, but this top down approach short-circuited elite bargaining processes, leading to a 
political settlement that further entrenched ethnic cleavages.  
 
147. External efforts to instigate peace talks are often presented as having little to lose in light of the 
alternative of continued armed violence. However, many of the cases demonstrate that 
diplomatic interventions are not politically costless and can destabilise conflicts further. Failed 
attempts by external actors to reach a political compromise when both sides are not ready to 
negotiate in good faith can scupper opportunities for future negotiations. Decisions over 
whether or not to engage in such talks can often be highly divisive within organisations with 
leaders taking significant reputational risks by getting involved. Failed talks can side-line more 
moderate voices and delegitimise future peace talks. Whereas some have argued that North 
Vietnam’s decision to use military means to seize control of the south after the failed Paris 
Peace Accords was pre-determined before the talks, this course of action was not inevitable, 
but appears to have also been linked to the failure of the peace talks, which side-lined ‘doves’ in 
the northern leadership and enabled ‘hawkish’ voices to come to the fore. Another perverse 
effect of ‘over-internationalisation’ is that domestic players may end up spending more time 
trying to capture the attention and resources of international actors rather than negotiating 
with each other. This was one of the criticisms of the Norwegian-brokered peace process in Sri 
Lanka, which largely avoided tackling core differences between the key protagonists in relation 
to state reform and secession. 
 
148. Second, the cases reveal that in some contexts, particularly Africa, there has been a shift 
towards more regional and subregional actors like the African Union and the South African 
Development Community (SADC) taking a lead role in conflict resolution and military 
intervention. A number of cases suggest that efforts to deploy diplomatic pressure on several 
fronts to create a regional ‘enabling environment’ for mediation may be more effective than 
using coercive power. In the case of the M23 in the DRC, SADC’s use of diplomatic pressure on 
Rwanda resulted in the end of Kagame’s support to the M23 rebels. Regional organisations and 
regional hegemons may be incentivised to bring stability to their conflict-affected neighbour, 
because they do not want the conflict to spill over into their own countries. They certainly have 
longer term ‘attention spans’ than western actors, and may also be more trusted, especially in 
regions where legacies of colonial rule and imperialism create antagonism and distrust towards 
global powers. In some cases regional actors have used their long-standing ties with warring 
parties to exert pressure on them to enter into peace negotiations. In Colombia, for example, 
both Venezuela and Cuba played an important role in acting as initial interlocutors between the 
FARC and the Colombian government. 
 
149. Yet regional hegemons and regional organisations often have long and complicated 
relationships with governments and opposition leaders in the region. These can solidify trust in 
some cases and undermine it in others. While regional actors may be better placed to 
understand local politics because of similarities in culture, traditions, and customs, this 
frequently means that they are more likely to become entangled in local politics. As discussed 
below, Ethiopia was willing to overthrow the Islamic Courts Union and destabilise Somalia, in 
part because of its longstanding relationship to Colonel Abdullah Yusuf, the head of the 
Transitional National Government at the time.67 Interventions through regional organisations — 
militarily or politically —can become a vehicle for regional hegemons to pursue their own 
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foreign policy goals. Hence, while high profile international interventions may appear initially to 
generate significant leverage, this often has a limited shelf life. In contrast, neighbouring 
countries or regional powers (such as India in Sri Lanka, Ethiopia and Kenya in Somalia) may not 
have the resources to initiate major political interventions to engineer peace but, for better or 
for worse, have sustained interest in the outcomes of transitions and greater staying power. 
 
150. Third, the cases show that external diplomatic interventions can inject further sets of interests 
that complicate elite bargaining processes and make it more difficult to reach a stable political 
settlement. This occurred with US political intervention in Somalia in 2006, after a coalition 
known as the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), backed by Eritrea and local business owners, 
successfully removed the Transitional Federal Government and took control over most of the 
country, including Mogadishu. Arguably, at the time, the ICU offered the best chance for 
political stability, but American interests in Somalia vetoed that possibility because the ICU was 
perceived to have links to al Qaeda. This overrode other priorities — including the need to end 
two decades of violence in Somalia, and ruled out political configurations that might have been 
stabilising. Subsequently, Ethiopia invaded and toppled the ICU, with the support of the US. A 
further example can be seen in various peace efforts in Mali that brought separatists and pro-
government militias to the table, but excluded groups antithetical to western interests because 
of their real or perceived links to terrorist groups.  
 
151. Decisions by interveners to engage are also inevitably shaped by domestic political 
considerations, which may exist in tension with, or work at cross-purposes to local bargaining 
dynamics. Domestic political settlements within intervening powers have had a major influence 
on interventions within conflict-affected countries. US decision-making around Vietnam and 
Afghanistan has been intimately shaped by domestic electoral considerations, leading to 
decisions to escalate the conflict or hold hasty elections. Similarly, the Indian government’s 
flawed intervention in Sri Lanka in 1987 was to a great extent impelled by the need to maintain 
its support in Tamil Nadu or face electoral defeat.   
 
152. Fourth, a striking commonality across the cases, is local elite instrumentalisation of external 
actors. As already noted, external actors are not neutral referees but active players in the 
political marketplace. Domestic elites view external players as potential force multipliers – 
providing coercive power, resources, and legitimacy – to be used to tilt the balance of power in 
their favour. Injections of external resources run the risk of increasing the volatility of elite 
bargaining and rent-sharing agreements as has been the case in Somalia (which has received 
vast amounts of international aid and where elites compete for access to it) in contrast to a 
relatively stable Somaliland (which receives hardly any international aid). The scope for elite 
instrumentalisation is particularly high in contexts where there are multiple external actors with 
different sets of interests and priorities. For example in Afghanistan after 2001, Hamid Karzai’s 
government would play off against each other international military forces, diplomats, donors 
from within and between different states. In Sri Lanka, the government drew on funding and 
support from India and China in order to stave off western international pressure during the 
final phase of the war.    
 
153. Unsurprisingly therefore, the cases show domestic elites have agency and cannot easily be bent 
to the will of external actors. When such instrumentalisation is recognised there tends to be a 
denial of responsibility on the part of international actors. In Sri Lanka, Norway responded to 
the failed peace process by laying the blame with the LTTE and the government, along with 
insufficient support for the peace process from other international actors. This tendency could 
also be observed in Afghanistan and Iraq. In these cases, ever-greater military, diplomatic, and 
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economic resources were deployed, rather than recognising that international intervention was 
in part perpetuating the very conflict it sought to end. 
 
Negotiating the peace - Peace agreements 
154. Peace negotiations and the signing of a peace agreement are often viewed as the pivotal 
moment in war to peace transitions. Interveners have thus sought to play a key role in 
influencing negotiations and in shaping the content of the final peace agreement. This approach 
is often founded on a problematic assumption that the post-war moment offers a ‘window of 
opportunity’ to push for radical change based on the belief that there will be limited elite 
resistance to reforms. Interveners have thus sought to use peace agreements as a mechanism 
through which to shift elite incentives by encouraging or pressurising them to agree to 
ambitious goals of democratisation, good governance reform, social inclusion and poverty 
alleviation. 
 
155. Peace agreements have come to be seen as the launching pad for ambitious transformational 
post-conflict change. First, the political framework of liberal democracy has gradually 
permeated almost all of the post-Cold War peace agreements. Out of the 33 post-Cold War 
peace agreements that are logged in the University of Notre Dame’s Peace Accord Matrix, 27 of 
these include the words ‘election’ and ‘democracy’.68 Second, since the end of the Cold War the 
core pillars of modern peace agreements have expanded far beyond issues of security and 
territory. Whereas peace agreements signed before 1989 used to resemble ‘security pacts’ — 
focused on de-escalating violence (e.g. the Paris Accords in Vietnam) — contemporary peace 
agreements are more likely to constitute ambitious and transformative ‘grand bargains’. For 
example, the Guatemalan and Colombian peace accords both demonstrated ambitions to re-
engineer the political settlement in ways that would address the root causes of their respective 
conflicts (e.g., land tenure, democratisation of the state). This trend can be linked to a structural 
shift at the end of the Cold War, with the apparent triumph of liberalism, the reworking of 
sovereignty and the decline of the super power veto, all creating a permissive space for greater 
international activism. This manifests itself in the well-documented rise of UN peacekeeping 
and peacebuilding operations and an apparently related trend that has seen more conflicts 
come to an end through negotiated settlements. 
 
156. In some cases, interveners have used their leverage to pressurise elites into embracing far-
reaching reforms. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the possibility of EU membership played a role in 
reshaping the country’s formal institutions, though elites consistently tried to undermine the 
substance of these reforms. In this case, the risk of a return to violence was somewhat 
mitigated by the fact that elites could continue to find workarounds that did not fundamentally 
alter the underlying settlement,69 and also because majorities within each of the Bosniak, Serb, 
and Croat communities recognised they shared a common interest in preserving a flawed but 
stable settlement. 
 
157. However, many of the cases show that external political or diplomatic interventions can lead to 
a fundamental misalignment between peace agreements, elite bargains and the underlying 
distribution of power. First, where heavy international pressure is brought to bear on elites to 
reach agreements, this can result in peace accords that do not reflect existing power dynamics, 
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leading to agreements that are impossible to implement in practice. The 2006 Darfur Peace 
Agreement (DPA) signed by the Government of Sudan and one faction of the SPLA was, on 
paper, a comprehensive deal containing provisions for wealth-sharing, power-sharing, political 
reform, victim compensation, security and reconciliation. However, this deal quickly broke 
down and was followed by further sustained outbreaks of violence. The failure of the DPA was 
partly a consequence of the deep historical, political and economic causes that proved difficult 
to resolve, and the deep-seated animosity between the warring parties. However, failure was 
also a consequence of the dynamics around the peace process. Mediators were constrained by 
the tight deadline imposed by the UN Security Council and increasingly became “arbitrators 
rather than facilitators”.70 Getting to a deal became a superficial process as negotiators “lost 
sight of the distinction between getting the parties to sign an agreement and obtaining their 
real commitment to its terms and implementation”.71  
  
158. Second, there is a significant risk that external diplomatic pressure can result in a ‘dual 
legitimacy trap’ where the demands that external actors place on elites (often embedded in 
formal peace agreements) are in tension with, or in contradiction to, the pressures elites face in 
maintaining their support bases. For example, in Afghanistan elites came under heavy pressure 
to reduce levels of illegal opium production in order to maintain the support and backing of 
international actors. However, opium bans generated widespread resentment from local 
populations whose livelihoods are dependent on cultivating the crop and thus weakened local 
and provincial elites whose positions were dependent on maintaining the support of local 
communities. Thus the opium bans undermined the very structures of authority that the 
government was reliant upon to extend its writ into the countryside.  
 
159. Third, the prioritisation given to formal peace agreements can also mean that ‘transactional’ 
elite bargains, which may be separate from the formal peace accord, fail to gain international 
support and legitimacy. For example, in Sudan the international community invested heavily in 
the 2005 CPA but not in the effective elite deal of the 2006 Juba Declaration. Therefore, the 
international community had less investment in making the 2006 deal work, despite the fact 
that this deal better resembled the distribution of power in South Sudan compared with the 
division of resources as outlined in the CPA that focused the resources in the hands of the SPLA 
through their dominance of the new Southern government. 
 
Consolidating the peace: Post-agreement implementation 
160. War recurrence in conflict-affected countries is a common phenomenon and external 
intervention is often viewed as an important mechanism for enforcing fragile peace agreements 
until the momentum for peace is self-sustaining. This has involved monitoring of, and financial 
support for, the implementation of peace agreements, for example support for conducting 
national elections and Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration programmes. 
 
161. The cases show that war to peace transitions do not follow a linear trajectory and that the 
reaching of a formal peace agreement does not necessarily create the momentum for more 
sustained post-war transformation. Indeed, where heavy international pressure played an 
instrumental role in the signing of a peace agreement, this is frequently followed by a strong 
elite push back during their implementation (and when international leverage wanes and the 
focus often dissipates). This means that ‘post’-war periods – even when they are founded upon 
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a clear peace agreement – can still be highly volatile and subject to continued forms of 
contestation that can lead to a return to violence.     
 
162. This helps to explain why, across many of the cases (e.g. Guatemala, Sierra Leone, DRC), peace 
agreements have tended not to be implemented in full. However, the reasons for this were 
different and had varying outcomes. In some cases, (e.g. Sudan) reneging on the terms of the 
deal has been a deliberate strategy by one faction or the other, as local elites sought 
opportunities to renegotiate and improve their position. In such cases, the recurrence of 
violence after external diplomatic pressure receded has often been interpreted as evidence of 
the need for greater mediation and third-party enforcement. However, the cases warn against 
the idea there is a technical or intervention failure or ‘gap’. In contrast, they indicate that the 
return to violence once external actors leave is often a consequence of the artificial nature of 
externally-driven peace agreements and the misalignment they create between formal 
structures for post-conflict transformation and the underlying political settlement.  
 
163. In other cases, powerful elites were able to resist the reforms set out in peace agreements, and 
international actors may face difficult trade-offs and dilemmas around upholding the terms of 
an agreement against the risk that doing so would generate instability. In Guatemala, for 
example, powerful military and economic elites – which retained significant control over the 
country’s political system and economy – were able to resist commitments to land reforms and 
transitional justice that were directly counter to their interests, and the US chose not to 
intervene.  
 
164. In other instances, the lack of sustained international pressure following a peace agreement 
may contribute to its unravelling. For example, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the 
soldiers who rebelled cited the failure to uphold the terms of the 2009 March 23 peace 
agreement as a key factor in their taking up arms again. In this case, external actors could have 
changed the trajectory of the conflict by bringing to bear early pressure on Rwandan president 
Paul Kagame, but chose not to do so. In Mozambique, RENAMO leaders blamed the failure to 
fully uphold the terms of the 1992 Rome peace accords on external actors as well as the 
FRELIMO government. Two decades later, RENAMO leader Afonso Dhlakama claimed that 
donors did not follow through sufficiently on their commitments to fund the agreement, even 
though substantial amounts of funding were provided. These benefits may have been unevenly 
divided, with the bulk going to FRELIMO supporters. In this case, external actors could have 
implemented more robust checks on how funds were distributed, and helped uphold the terms 
of the agreement. 
 
165. The scope for peace agreements to be implemented – and the role that interveners can play in 
supporting implementation – is also shaped by two other important factors: (1) the nature of 
the conflict and the issues that are being contested; (2) the nature and distribution of power at 
the end of a conflict. For example, international support for the implementation of the 2005 
Aceh peace agreement was aided by the fact that that the stakes upon which the Free Aceh 
Movement (GAM) were fighting shifted from outright secession and independence to demands 
for greater political rights, withdrawal of non-Aceh troops, the right to establish local political 
parties and the division of resource revenue. This marked a shift from an indivisible to a 
divisible conflict and created a context in which international intervention could play an 
important role in ensuring these conditions were upheld. In contrast, in cases where conflict 
remains over indivisible issues, getting to a peace agreement and then implementing it is 
extremely difficult. In Vietnam’s 1973 Paris Peace Accords, for example, indivisible conflict 
between north and south over the very nature of the future Vietnamese state made it 
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impossible to implement any kind of lasting peace agreement despite the fact that such an 
agreement suited the interests of the US, the Soviet Union and China at that time. 
 
166.  In cases where there have been concerted internationally-backed efforts to reach and then 
implement comprehensive peace agreements, the potential to realise such outcomes is shaped 
by the configurations of power left at the end of the conflict. In Colombia, for example, the 
implementation of the 2016 Peace Agreement faces huge challenges due to the highly 
fragmented political dynamics. At a national level this is reflected in the electoral competition 
between supporters of President Juan Manuel Santos and former president Álvaro Uribe. The 
rivalry between them is rooted directly in the nature and implementation of the peace 
agreement. The role of external actors in implementing the peace agreement has also been 
complicated by the fact that the demobilisation and disarmament of the FARC has created a 
more volatile and multipolar settlement in light of the prevalence of paramilitary organisations 
that are now contesting former FARC-controlled territory.  
 
167. Many of these cases highlight that policies set out in peace agreements – which have primarily 
revolved around supporting free market democracies – are often at odds with the logic that 
underpins limited access orders, making their implementation inherently destabilising. Electoral 
democracy, for example, is typically viewed as a rite of passage for post-conflict transitions, the 
timing of which is often set by external actors (often as a way of legitimising their exit strategy). 
However, attempts to introduce more open political competition through elections can shorten 
the shelf-life of elite bargains that underpin transitions by fragmenting and destabilising the 
kinds of ‘transactional’ agreements (such as the rent-sharing arrangements) upon which 
stability is founded in limited access orders. In many cases, pressure to implement such policies 
– and their timing – has been linked to domestic power struggles within intervening powers. For 
example, the timing of the Afghan elections post-2002 was tied to the timing of George W. 
Bush's presidential election in the US. 
 
Conclusions 
168. Diplomatic and political interventions are typically seen as a less risky and costly form of 
intervention. However, the cases show that diplomatic intervention is not costless. Tensions 
and trade-offs exist between the opportunities that interveners offer in terms of supporting 
negotiations versus the damage they may cause by blocking or distorting domestic bargaining 
processes and in further destabilising volatile power dynamics. Therefore the tendency of 
interveners to believe that ‘something must be done’ in the face of violent conflict – with 
diplomatic interventions often being the first step – needs to be counter-balanced by more 
rigorous analysis of how such interventions are likely to impact on existing power dynamics and 
elite behaviour.   
 
169. These issues relate to the broader theme that runs through the report of the tension between 
‘working with the grain’ of existing power structures versus efforts to promote more 
transformational post-war outcomes. Where political interventions are more conservative and 
aim primarily to facilitate negotiations, build confidence and trust in peace processes and 
address security dilemmas, elites may see this as an opportunity to perpetually avoid core 
points of contention, resulting in little scope for any kind of transformational change. In 
contrast, efforts to promote more ambitious and comprehensive peace agreements can push 
elites into positions they cannot sustain without external resources and support. The key 
challenge for diplomatic and political interventions is to find ways that create space for 
meaningful political dialogue and can support momentum for more developmental post-war 
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outcomes without pushing too hard against the existing political settlement and against the 
kinds of deal-based mechanisms upon which elite bargains are founded.    
 
4.3.2 Military and policing interventions 
Overview 
170. In this section, we examine the range of coercive measures deployed by external actors in order 
to: a) enforce or bring about an elite bargain; b) keep the peace in the context of peace talks or 
a peace accord; and c) support post-agreement consolidation. We explore how external 
military/security interventions impact upon and shape the political economy of violence in the 
context of stabilisation efforts. Specifically, we address: how interventions affect the balance of 
coercive power between elite groups; and the extent to which interventions have contributed 
to the monopolisation and bureaucratisation of coercive power and enhanced stability; or 
conversely, whether they have contributed to the fragmentation of the means of coercion, 
intensified elite competition, and undermined political settlements.   
 
171. Across the cases there is a wide spectrum of external ‘specialists in violence’ involved in 
different forms of ‘violence provision’/conflict management at different stages of a war-to-
peace transition; from governmental and inter-governmental military actors involved in war 
fighting and counterinsurgency operations (e.g., NATO forces in Afghanistan, US forces in Iraq 
and Vietnam) to ceasefire monitoring prior to a peace settlement (e.g., SLMM, Sri Lanka), to 
peacekeeping operations following an agreement (e.g., Sierra Leone, Mozambique, Nepal) to 
technical support, funding and training for SSR, DDR, policing reforms in the context of post-
agreement peace consolidation (e.g., Afghanistan, Northern Ireland, Colombia).   
 
172. Although the rationale for external military interventions varies from case to case, the broad 
assumption is that external support is necessary because the affected state is unable to manage 
its internal security. The deployment of external security providers can have various aims; 
undermining or augmenting the coercive capacity of targeted actors or groups to change the 
balance of power and clear a path for a negotiated peace agreement; to provide security 
guarantees so that armed groups have the confidence to engage in peace talks; to police the 
implementation of a peace agreement, provide protection to the civilian population and ensure 
the delivery of aid; to provide support and training for the restructuring of the security and 
justice sector to ensure a more stable and inclusive long term peace. Since these goals are 
usually pursued alongside other (economic, diplomatic, legal) policy measures, it is difficult to 
isolate and assess the impacts of military/policing instruments alone. 
 
173. As already highlighted, in the majority of case study countries, violence potential is diffuse or 
fragmented and it is managed by forging coalitions between powerful elites.  Stable political 
settlements are the result of the co-option of elites that have ‘holding power’ or the potential 
to destabilise the political settlement. The ‘disruption potential’72 of elites depends on access to 
the means of violence on a sufficient scale to challenge the terms and distribution of benefits of 
the prevailing political settlement. As already noted it is important to dis-entangle different 
types of violence that are characteristic of, and inherent to, limited access orders, and to 
understand how external military engagement may interact with them.  
 
174. External military interventions may have the effect of placing limits or constraints on certain 
types of violence observable in limited access orders. They can shift elite incentives away from 
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the deployment of violence to pursue their interests, or conversely they can have the opposite 
effect of intensifying and fragmenting the means of violence.  Elites will look to 
challenge/engage with external interventions as part of broader processes of bargaining and 
contestation. Although foreign security actors may see themselves as external and standing 
above the fray, they must be analysed as players in the ‘game’. When they engage in such 
environments (either by deploying violence themselves or by backing certain warring actors) 
they tend to invest heavily in drawing clear boundaries between themselves and the recipients 
of their support – by having separate chains of command, following differing operating 
procedures and codes of conduct, focusing on the technical dimension of the mission and 
having clear exit strategies. Military instruments are usually framed as short-term measures, 
deployed to enable a transition from violence back to politics. However, notwithstanding these 
efforts, as explored further below, military interveners inevitably get drawn into and embedded 
in the politics surrounding violence.  
 
Military intervention to enforce a peace agreement 
175. Here we are concerned with military interventions where there is no ‘peace’ to keep.  These 
include major troop deployments engaged in war-fighting and counterinsurgency, and/or 
airstrikes mounted to support client regimes (Malaya, Vietnam), or conversely to overthrow 
regimes that were viewed to be generating instability or supporting terrorism (Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Libya). Other external military interventions were deployed with the aim of creating more 
conducive conditions for a negotiated agreement and/or to address humanitarian crises 
including the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka, Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, 
UK intervention in Sierra Leone, UNPROFOR in Bosnia and the South African Development 
Community (SADC) Forces in relation to M23 in DRC. 
 
176. Drawing broad conclusions from such a diverse range of cases is difficult, but a number of 
observations can be made about the utility of external force and its impacts on the 
enforcement of a peace agreement and the underlying political settlement. The limits of foreign 
military intervention in creating the conditions for improved stability through a negotiated 
peace agreement underpinned by a new political settlement, comes out strongly. Few cases can 
be identified where successful peacebuilding outcomes can be attributed to the deployment of 
coercive measures. The most positive cases can be found where there was a supportive 
domestic coalition for strategic and limited military interventions, allied with timely diplomatic 
action, which together played a stabilising role and in some cases created a more permissive 
environment for peace negotiations.  For example UK intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000 
(Operation Palliser) changed the military balance of power, helped strengthen the UNAMSIL 
mission and paved the way for a DDR process. Another example is the role of SADC in relation 
to M23; the key to this intervention being the calibration between the deployment of force and 
the use of diplomatic and economic pressure on Rwanda, M23’s key backer. Arguably also the 
increased unity of military purpose amongst western nations created more propitious 
conditions for a negotiated settlement in Bosnia. The 2011 Sangin Accord hints at the potential 
for the calibration of diplomatic, military and economic measures to forge an elite bargain that 
was temporarily stabilising, yet in the absence of an overarching political settlement it soon 
broke down. This example, as well as the case of the ‘Awakening’ in Anbar Province in Iraq, 
shows that externally facilitated responses to insecurity, may appear to be successful in the 
short term, but can have deleterious consequences in the long term. 
 
177. The long-term costs of military intervention to effect regime change, comes out strongly in 
several of the cases. Interventions in Afghanistan, Libya and Iraq, overthrew regimes that were 
underpinned by exclusive but stable political settlements – in which there was limited 
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competitive violence, though high levels of embedded violence. Intervention had the effect of 
fragmenting the means of violence – in a sense democratising violence rights and reversing the 
regimes’ historical efforts – largely successful in the cases of Libya and Iraq - at monopolising 
the means of coercion. This led to a splintering of the political settlement, whilst efforts to forge 
a new ‘grand bargain’ were undercut by the forces (both domestic and regional) that were 
galvanised by military intervention – the multitude of specialists in violence who were no longer 
constrained by, or incentivised to mediate with, a domestic ruling coalition. 
 
178. Foreign military intervention – particularly when there is an extended troop presence – risks 
producing an escalatory dynamic and creating perverse incentives for further violence and 
closing down the political space for elite bargaining. The presence of large foreign troop 
deployments can become a systemic and central part of a volatile conflict system, around which 
vested interests develop for its continuation. It provides a mobilising anti-colonial narrative that 
can glue together violent entrepreneurs with quite different agendas – as for example the 
Taliban, al Qaeda, Hezbi Islami and the Haqqani network in Afghanistan. In addition, because of 
concerns about the safety of foreign troops (or simply because there are many more soldiers 
than civilians), there may be strong incentives to resort to kinetic force more readily than 
attempting political bargaining and negotiations. Furthermore, military intervention can be 
leveraged by domestic players to undermine their enemies, for example by claiming that one’s 
political opponents are ‘al-Qaeda’ so that they are arrested or killed by unwitting foreign troops.  
 
179. External military interventions can also become sources of rent and resources that can fuel the 
war economy. The logistics and contracting operations around the war efforts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan and the tendency for them to fuel corruption and provide part of the tax base for 
the insurgency has been well documented. Rather than addressing the ‘violence problem’, 
intervention may simply displace it – in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Libya and Mali, foreign 
interventions have pushed rebel groups into borderland regions which as noted earlier became 
neuralgia points in regional conflict systems. This in turn, increases the complexity of 
negotiations as neighbouring powers are drawn into, and have stakes in the conflict. In sum, a 
heavy military footprint may have the effect of dis-incentivising domestic elite bargaining that 
aims to forge a new political settlement. In effect international troops become the dominant 
ruling coalition and the bargaining game for domestic politico-military entrepreneurs becomes 
one of trying to negotiate ‘protection pacts’ and ‘provision pacts’ with the occupying force, 
rather than bargain with one another. Military intervention may have the effect of ‘freezing’ the 
war rather than ending it. 
 
180. Foreign military interventions ostensibly aiming to build peace are in a number of the cases 
mixed up with other policy goals including counter-insurgency (COIN) and counter terrorism (CT) 
objectives. Although it is beyond the scope of this study to examine in detail the effects of COIN 
and CT, both have significant impacts on the scope for stabilising elite bargains and peace 
agreements. COIN doctrine and practice, can perhaps be understood as an attempt to work 
with the grain of local political society and social structures. It runs in parallel to, and overlaps 
with, the ‘local turn’ in peacebuilding with its focus on engaging with ‘traditional’ security 
providers – such as paramount chiefdoms in Sierra Leone or tribal or clan structures in 
Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia. In the case of the Iraqi ‘Awakening’ strategy, in which a series of 
loose bargains between US forces and Sunni insurgents were forged, a temporary reduction in 
levels of violence was achieved, but ultimately these deals broke down because of a lack of 
support from Maliki and the central government. Similarly international forces’ support for 
tribal militias in Afghanistan failed to extend the footprint of the government and build stability 
at the local level. The Afghan government became increasingly critical of the practice because 
‘going local’ further fragmented the means of violence and authority; instead of addressing 
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security dilemmas it created new ones, acting as a disruptive and centrifugal force in the Afghan 
security market. Rather than creating stable interdependencies between centre and periphery, 
militia formation increased the autonomy and volatility of politico-military networks.73 In the 
Afghan political marketplace, such programmes inflated the costs, for central state elites, of 
buying the loyalty of peripheral elites.  Contrasting examples where COIN strategy appears to 
have been more successful on its own terms – in weakening the rebels prior to a peace 
settlement (as in Colombia) or military victory (as in Sri Lanka) - indicates that a key factor is the 
existence of a high capacity regime that understands the terrain, and that militias are operating 
within a broader security architecture. 
 
181. International military engagement was animated in several cases by counter terrorism goals, 
notably in Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Mali and Libya. Again the topic is too vast for an adequate 
treatment here, but a number of points that are salient to the question of elite bargaining can 
be highlighted; first, the logic of counter-terror and stabilisation may run in opposite directions. 
The label ‘terrorist’ creates strong boundaries between in-groups and out-groups, which may be 
inimical to, and undercut the pragmatism needed for building an inclusive peace process and 
political settlement – the cases of Al Shabaab and the Taliban being excluded from peace talks 
have already been noted. If strict counter-terror conditionalities had been applied in the 
Northern Ireland and Nepal peace processes then neither the IRA nor the Maoists would have 
been able to enter the talks. 
 
182.  Second, the means deployed to pursue the war on terror may undermine the potential to forge 
a new elite consensus. The war on terror has created new rent-seeking opportunities for 
politico-military entrepreneurs – international as well as local - who may have limited local 
legitimacy or accountability. The arming and deployment of local warlords, the use of 
inaccessible prisons and black sites, and the deployment of para-military structures, loosely 
coordinated intelligence agents and private security companies together constitute a network 
of actors that are frequently beyond the rule of law, and extremely resistant to efforts to forge 
a stable political settlement. Third, counter-terrorism measures can lead to ‘perverse 
internationalisation’, where rebel groups branded as terrorists are pushed into a closer 
relationships with transnational terrorist groups in order to gain access to resources and 
strengthen their bargaining position with the state, as happened with the Taliban in Afghanistan 
and Tuareg groups in Mali.  
 
183. Finally, as already intimated, ‘violence rights’ are extremely fragmented and diffuse in the 
international arena. Turning the political settlement framework inwards, it is clear that 
particularly in militarised and politicised international interventions, the problems of forging an 
elite political consensus based on an agreed rules of the game, is as much of a challenge in the 
international sphere as it is in conflict affected countries.  
 
Military Intervention to Keep the Peace 
184. A number of the cases have involved international peacekeeping forces – either to monitor 
ceasefires whilst peace talks are ongoing or to oversee the implementation of the terms of the 
peace agreement. They have varied in terms of their size, duration, coercive capacity and 
breadth of mandate. 
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185. In theory peacekeeping interventions have a limited shelf life; their purpose is to address 
security dilemmas, provide confidence, send clear signals to the conflicting parties, protect the 
civilian population and enable a transition to ‘local ownership’. In the Nepali case, these goals 
were to an extent achieved without the deployment of armed peacekeepers (which was 
resisted by India), but through unarmed civilian observers and a political office with a time 
bound UN mission that was supportive of, and responsive to the diplomatic process. This was 
complemented through aid programmes explicitly linked to the ‘inclusion agenda’ set out in the 
CPA. 
 
186. In other cases there have been significant contingents of peacekeepers deployed under the 
authority of the UN, NATO, regional organisations, regional powers or a ‘coalition of the willing’. 
The line between peacekeeping and war-fighting has been blurred in many of the cases – 
broadly, the greater the misalignment between the peace agreement and the underlying 
political settlement, the greater the potential for instability and more ‘robust’ peacekeeping – 
with Afghanistan being an emblematic case. Foreign peacekeepers may get drawn into 
confrontations and/or provoke an armed reaction, especially in non-consent based Peace 
keeping Operations (PKOs) – as happened with the IPKF in Sri Lanka, UNISOM in Somalia, 
MONUC in DRC, and NATO troops in Afghanistan.   
 
187. Second, a heavy military footprint risks creating perverse incentives. As noted above, kinetic 
force can become a substitute for diplomatic measures and local negotiation, and the military, 
who have the greatest manpower and resources, can easily overshadow and distort other areas 
of external intervention. Third, foreign forces and PKOs may work though finance, strengthen 
and legitimise armed proxies who may have limited authority and support in society, and in so 
doing create baleful legacies. Repeated interventions in Afghanistan, Somalia and DRC 
associated with large infusions of arms and aid contributed to the formation of a predatory 
military class that, in the absence of a cohesive ruling coalition, has a limited interest in ‘peace’.   
 
188. Fourth, in these cases of serial intervention, there is a seeming paradox; the presence of 
external peacekeepers may create perverse incentives that prevent the emergence of a stable 
political settlement, yet the sudden withdrawal of coercive power and resources leads to a new 
round of violence. This phenomenon is most problematic in cases where the level of external 
influence is higher – and so elites are focused on satisfying the demands of external actors 
rather than domestic support bases. In such cases, the pulling out of external military forces will 
create the greatest instability to the equilibrium that has underpinned a limited access order. 
Afghanistan and Somalia are the two most obvious examples in which foreign engagements 
have produced rentier states and rentier rebels that have developed strategies geared to 
capturing external flows of resources. And it is not only elites who benefit; there is a wider 
trickle down of resources to society at large in the form of employment, contracts, 
development projects and so forth. A sudden end to these income streams and benefits is likely 
to create shocks and incentives for bottom up violence. 
 
189. The recurrence of violence after peacekeeping forces leave has often been interpreted as 
evidence of the need for third-party enforcement (and the apparent effectiveness of such 
enforcement – i.e., ‘look what happens when external actors leave…’). Conversely, violence 
recurrence may in fact be the result of such interventions due to the way that their presence 
and then their departure destabilises the fragile stability of limited access orders – this is 
captured in Alex De Waal’s notion of ‘endless peacekeeping’.  
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Military intervention to consolidate the peace 
190. We are concerned here with interventions by security actors (state and non-state, military and 
civil), which aim to create a more secure environment for a post-war transition. These include 
efforts directed towards the ‘supply’ of security including accumulation, monopolisation and 
bureaucratisation of the means of violence (large-scale and small scale) – including SSR and DDR, 
train and equip programmes, police reforms – and efforts to strengthen the ‘demand’ for 
improved security including community policing, access to justice programmes, civil society 
oversight of the security sector and so forth. To an extent it is assumed that competitive 
violence has been dealt with through the peace agreement (though this is often not the case) 
and these interventions are about preventing it from reoccurring and to directly target 
embedded and permissive violence. 
 
191. SSR and DDR are at the core of the international template for a sustainable security transition. 
In theory they are meant to help bring about a gradual shift in elite bargaining from ‘deal-based’ 
to ‘rule-based’ mechanisms. In contexts where stabilisation is predicated on ‘deal-based’ 
mechanisms around the use of violence, the likelihood of stability enduring may be weaker 
because elites’ commitment to not deploying violence remains only as long as the deal stays in 
place. In contexts where there are moves to more impersonal, rules-based mechanisms around 
the use of violence, these may pave the way for greater stability as it provides stronger 
foundations for the containment of violence.  
 
192. Throughout the cases there is a tension or a trade-off between managing violence and 
transforming the structures of violence in order to achieve the ‘rules-based’ mechanisms 
described above. The management of violence has included more pragmatic strategies around 
engaging with ‘warlords’, forming militias, amnesties for rights abusers etc.  Attempts to 
transform violence have involved measures that aim to create new security architectures, 
linked to strengthening the state’s monopoly on the means of violence and to move towards 
greater democratic oversight of the armed forces and policing. However, such efforts have 
major ‘distributional effects’ – they grant the state the right to use violence but deny it to 
others. Such approaches are likely to be highly contested – particularly where the gap between 
the existing political settlement and the transformational goals of SSR is a large one – and 
therefore may entail more violence before the state’s monopoly on violence is realised (with no 
guarantee it will be). Therefore, whether efforts are directed at managing violence or 
consolidating the means of violence, both carry major tensions, risks and different timeframes. 
 
193. The holding power (the ability of elites to hold out in conflicts against the state or other elites) 
of the state militaries in post-war transitions comes out strongly across the cases, and this in 
turn shapes SSR and DDR processes as well as the political and socio-economic transitions. In 
Guatemala and Nepal, partly as a result of foreign funding and training during the war, the 
military expanded in size. Consequently, in the post-war period, the armed forces have become 
increasingly dominant and remain a crucial, and largely unaccountable, political force. In spite 
of internationally supported SSR and DDR programmes in both countries, such reforms have 
generally been a façade, leaving underlying configurations of power unchanged.  
 
194. Therefore elite bargaining surrounding SSR and DDR processes means that decisions about such 
programmes are never purely technical, but highly political. The question of DDR and the 
absorption of Maoists into the Nepali military structures became a key sticking point and 
threatened to destabilise the peace. India played a crucial role in mediating this dispute. This 
example hints at the complex and recurrent feedback loops between political settlements and 
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DDR processes. Rather than seeing DDR as the precondition for security, often the opposite may 
be the case, i.e. security is the precondition for an effective and sustainable DDR programme.  
 
195. It is also obvious that interventions in other spheres shape the security transition. For example, 
in Sierra Leone, there was a widely recognised failure to sufficiently grow the economy, create 
employment and tackle poverty, which held back efforts to re-integrate ex-combatants. 
Similarly, in Afghanistan the lack of investment in the agrarian economy meant that there were 
few opportunities in the licit economy to absorb former fighters.  The failure of the economic 
transition to keep pace with and support the security transition may account for the growth of 
permissive violence in many post-war societies – as for example with growing criminal violence 
in post accord Guatemala and Colombia. 
 
196. The growth of permissive violence can be linked to the inadvertent effects of external 
interventions during the war, or to post peace agreement efforts that aim to combat criminal 
economies. Military and policing interventions may unsettle and rebalance violence rights in 
regions where organised crime interests dominate – for example narco-trafficking in Colombia, 
Afghanistan, Guatemala and Tajikistan. In some cases, military intervention was set up to 
deliberately disrupt narco-trafficking patterns. Plan Colombia sought to reduce the FARC’s 
financial resources and local influence, and required a substantial strengthening of the 
Colombian military. This intervention changed the national political settlement, creating the 
conditions that induced the FARC and the government to negotiate. But there were also 
downstream effects as local and regional political settlements were undone, including those 
that incorporated the interests of organised crime and narco-traffickers. In some cases, FARC 
splintered internally over control of narco-trafficking routes; in other cases, FARC fought the 
ELN, or joined the ELN; in other cases still, criminal gangs sought to take control. Military 
intervention reshaped violence rights at the national level but also unsettled and fragmented 
political power at the local level.      
 
Conclusions 
197. Although the cases are too narrow and unrepresentative to draw wider conclusions, it is 
noticeable that in the majority of African cases, there has been a heavy international military 
footprint, whilst this has rarely been the case in Asia and Latin America. From the cases, Asian 
and Latin American powers that have engaged in the conflict-affected countries have tended to 
adopt a different approach to stabilisation than western powers. There is a stronger rhetorical 
insistence on sovereignty, a prioritisation of diplomacy over coercion and a strong preference 
for establishing or working with a ruling coalition that is powerful but exclusive, rather than 
weak but inclusive. 
 
198. The cases highlight that notwithstanding the potential for external military actors to stabilise 
large-scale armed conflicts, they always bring their own forms of disruption. This suggests that 
approaching violent conflicts through a fixation on wartime violence can lead to an assumption 
that any intervention is worth trying given that the priority is to stop the violence. This leads to 
a tendency to conceptualise interventions as entering into a vacuum where anything to try to 
stop the violence is better than doing nothing. This also leads to the danger of deploying 
violence as a ‘first resort’ and as an alternative to, rather than a support for, diplomatic and 
political measures. From Vietnam, to Somalia, to Afghanistan, the dangers of creating a new 
infrastructure of violence and honing combat effectiveness in the absence of a political strategy 
comes out clearly. Highly invasive military engagements tend to crowd out local capacities and 
foster dependent relations, and are deeply destabilising when withdrawal takes place. 
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199. Therefore, approaching violent conflict by focusing narrowly on the violence and the need to 
‘do something’ about it, rather than the politics surrounding this violence, means that the logic 
underpinning limited access orders are not understood and the distortionary impact of external 
interventions on this logic is overlooked, or at least not properly engaged with.  
 
4.3.3 Economic interventions 
The logic of economic interventions 
200. In this section we assess the array of economic interventions deployed by external actors. 
Broadly, economic measures – ranging from aid, investment, trade deals and sanctions (or the 
threat of) – are aimed at incentivising elites to adopt non-violent ways to resolve social conflicts, 
and to generate economic growth that can enable fragile states to escape the ‘conflict trap’74 
and experience a ‘peace dividend’ that encourages a sustained commitment to peace.  
 
201. As with the rest of the report, the focus here is specifically on measures aimed at strengthening 
processes of elite bargaining to stabilise large-scale violent conflict and to sustain commitment 
to broader processes of peacebuilding, rather than focusing more broadly on the full array of 
post-conflict reconstruction efforts. However, many of the cases also reveal insights into the 
enduring impact of economic measures that are initiated as part of initial efforts at stabilisation. 
 
202. The rationale for deploying economic measures to shift incentive structures around war and 
peace is linked to a body of work arguing that the primary motivation for armed groups to 
choose to fight since the end of the Cold War has been the economic benefits that war 
delivers.75 These claims, which have been influential for policymakers, warn that political or 
diplomatic measures are unlikely to succeed without directly confronting the profitability of war 
and the incentives this provides for elites and their followers to engage in warfare. From this 
perspective, addressing violent conflict requires external actors to deploy an array of economic 
measures to shift these incentive structures and make combatants view peace as more 
profitable than war. This has included initiatives aimed at: dismantling war economies; 
sanctions against aggressors; conditioning aid flows, investment and trade deals to 
commitments by warring elites to peace negotiations and/or the implementation of peace deals; 
and efforts to stimulate economic growth nationally in order to generate employment and 
broad-based development in order to discourage a return to violent conflict. The logic 
underpinning economic interventions has also been motivated by a belief amongst 
international donors that peace agreements and periods of post-conflict transition offer 
opportune moments to tackle corruption and to enforce a series of wider structural economic 
reforms.  
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The range of economic interventions 
203. The cases reveal a wide array of economic interventions deployed by external actors in conflict-
affected states aimed at:  
 
(1) efforts to pressure warring parties into entering negotiations. This has included sanctions 
targeted at warring parties (both state and non-state armed groups) to pressurise them to 
enter into peace negotiations and/or to limit their capacity to wage war, for example the 
efforts to tackle the targeting cross-border trafficking and trade of ‘conflict diamonds’ 
emanating from Sierra Leone.   
 
(2) efforts to shape the outcomes of negotiations. This includes external funding to ‘buy-off’ 
potential spoilers in peace processes, as was the case in Northern Ireland where police 
officers retiring from the pre-peace accord police force received very handsome pension 
pay-offs. It has also included efforts to use external aid as a mechanism through which to 
‘co-opt’ elites into engaging with peace negotiations. In Somalia extensive aid flows has 
provided discretionary funding for elites encouraging them to commit to external peace 
efforts. In Mozambique the ‘UN Trust Fund for Implementation of the Peace Process in 
Mozambique’ (1993-94) provided extensive funding to support RENAMO’s conversion into 
political movement to contest the 1994 general election.  
 
(3) efforts to enforce agreements and to strengthen the economic foundations for sustained 
peace. External aid has been deployed in an attempt to create a ‘peace dividend’ by 
stimulating economic growth, poverty reduction and ‘inclusive’ development. In the 
Philippines, the Sajahatra Bangsamoro Program (supported by a multi-donor grant called the 
Mindanao Trust Fund) aimed to initiate socio-economic programs to create support for 
peace. In Northern Ireland, four successive EU Northern Ireland PEACE Programmes have 
leveraged more than 1.5 billion EUR between 1995 and 2013 for infrastructure, economic 
development and broader civil society support. In Aceh, large amounts of post-Tsunami aid 
were linked to the peace process, while in Sri Lanka, China has provided extensive funding 
(concessional loans) for major infrastructural developments such as improving the 
nationwide road network, major port developments (e.g., Hanbantota) and power stations 
under the rubric of fostering peace and stability.  
 
In some cases, this has included funding to support the implementation of specific tenets of 
peace agreements. In Mozambique, the Reintegration Support Scheme (RSS) was designed 
to support a DDR process. Demobilised soldiers were paid monthly stipends for two years, 
totalling US $94.4 million, 75% of which was covered by donors. The aim was “to pay them 
[Renamo forces] and to scatter them.”76 
 
Peace agreements and periods of post-conflict transition have also been viewed as 
opportune moments to pressure implementation of wider structural economic reforms, 
often through aid conditionality. In Sierra Leone post-conflict aid flows from many donors 
were conditional upon the government adhering to the terms of the IMF Poverty Reduction 
and Growth Facility (PRGF), which prioritised macroeconomic stability. Donors have argued 
such reforms are necessary to strengthen overall economic performance and to provide a 
more stable foundation for peace and development, although such claims are highly 
contested. 
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Assessing the impact of economic interventions 
204. There are a number of challenges in assessing the impact of economic interventions on 
stabilising armed conflict and reducing levels of violence. First, economic interventions do not 
occur in a vacuum but operate alongside an array of other dynamics. For example, targeted 
sanctions on rough diamonds and the largely effective interruption of cross-border smuggling 
by British and Guinean forces in Sierra Leone and Liberia respectively have often been cited as 
key to ending the conflict in Sierra Leone. However, these sanctions operated alongside a wider 
array of other factors. This included growing US pressure on Charles Taylor’s Liberian 
government, leading to reduced Liberian support for the RUF, greater military pressure on the 
RUF, reforms within Sierra Leone’s military, and a more extensive DDR programme.77  
 
205. Second, economic interventions often operate at multiple levels concurrently, including at the 
individual level (for example DDR payments to ex-combatants, targeted sanctions against elites), 
at the community level (for example socio-economic development initiatives in fragile and 
conflict-affected parts of a country) and at the societal level (such as budget support for 
nationwide poverty-reduction strategies). Third, the evidence base on the relationship between 
economic interventions and the dynamics of violence remains limited and contested with 
different studies drawing contrasting conclusions on the impact of sanctions and aid. 
Furthermore, the more comprehensive and ambitious aid interventions are, the harder it is to 
measure their impact through simple cause and effect models of analysis. Much analysis makes 
problematic assertions about what has and has not worked without adequately addressing the 
complexity of long causal chains and the lack of counterfactual knowledge.78 
 
206. Fourth, much of the logic underpinning economic interventions and analysis of their efficacy 
does not adequately address the political economy dimensions of such measures on rent-
sharing arrangements surrounding how limited access orders operate, the extent to which such 
interventions strengthen or distort elite bargaining processes, the distributional impact that 
such measures have and how they affect the relationship between horizontal and vertical 
inclusion, and the tensions and trade-offs that exist between different economic measures that 
are often implemented concurrently in fragile and conflict-affected states.    
 
207. Although these limitations and caveats warn against definitive conclusions, the cases do reveal 
a number of important insights regarding the impact of economic interventions on 
(de)stabilising large-scale armed conflict. Three particularly important factors stand out:  (1) the 
level of influence that external actors have, largely predicated upon the significance of external 
financial flows to the national economy and the level of aid dependence on key donors; (2) the 
nature of the limited access order in the country where interventions are implemented; (3) the 
impact of wider economic policies (i.e., not those explicitly designed as peace-making 
interventions) in shaping the structural framework within which elites operate. The remainder 
of this section explores each of these factors in turn. 
 
The level of external influence 
208. The extent to which external actors have been able to use economic levers to pressurise and co-
opt elites into engaging in negotiations and committing to peace agreements is shaped by the 
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level of aid dependency and the importance of external flows of revenue to the foundations of 
elites’ holding power. In some cases elites’ reliance upon accessing external aid flows has meant 
that conditioning such aid flows to peace negotiations has been effective in encouraging elites 
to pursue peace. In Mozambique, for example, the country’s extreme level of aid dependence – 
estimated to be as high as 90% of GNP in 199479 – increased the susceptibility of both the 
FRELIMO government and RENAMO to succumb to external pressure for negotiations, 
especially following the collapse of support from the Soviet Union and other eastern bloc 
countries. 
 
209. However, the ability of external actors to use such economic levers should not be over-stated. 
External influence remains shaped by how economic measures interact with the underlying 
logic of how limited access orders operate in fragile and conflict-affected countries. Even in the 
case of highly aid-dependent Mozambique, RENAMO’s decision to engage in talks was also 
shaped by various other political and economic guarantees, including the right to tax businesses 
in areas it controlled. Furthermore, even in countries that receive significant aid, aid flows must 
be placed in the wider context of the rents contested by elites, which may include cross-border 
trade and remittances. For example in Afghanistan the channelling of extensive volumes of aid 
through the central government has been intended to encourage the country’s powerful 
regional elites to co-operate (and thus gain access to such aid). Yet, such economic strategies 
have had to compete with the vast income generated from the country’s cross-border trade (in 
both legal and illegal goods) over which the central government exercises little control. 
 
210. Many of the cases also reveal that competition between donors for influence and the 
bilateralisation of aid can enable governments (and also opposition groups) to partake in ‘donor 
shopping’, off-setting donor attempts to condition their aid with demands for progress in peace 
negotiations by accessing assistance from other donors. (Re)emerging powers, especially China, 
but also Russia and India, provide billions of dollars of aid every year, much of it outside of 
western monitoring systems such as OECD development finance data or the International Aid 
Transparency Initiative (IATI). The increasing importance of such non-western aid flows has, in 
many cases, blunted the impact of sanctions and aid conditionality on warring elites. In Sri 
Lanka, for example, western donors increased aid flows to Sri Lanka after the 2002 ceasefire 
with the LTTE, conditional on progress in the peace process. But these aid flows were 
significantly scaled back in 2007 in an attempt to force the Rajapaksa government to 
reinvigorate peace talks after the breakdown of the ceasefire. This proved ineffective in light of 
China’s significant increase in aid to the country after 2007.80 Chinese and Indian aid after the 
end of the war in 2009 also enabled the Sri Lankan government to pursue its vision of ‘winning 
the peace’ through large-scale development projects in the north and east of the country rather 
than addressing underlying political grievances.   
 
211. The cases also demonstrate instances when international actors have proved unwilling to 
implement economic measures in an attempt to strengthen momentum for peace negotiations, 
especially sanctions, since such measures counteract other foreign policy interests. Throughout 
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much of the war in the DRC, international actors have proved unwilling to pressurise Rwanda 
and Uganda, both of which have played an instrumental role in fuelling the conflict, as they 
were major recipients of aid and investment. This case demonstrates that even in contexts 
where extensive financial flows do give external actors potential levers to exert pressure, 
competing interests may prevent such levers from being deployed. However, in the specific 
case of the M23 Movement in the DRC in 2012/13, a wide range of development actors did cut 
or suspend financial assistance to Rwanda following evidence that the Kagame government was 
backing the group. There was also significant high-level diplomatic pressure placed on the 
Rwandan leadership by the US and UK amongst others. The international response in this 
particular period demonstrated that a comprehensive and relatively united front amongst 
external actors and donors can prove effective in shaping elite calculations.  
 
Economic interventions and the mechanisms of limited access orders 
212. As shown in Section 3 of this report, the majority of fragile and conflict-affected states exist as 
varying forms of limited access order, in which the state does not exercise a monopoly over the 
means of violence. In such cases of contested sovereignty, stability is typically dependent on 
fashioning a system of ‘rents’ by manipulating access to political and economic privileges and 
providing powerful elites with access to these rents in return for their loyalty. In such contexts, 
external aid flows into volatile and monetised ‘political marketplaces’ may become an 
important ‘rent’ that shapes incentive structures within limited access orders. The fact that aid 
is sometimes ‘fungible’ (i.e., it can be used for purposes other than that for which it was 
intended – for example a government may use aid money to replace existing government 
spending on services, freeing this money to be spent elsewhere) means that it can be a 
particularly valued source for creating discretionary revenues for elites to strengthen patronage 
networks, fund election campaigns and finance violence.   
 
213. Tensions revolve around the fact that external efforts to help fragile countries break out of the 
‘conflict trap’ and deliver a peace dividend are often predicated on a series of policies – 
dismantling war economies, tackling corruption, promoting good governance and increasing 
competition in the economy – that are often anathema to the logic of limited access orders. For 
example, granting control over lucrative wartime economies, including illegal activities, may 
provide important rents through which elites are co-opted by the government, as was the case 
surrounding the drug trade in post-war Tajikistan. Indeed, in many cases war transforms the 
economic foundations of a country as illegal activities become more important to how elites 
accumulate wealth and for sustaining the livelihoods of parts of the population. External efforts 
to target illegal wartime economies may therefore work at cross-purposes to government 
strategies to co-opt elites, since these strategies often revolve around re-working who has 
access to illicit income-generating activities, rather than dismantling them. 
 
214. The cases reveal three inter-linked tensions surrounding the respective logics of economic 
interventions and limited access orders and the trade-offs these tensions create. The first 
regards the political economy of corruption. Attempts to deploy economic measures to 
promote processes of elite bargaining are likely to revolve around providing clear economic 
incentives to armed groups to relinquish violence. This was clearly the case with the financial 
pledges that underpinned negotiations with RENAMO in Mozambique. In Sierra Leone, the 1999 
Lomé Peace Agreement granted RUF Commander Foday Sankoh control over the country’s 
diamond and gold mines. In Somalia, the willingness of elites to enter into so-called ‘state-
building pacts’ has been predicated on elite calculations that such a stance offers easy access to 
foreign aid. In 2001, the formation of the Transitional National Government (TNG) led to major 
aid inflows from the Saudi government that were never actually used to jumpstart the TNG but 
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were dispersed amongst political and business elites. Aid was deployed in similar ways under 
the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) that was in place between 2004 and 2012. Indeed, 
the copious volumes of foreign aid that have flowed into Somalia since the Mbagathi peace 
process in 2004 have “provided ample incentive to elites to stay in the game, and has given the 
post Mbagathi elite bargain a level of “stickiness” it would not have otherwise had.”81  
 
215. However, at the same time, these external aid flows have not been able to strengthen formal 
institutions to govern bargaining processes in Somalia; rather they have created parallel 
structures, the funding for which has largely been channelled into informal arenas of elite 
bargaining where real power lies. Such instances of “corruption buying peace”82 may provide 
stability but can also be highly damaging in the longer-term. Although it is hard to prove 
empirically, this dynamic may have ‘demonstration effects’, encouraging elites to mobilise 
violence in order to be included in negotiations and access aid flows. It may also lock in place 
political and economic structures by encouraging elites to seek to maintain the status quo 
rather than initiate further processes of economic reform. This can lead to the emergence of 
rentier states, in which elites become more focused on retaining the backing of external patrons 
than engaging in domestic processes of elite bargaining.  
 
216. The second tension surrounding economic interventions, closely linked to the first, is the trade-
off between securing stability in the short-term and the risk that such measures sow the seeds 
for instability in the longer term. Many of the cases – even those covering Bosnia, Tajikistan and 
Northern Ireland where stability has endured – raise concerns over the long-term sustainability 
of the current settlement. Many of these concerns are linked to enduring economic grievances 
that, in some cases, have been exacerbated by the ways in which peace agreements and inflows 
of external revenue have been unequally distributed and have concentrated wealth in the 
hands of a small elite. The 1995 Dayton peace agreement following the Bosnian War, for 
example, was perceived by many to be “rewarding local elites who had already rewarded 
themselves through violent accumulation in wartime.”83 In Tajikistan wealth has become 
concentrated in an increasingly narrow elite that has excluded much of the population. Some of 
the cases also warn, especially in highly aid dependent contexts such as Somalia, that external 
aid flows may create rent-sharing arrangements that work only as long as these economic flows 
remain in place. There is no clear transition to a peace cycle with momentum of its own; rather 
elites are constantly hedging in an environment in which the drawing down or termination of 
external economic support is likely to lead to renewed instability, with elites competing for the 
best position within changing economic conditions.   
 
217. The third interlinked tension is the extent to which economic measures prioritise horizontal 
inclusion – i.e., by accommodating elites – over vertical inclusion of wider sections of the 
population through broad-based development programmes. Across the cases, trade-offs exist 
between the ways in which economic measures (such as aid, investment, trade deals) become 
deployed (intentionally or unintentionally) to build horizontal inclusion, against efforts to 
deliver a more vertically inclusive peace. The cases suggest that in fragile limited access orders – 
such as Somalia and Afghanistan – external aid flows are particularly likely to become 
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embedded in the money politics surrounding processes of elite bargaining, reducing the scope 
to deliver more broad-based benefits.84 
 
The wider economic context of elite bargaining processes and external interventions 
218. The impact of economic interventions aimed at stabilising armed conflict is also shaped by the 
wider economic context in which processes of elite bargaining take place. This emphasises the 
need for external actors to consider how global economic structures and donor-led economic 
reform processes – even those not ostensibly framed as peacebuilding initiatives – shape the 
structures that in turn influence elite interests and behaviour.  
 
219. A number of cases warn of the instability created by processes of structural adjustment and the 
kinds of ‘shock therapy’ that have been deployed by the IMF and World Bank in an attempt to 
stimulate economic development. Such processes have often been proclaimed as congruent 
with peacebuilding based on the assumption that they can deliver rapid growth and thus assist 
countries to break out of the ‘conflict trap’. Evidence from various cases, however, questions 
this assumption. In Sri Lanka, for example, the rise of Sinhala nationalism and hardening 
approaches to negotiating with LTTE has been linked to the uneven distribution of the ‘peace 
dividend’ after the 2002 ceasefire. The liberalisation of the economy post-2002 appeared to 
contribute to economic growth and low inflation; yet the benefits of growth were concentrated 
on Colombo and among a narrow elite. For the majority of the rural population, liberalisation 
equated to reductions in food subsidies, rising food costs and less secure livelihoods, creating 
an environment “ripe for political mobilisation”.85  
 
220. In Mozambique the influx of aid to support the peace process coincided with austerity 
measures imposed through structural adjustment. In a country where public sector wages had 
historically been well above the poverty line, austerity measures and rising inflation cut public 
sector wages by as much as 75%.86 This made it impossible for public servants to live off wages 
alone and exacerbated pervasive corruption throughout the civil service. Although such 
corruption (e.g., payments to teachers to pass school exams) has propped up the civil service, it 
has added further burdens onto those even more vulnerable.87 Although Mozambique’s post-
war growth has been impressive, this has been driven by the oil and gas sector and economic 
growth has coincided with worsening levels of economic inequality over the past two decades. 
Periodic riots (notably in 1995, 2008, 2010 and 2012) have reflected widespread frustration 
across Mozambique. The resumption of armed conflict by RENAMO in 2013 may have largely 
centred on efforts of RENAMO elites to secure a greater share of oil and gas revenues, yet it 
also tapped into these widespread economic frustrations that have, at least in part, been the 
result of externally imposed economic reforms. 
 
221. Similar concerns regarding the risks of externally imposed economic policies reigniting conflict 
continue to exist in Sierra Leone. Enforced liberalisation measures imposed on the country 
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during the 1980s and 1990s appear to have contributed to the country’s armed conflict in 
various ways. These included funding cuts to education and health services and collapsing 
salaries for civil servants that fed rampant corruption, all of which incited widespread 
grievances. David Keen also argues that praise of the government’s ‘financial orthodoxy’ in the 
mid-1990s diverted attention from worsening military abuses.88 However, after the war, aid 
conditionality imposed through the IMF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) 
demanded further cuts to government salaries and to overall government spending. Although 
the country has remained stable, numerous observers point to the fact that many of the 
conditions that contributed to the outbreak of war in the 1990s remain.         
 
Conclusions 
222. The cases clearly reveal that the ability of external actors to leverage warring elites through 
economic measures is limited. The extent to which external actors are able to exert influence is 
shaped by the importance of external aid and investment to elites’ power bases and also the 
alignment of interests between different external actors. Where elites’ dependency on external 
flows of revenue is low the scope for external actors to influence elite bargaining processes is 
limited. In cases where elites are able to access funds from various donors with competing sets 
of interests (as in the case of Sri Lanka), elites can retain autonomy through partaking in ‘donor 
shopping’. External influence is higher in cases, such as Somalia and Mozambique, where the 
level of dependence on external aid is much higher. 
 
223. However, even in these cases aid flows are entering highly politicised and volatile environments, 
and significant tensions and trade-offs exist. Economic flows may serve to strengthen incentives 
for peace and elite coalitions, but this may come at the cost of facilitating elite capture, 
exacerbating vertical exclusion and failing to address underlying grievances that may pave the 
way for future conflict. Attempts to push for more concerted economic reforms – for example 
dismantling war economies, increasing levels of competitiveness in the economy, and improving 
macroeconomic stability – also risk creating an externally-led agenda for economic reform that 
is increasingly misaligned with the logic of how limited access orders operate. This creates a set 
of external economic pressures that may complicate and undermine the feasibility of domestic 
elite bargaining processes to stabilise armed conflict. 
 
4.3.4 Legal measures/Transitional justice 
224. Transitional justice refers to the ways that countries emerging from armed conflict and mass 
violence address large-scale or systematic human rights violations and/or war crimes. The core 
pillars of transitional justice are rights to truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-
recurrence. The underlying logic of transitional justice is that a reckoning and/or some form of 
reconciliation with the past is needed to enable societies to deal with the legacy of past abuses 
and to prevent future conflict from breaking out. Transitional justice incorporates a broad 
spectrum of judicial and non-judicial measures. These range from ‘softer’ forms of restorative 
justice, including truth telling and collective reconciliation, to ‘harder’ forms of retributive 
justice, including criminal trials involving individual accountability. 
 
225.  Justice is ‘transitional’ because it is seen to be temporary and exceptional; the scale of abuses 
and the weakness of the post-war state mean that ‘normal’ justice cannot be administered. The 
international footprint is more visible at the ‘retributive’ end of the spectrum – as with ICC 
cases – and less visible at the ‘restorative’ end, with domestic hybrid mechanisms and 
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‘traditional’ forms of justice and reconciliation being modified and adopted to suit the crimes 
committed. Nevertheless, international actors such as OHCHR, UNDP, the ICRC, and the 
International Center for Transitional Justice play an important behind-the-scenes role in 
influencing the specific mechanisms and timing of restorative justice initiatives, truth telling 
commissions, and reconciliation processes.  
 
226. There is a general assumption that the prosecution of war crimes plays a broader conflict 
prevention role because it sends important signals to political elites elsewhere that they will be 
held to account for their actions in the event of grave human rights abuses. In practice, 
transitional justice involves complex trade-offs between internal political dynamics and external 
pressures, as well as the balancing of demands for accountability with the realities of political 
feasibility. Even if there is strong elite support and a societal demand for some form of justice, 
the risk remains that justice mechanisms will be unable to fundamentally overcome the existing 
governance and rule of law problems that contributed to the original causes of the conflict. The 
benefits of transitional justice mechanisms are often perceived as, at best, costly, unevenly 
distributed and falling short of public expectations for comprehensive justice and at worst, 
deeply divisive and destabilising, especially in cases where the pursuit of retributive 
mechanisms causes a rupture in the political settlement. 
 
227. There is a vast transitional justice literature and the aim here is not to provide a systematic 
assessment of the impacts and efficacy of transitional justice programmes, not least because 
the body of evidence from the case studies is quite limited. Instead, drawing on examples from 
the cases, we focus on the interactions between these externally-promoted programmes and 
the dynamics of elite bargaining: to what extent were justice and accountability provisions 
incorporated into peace accords, and were these conditions implemented in practice? To what 
extent did transitional justice interventions affect the level of (mis)alignment between elite 
bargaining, political settlements and peace agreements?  How did such programmes shape the 
dynamics and pathways of post-war transitions?  
 
228. Going back to our analytical framework, notions of transparency and accountability – concepts 
that are central both to the transitional justice and ‘good governance’ agendas – work against 
the logic of limited access orders. Externally supported processes tend to assume an overnight 
shift from deal-based to rule-based mechanisms. Yet such interventions may diminish the room 
for manoeuvre, and take away the tools that political elites need to manage violence, build 
coalitions, distribute benefits, and so forth.  This may provoke, as seen in several of the cases, a 
high degree of elite push back against transitional justice. Furthermore, as noted in relation to 
other policy instruments, when transitional justice mechanisms enter the political marketplace, 
they become yet another resource that is fought over and instrumentalised by domestic elites. 
Transitional justice mechanisms also interact with other types of interventions, forcing trade-
offs, and as the cases show, transitional justice is frequently undercut by other priorities. 
 
Experiences of Transitional justice across the cases 
229. The historical case studies – Vietnam and Malaya – preceded the growth of the international 
‘transitional justice regime’. In these cases there was no internationally mediated process, and 
the war crimes and human rights abuses – perpetrated by both domestic and international 
forces – largely went unpunished, though there was post-war retribution and ‘re-education’ by 
the victorious powers. In several of the more recent cases, where there has either been no 
formal peace agreement or where agreements have failed to put an end to large-scale violence 
(Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Sri Lanka), there has been limited referral to, or concrete 
implementation of transitional justice mechanisms. In other cases, where there have been 
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peace agreements that marked a significant reduction of large-scale armed violence (Colombia, 
Guatemala, Tajikistan, Sierra Leone, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Nepal), transitional justice 
conditions were incorporated into almost all agreements, but the extent to which they were 
implemented has varied.  
 
230. In Tajikistan, where there was a strong alignment between the underlying political settlement 
and the peace agreement – with formal power-sharing arrangements underpinned by informal 
rent-sharing agreements – there were few external pressures or domestic incentives to deal 
with past abuses. This was reflected in the language and architecture surrounding the peace 
process – with, for example, the creation of a Joint Commission for National Reconciliation. 
Essentially, there was no formal transitional justice process, with the principal wielders of 
violence retaining their coercive power and enjoying the distributional benefits of being part of 
the ruling coalition. 
 
231. Similarly, In Afghanistan, the Mujahedeen factions aligned with the Northern Alliance – many of 
whom were suspected to be guilty of human rights abuses and war crimes - strongly resisted 
any incorporation of justice and accountability mechanisms being included in the wording of 
the Bonn Agreement: in 2010 a ‘National Stability and Reconciliation law’ came into effect, 
removing the possibility that those involved in armed conflict before 2001 could be prosecuted 
for any abuses committed. Therefore, in basic and fragile limited access orders, where there are 
strong continuities between wartime and peacetime, elite interests are likely to be oriented 
towards deferring justice, providing amnesties and maintaining weak rule of law. In these 
contexts, the price of securing military cooperation and political stability often comes at the 
cost of sacrificing justice claims. 
 
232. A similar set of dynamics emerge from the Guatemala case, where the military had significant 
holding power and pushed back against demands for justice, particularly from the indigenous 
Mayan population. However, this case also shows how processes of transition are long and 
convoluted, and how, as political settlements shift, the policy space for transitional justice can 
grow over time.  
 
233. The peace accord of 1996 explicitly used the language of transitional justice and set in motion a 
set of provisions and processes to facilitate truth telling, reconciliation, and accountability. For 
example, the 1999 Historical Clarification Commission (CEH) report focused on the historical 
and structural factors behind the conflict and found the state’s military operations against the 
Mayan communities constituted genocide, putting the estimated total deaths and 
disappearances at 250,000. At the same time, elite resistance meant that there was a constant 
deferral or evasion of ‘hard’ justice mechanisms. For example, victims’ groups demanded 
reparations, but it took almost ten years after the peace accords to start the National 
Reparations Program. Although strong evidence of abuses had been collected, particularly by 
civil society groups, only a handful of cases were prosecuted after years of efforts by victims. 
The fact that several cases had to be tried in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights served 
to highlight the negligence and corruption of the national justice system. Yet the fact that they 
were tried at all also signified that Guatemala’s political settlement had shifted.  
 
234. Then, in 2006, the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) was 
established to strengthen the state’s ability to tackle the powerful organised crime groups that 
had grown out of military intelligence structures set up during the war. CICIG was set up as a 
bespoke institution, jointly coordinated by the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the National 
Police, with the support of the UN. Its investigations have led to the successful prosecution of 
numerous high-level officials, including ex-president Alfonso Portillo, as well as bringing down 
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the government of President Otto Pérez Molina in 2015 and exposing a government-wide 
corruption ring in the La Línea case.  
 
235. During this period, there was also the landmark trial of 86-year old former military dictator Jose 
Efraín Ríos Montt. This was the first time a former head of state had been meaningfully tried for 
genocide in national proceedings. In 2013, Montt was convicted of genocide and crimes against 
humanity. The gradual attempts to curb impunity through legal mechanisms in Guatemala 
reflects the complexity and drawn out nature of its post-war transition. Against a backdrop of 
elite holding power, and extremely high levels of embedded and permissive violence, there 
have been some successes, largely the result of shifts in the constellation of power within the 
ruling coalition and growing domestic and international pressure. The regional diffusion of 
experiences and tactics and the support of UN and the International Center for Transitional 
Justice have also been significant, with domestic elites and civil society groups learning from 
transitional justice processes in other Latin American countries.89  
 
236. In Nepal and Sri Lanka, though much earlier in their post-war transitions, the story is also one of 
justice delayed or deferred. In Nepal, the CPA laid out steps to establish the truth about the 
conflict, including a special commission to investigate the hundreds of enforced 
‘disappearances’. Transitional justice was seen as being a central component of the ‘inclusion 
agenda’ and there were strong demands for justice from the borderlands most directly affected 
by human rights abuses and disappearances during the war. However, the creation of the 
proposed Commission on Investigation on Enforced Disappeared Persons (CIEDP) stalled after 
parliament introduced a bill that would grant it the powers to provide amnesty to perpetrators.  
 
237. CIEDP finally started a four-month complaint registration period in 2016. At the end of this 
period, it had registered around 3,000 complaints related to enforced disappearances. In the 
same year the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) started taking complaints in April 
2016, and by July 21 2016 had received 53,000. These faltering steps in the direction of 
accountability can be understood as largely symbolic or theatrical – aimed at external audiences 
and domestic constituencies with limited power including civil society and Maoist supporters. 
Political elites from within the Maoists and Nepali Congress, the two sides with the most to lose 
from an accountability process, sought to constantly evade and defer transitional justice 
mechanisms. The issue of amnesty frequently came up in political negotiations and was used as 
a bargaining chip in inter-party deals in Nepal’s volatile parliamentary politics. In fact their 
evasion became a point of convergence amongst the national political elite. Without strong 
international backing, and given that India was not prepared to invest political capital on the 
issue, transitional justice is likely to be delayed indefinitely. 
 
238. In Sri Lanka, credible evidence was collected by the UN and others that war crimes had been 
perpetrated by the government and the LTTE during the final months of the war.  However, the 
prevailing politics immediately after the conflict meant there was no appetite or backing to 
pursue this issue.  The Rajapaksa regime and the military had widespread political support for 
having won the war, whilst the main proponents of transitional justice – local civil society, 
international actors and the Tamil diaspora – had limited voice or political traction.   The 
government’s strategy was to focus on reconciliation rather than accountability, by providing 
reconstruction to the north and east as a way of blunting the secessionist impulse and obviating 
the need for a substantive political settlement. It made limited moves in the direction of 
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accountability – such as the Lessons Learned and Reconciliation Commission – in part to show 
that ‘something was being done’.  Yet such mechanisms had no traction and no real domestic 
champions given the prevailing exclusive political settlement. This appeared to change radically 
with the surprise election of a new coalition government which promised ‘good governance’, a 
political solution to the ‘ethnic problem’ and a commitment to some form of transitional justice. 
 
239. Under President Sirisena, the government changed tack, making a public commitment at the 
UN Human Rights Council in 2015 to an expansive transitional justice process, which included 
truth telling, reparations, dealing with the disappeared and an accountability mechanism 
(domestic with some international involvement) to deal with war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.  However, in spite of some progress, such as the establishment of an Office of 
Missing Persons, the initial optimism around the government’s agenda passed, as progress on 
transitional justice was slower than hoped for and became used by nationalists as an issue of 
bargaining within the coalition.  A horizontally inclusive ruling coalition was constrained by the 
need to satisfy these elements of the coalition – making it harder to advance a relatively 
‘progressive’ policy agenda on either constitutional reforms or transitional justice. The latter 
became increasingly instrumentalised as a vehicle for advancing interests that had very little to 
do with justice.  For example, the Tamil diaspora saw it is as a source of leverage to gain 
international support and exert pressure on the government to negotiate a new political 
settlement.  For nationalists within the coalition, transitional justice became a signifier of neo-
colonial interference and a useful discourse to mobilize supporters in the Sinhala heartland.  
International actors were cautious to push too hard because of fears it would bring about the 
downfall of the coalition government and open the door for the return of the Rajapakses. 
Hence, justice mechanisms became a useful tool to pursue other goals, and vested interests 
developed around keeping it in a state of constant deferral.90    
 
Conclusions 
240. The dynamics of bargaining around transitional justice appears to be shaped by several factors 
including; the nature of the post-war political settlement - whether the ‘old guard’ was 
displaced, remains in power or retains significant influence; the level of inclusion and the basis 
of inclusion within the political settlement; the capacity and autonomy of post-war institutions; 
and the level of internationalisation and the degree of leverage of international actors. Where 
there is high internationalisation (and high influence) and the old guard has been displaced, one 
would expect strong pressures for, and receptiveness to harder forms of retributive justice. In 
contexts where the old guard remains powerful, and international actors have limited 
engagement or influence, there are likely to be strong incentives for amnesties or softer forms 
of restorative justice. This particularly applies where conflict termination has occurred as a 
result of a military victory rather than a negotiated settlement as in the case of Sri Lanka. In 
contexts where the old incumbents and new challengers share power in a relatively inclusive 
political settlement, with weak institutions and relatively limited international pressure – as in 
the case of Nepal – incentives may be oriented towards forestalling, or maintaining a form of 
perpetual ‘unsettlement’ rather than one of closure. 
 
241. While these constellations of power at war’s end are crucial, they are not set in stone – shifts in 
political settlements open up new spaces and as the Guatemala case shows, processes of 
transition can take a long time: it was 17 years after the signing of the peace accords before 
Montt was convicted. Clearly, externally-led transitional justice (particularly ICC, and previously, 
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UN ad hoc tribunals such as Sierra Leone, ICTY, Guatemala) are fundamentally political 
institutions, even though they are set up to be impartial and technical. Prosecutions become 
instrumentalised and become part of the elite bargaining process; either ‘I’ll let you into the 
country if you prosecute my rivals’ or ‘I’ll help you prosecute someone else if you give me 
immunity’. In cases where transitional justice is written into peace agreements, this frequently 
creates pressures for further internationalisation, as domestic elites seek to water down these 
measures and domestic human rights defenders call for greater external pressure for 
enforcement. 
 
242. Finally, although we have focused on the centrality of coercion and rent-sharing in the forging 
of elite bargains and underlying political settlements, the experiences of transitional justice 
show that ideas, beliefs and notions of legitimacy can play a significant role in building inclusion 
within, or conversely, unsettling ruling coalitions. Transitional justice provides a language and a 
narrative that can and has proven to be empowering, and a useful tool to build vertical inclusion 
– as was the case amongst the Mayan population in Guatemala. In Nepal, it played a similar role 
for a period of time after the CPA for the Maoists and their constituencies in Nepal. 
Alternatively, it may provide a useful foil for nationalist elites to mobilise against, as it becomes 
a symbol of international interference and neo-colonialism. A purely materialist reading of 
transitional justice misses how such projects enter the vernacular of local politics and can 
become theatrical props for local elites attempting to build legitimacy. 
 
4.4 The pathways of external interventions 
243. This section explores how interventions impact upon the dynamics of elite bargaining (outlined 
in Chapter 3) and lead to different pathways out of, or back into, large-scale armed violence. 
This is shaped by two important factors: (1) the degree of rupture in pre-war/wartime 
structures that underpins war to peace transitions; and (2) how interventions impact upon 
power relations and political contestation between competing elites and how their actions 
shape the relationship between political settlements, elite bargaining and peace agreements 
during such transitions. 
 
244. Post-war pathways are shaped by the degree to which the post-war transition embodies a 
radical rupture from pre-war and wartime structures. In some cases, processes of elite 
bargaining during war to peace transitions may mark little more than the formalisation of 
existing power structures. In Tajikistan and Bosnia, for example, the post-war transition 
entrenched the rent-sharing arrangements that had emerged during the war and formalised the 
de facto balance of wartime coercive power. In such cases the distribution of power is much 
clearer; who controls the means of violence, the nature of rent-sharing arrangements, and who 
has the potential to disrupt if excluded are better understood. This creates greater scope for 
stability but also makes forms of elite capture more common, limiting the room for negotiation 
and reducing the scope for the inclusion of marginalised groups. 
 
245. In contrast, some transitions are underpinned by a more dramatic shift in underlying 
configurations of power. International actors have in some cases created these ruptures, for 
example through concerted military action (Iraq, Afghanistan), or through engaging in risky 
mediation (Sri Lanka), or have looked to capitalise on sudden ruptures (post-Tsunami 
engagement in Aceh, Indonesia). In these cases, the post-war moment embodies a much more 
volatile situation in which pre-war or wartime power structures have fractured and domestic 
elites and external actors have more agency to fashion and contest institutions (both formal 
and informal). At such points the potential to influence elite bargaining processes may be much 
higher, but inevitably brings both opportunities and risks for external actors. Although there 
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may be greater scope for the existing ‘rules of the game’ to be negotiated, in such contexts the 
very real danger exists that the ongoing contestation over the post-war order may spill over 
into renewed violence, especially where interventions push too hard against the interests of 
elites who continue to wield significant holding power.     
 
246. The second key dynamic that shapes post-war pathways relates to how external interventions 
impact upon the dynamics of elite bargaining during post-war transitions and how the actions 
of external actors shape the relationship between political settlements, elite bargaining and 
peace agreements. Interveners have often sought to shift elites’ incentive structures by 
encouraging or pressurising them to look beyond transactional frameworks with the aim of 
providing the foundations for more developmental post-war outcomes. Again though, such 
actions also entail very significant risks. Efforts by external actors to push for transformational 
change are more likely to create a greater degree of misalignment between the formal peace 
and the underlying political settlement. This can create contexts where efforts at 
transformational change are perpetually dependent upon external resources, precluding the 
emergence of sustainable domestic bargains, or they may heighten the risk of instability and a 
return to large-scale violent conflict.  
 
247. The cases indicate that a transformative shift towards a more developmental peace requires 
pushing negotiations to the limits of misalignment in the sense that the peace accord opens up 
but does fragment the underlying political settlement; yet they also show that such 
misalignment is the major factor that destabilises elite bargaining processes and can lead to a 
strong elite push back and/or renewed outbreaks of armed violence. On the other hand, 
prioritising stabilisation over transformational change means bringing the peace process into 
closer alignment with the underlying political settlement, although at the likely cost of elite 
capture. 
 
Post-war pathways 
248. Exploring these dynamics provides a way of assessing how interventions impact upon elite 
bargains in shaping different post-war pathways. Across the cases, we see three broad post-war 
pathways, presented below. It is important to emphasise that this typology is an ideal-type 
model aimed at exploring how the dynamics explained above shape the impact that external 
interventions can have. They are not intended to suggest smooth, linear or inevitable pathways. 
Indeed, post-war transitions are continually in flux; elites continue to seek to re-work bargains 
and further moments of rupture can occur that lead to sudden shifts in power relations and 
change the trajectory of how external interventions shape transitions. Alongside these caveats, 
however, the three pathways presented below do offer useful insights that help to account for 
the wide variation in the impacts external interventions have had. 
 
Pathway 1: Destabilising 
Outcomes: fragmented political settlement; conditions for a return to violence 
Examples: Sri Lanka 2002-06, South Sudan 2011, Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, Vietnam 
249. Across the cases there are many conflicts which are highly internationalised and where external 
actors wielded extensive influence – often bringing about significant moments of rupture – but 
where this influence has had a deleterious impact by inadvertently undermining or purposely 
fragmenting the underlying political settlement. This fragmentation increased the potential for 
renewed violence, which has occurred in many cases, notably Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan and 
Vietnam. In other cases, this fragmentation resulted in the emergence of a new equilibrium 
between elites, such as in Sri Lanka between 2002 and 2006, albeit one that is highly fragile.  
 
 
 
77 
 
250. Commonly, this phenomenon has occurred in contexts where external actors have used their 
leverage to pursue their own agendas, bringing a further set of interests to bear on fragile 
political settlements. This has increased the challenges facing bargaining processes and has 
often exacerbated the misalignment between formal peace processes and the underlying 
configuration of power. For example, demanding that certain groups are excluded (e.g. the 
Taliban in Afghanistan, al-Shabaab in Somalia) and attempting to shut down certain rent-sharing 
arrangements (e.g. counter-narcotics strategies in Afghanistan) have proved deeply 
destabilising in certain cases. Furthermore, efforts to promote radical social and economic 
reforms in very short periods of time have often worked against the logic of limited access 
orders upon which stability in fragile political settlements was previously founded. For example, 
in some cases efforts to promote democratisation, reduce corruption, strengthen judicial 
autonomy and dismantle war economies have been central to attempts by interveners to 
fashion new post-war orders. However, these interventions have contradicted the logic that 
underpins processes of elite bargaining in fragile states, which is about providing elites with 
more stable and predictable power and giving preferential access to valued resources (such as 
control over parts of the economy or providing political positions). In some cases, heavy 
external pressure and/or military presence may create a façade of stability in the short term, 
although any attempt by external actors to scale back their presence is likely to lead to renewed 
instability as elites seek to renegotiate their position within this changing context. 
 
Pathway 2: Consolidating 
Outcomes: Stability, elite capture   
Examples: Tajikistan, Mozambique, Guatemala 
251. There are numerous cases where external actors have a fair degree of leverage and influence in 
contexts where elite power structures are relatively entrenched and the post-war transition has 
largely embodied a continuation of pre-war/wartime structures rather than a significant rupture. 
Interveners play a role in influencing the peace process, and levels of large-scale armed violence 
decline. However, bargaining processes result in elite capture of the benefits of the peace, often 
reflected in high levels of vertical inclusion and growing levels of horizontal inclusion, and the 
continuation of forms of embedded and permissive violence.  
 
252. As emphasised in Chapter 3, although forms of elite capture share similarities in the sense that 
elites capture the processes of political authority and distribution of resources, the outcomes of 
these processes can vary significantly between forms of highly exclusionary elite capture to 
forms of elite capture that deliver more broad-based distribution.  
 
253. The cases demonstrate that there is a broad spectrum of outcomes within this overarching 
pathway of ‘consolidating’ political settlements. This suggests that there may be greater scope 
for international actors to play a role in limiting the scope for highly exclusionary forms of elite 
capture and pushing for more distributional outcomes. In Tajikistan, a less authoritarian 
outcome might have been possible if external backers had more interest in, devoted more 
resources to, and placed more pressure on the Government of Tajikistan to effectively 
implement power-sharing and a competitive political system after the signing of the peace 
agreement. States hosting major financial services industries, particularly the UK and US, might 
have reduced the emergence of an increasingly exclusionary political system by enforcing anti-
money laundering laws more strictly, thus constraining the government’s ability to further 
consolidate power and exclude rivals via corruption and its connections to organised crime. 
Such examples warn of the costs of non-intervention and emphasise that while the acceptance 
of forms of elite capture may be a necessary trade-off for the emergence of more stable 
political settlements, there may still be substantial scope to leverage more distributional 
outcomes and to limit the worst excesses of exclusionary elite capture.  
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Pathway 3: Transforming 
Outcomes: Moves towards more developmental peace 
Examples: Nepal post-2006; Northern Ireland, Aceh, Malaysia  
254. In a small number of cases external interventions have been able to support the foundations for 
a more transformational shift of the political settlement towards a more developmental post-
war peace without destabilising post-war transitions. In these cases,  war-to-peace transitions 
have embodied a significant moment of rupture in which pre-war or wartime structures of 
power have been weakened (such as the monarchy in Nepal) or are increasingly challenged by 
emerging elites (such as the urban middle class challenging the political power of the traditional 
landowning elite in Colombia). These changes have created emerging political space to contest 
previously exclusionary political and economic power structures.  
 
255. International actors have been able to support inclusive agendas (such as in Nepal) or 
transformational leadership (such as Santos in Colombia). As the case of Aceh shows, the scope 
for interveners to play a supportive role is heightened when conflicts over indivisible issues – in 
this case the demand for secession – gradually shift to focus on issues such as greater political 
rights and resource sharing that are divisible (see section 3.2.3). These factors contribute to the 
emergence of a more inclusive political settlement, which is reflected in changes in state 
policies and service delivery to previously excluded groups. This may be especially the case in 
contexts where elites are striving to (re)assert their legitimacy in a rapidly changing 
environment. This creates opportunities for interveners to strengthen formal institutions and 
make them more inclusive. There is greater scope for the ‘capture of elites’, in the sense that 
elites become enmeshed in rule-based, rather than deal-based mechanisms. This binds their 
power, resources and legitimacy to the delivery of services and the creation and preservation of 
a social contract. Interventions to support transformational shifts towards more developmental 
political settlements are therefore less about individual policy instruments. Instead success is 
more likely to be achieved through particular policy combinations that gradually build 
momentum towards more developmental post-war outcomes, without pushing too hard 
against the existing political settlement and the kinds of deal-based mechanisms upon which 
elite bargains are founded.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusions  
 
256. This synthesis paper has sought to answer the following overarching research questions: (1) 
How the dynamics of elite bargaining contribute to processes of conflict (de)escalation; (2) what 
determines whether elite bargaining processes have contributed to sustained processes of 
peacebuilding, or conversely a return to large-scale violent conflict; (3) how external 
interventions interacted with these processes and helped shape different pathways out of (or a 
return to) armed violence. The key findings and their implications for policy makers are 
presented below: 
 
5.1 Findings I: How the dynamics of elite bargaining shape post-war 
transitions 
The (mis)alignment between elite bargains, peace processes and political settlements is a 
major determinant of variations in post-war transitions   
257. This study has focused on how the (mis)alignment between elite bargains, formal peace 
negotiations and the underlying configuration of power – or political settlements – shape 
transitions from war to peace. Violent conflict will only stabilise when the distribution of 
political and economic benefits is consistent with the underlying configuration of power in 
society. In contexts where the formal peace process does not reflect/address the underlying 
distribution of power then the potential for negotiations to stabilise violent conflict and sustain 
peace is limited. The exclusion of certain unpalatable but powerful elites can make political 
settlements volatile. In such contexts, formal state institutions are likely to be highly unstable 
and the risk of violence is high.  
 
Ending war is not the same as ending violence 
258. A stable political settlement may still expose populations to significant levels of violence. Elite 
bargains may stabilise forms of ‘competitive violence’ deployed by warring elites to contest or 
defend the distribution of power. However, forms of embedded violence that are intrinsic to 
the workings of the political settlement may continue or increase, as may forms of permissive 
violence, including gender-based and criminal violence. Order may be as much about ‘disguising’ 
violence and reconfiguring who has the ‘right’ to enact violence, upon whom, for what reasons, 
and with what level of impunity. Violence may thus remain embedded in elite bargains and 
processes of stabilisation.  
 
259. The assumption that violence embodies the breakdown of order can lead to the belief that any 
type of intervention will be beneficial, as the priority becomes stopping the violence. However, 
there is no simple correlation between levels of violence and the breakdown of political orders 
and there is a need for careful pre-intervention analysis focusing on how external interventions 
impact upon the political structures and power relations that surround violence.  
 
Processes of elite bargaining have different trajectories 
260. The cases show there is unlikely to be a linear progression in which elite bargains lead to a 
formal peace process culminating in a progressive political settlement. The cases show that 
dynamics of elite bargaining are highly specific to individual contexts, however three broad 
pathways can be identified: (1) return to violence, (2) elite capture and (3) developmental 
peace.   
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261. Where elite bargaining does secure a reduction in large-scale armed violence, the most 
common outcome tends to be forms of ‘elite capture’. This should not be viewed as an 
unfortunate outcome of flawed negotiations but is often the very reason why efforts to stabilise 
violent conflict became feasible in the first place, i.e., elites’ realisation that they stand to 
benefit from peace may be what shifts a war cycle into a peace cycle. The prevalence of forms 
of elite capture also offers insights into why certain warring parties may be unwilling to support 
negotiations even when in a comparatively weak position. Such motivations need to be 
understood rather than simply branded as spoiling tactics amidst external pressure to secure a 
peace deal. 
 
262. None of the cases offer a clear example of immediate post-conflict transitions to a 
developmental peace, warning against unrealistic expectations of transformational change to 
occur within a short timeframe. What the cases do show is that the stronger the continuities 
between wartime and post-war power structures, the greater the likelihood there is of elite 
capture. Where the post-war transition embodies a more radical moment of rupture in which 
there is a significant departure from pre-war and wartime structures, the scope for a more 
progressive peace is greater. However, such transformational changes also run far greater risk 
of misalignment between the formal peace and the underlying political settlement, heightening 
the risk of instability and a return to large-scale violent conflict.   
 
263. A key factor in shaping whether there is a return to violence is the ability of elites to reframe 
indivisible conflicts – where satisfying the interests of one side is not possible without directly 
excluding the interests of opposing groups (e.g. demands for secession) – as divisible conflicts, 
in which there is scope for negotiation and compromise (e.g. through state reform and changes 
to resource allocations). The risk that this may lead to a steady state of political ‘unsettlement’, 
in which the core conflict issues are avoided or deferred, does not foreclose the possible 
emergence of a more inclusive political settlement. A situation of elite capture may evolve over 
time into one of ‘captured elites’ as elite preferences are oriented more towards the long term 
and elite bargaining is increasingly shaped and moderated by functioning institutions.  
 
5.2 Findings II: The linkages between external interventions, elite bargaining 
and pathways out of conflict 
Reverse engineering institutions can have destabilising effects 
264. External interveners have tended to focus efforts on strengthening formal institutions – 
constitutional reform, strengthening the rule of law, democracy – in the hope that these will 
provide a mechanism to ‘tame’ political behaviour and to manage violent conflict. However, in 
many contexts formal institutions are not the key political arena in which power is contested 
and violence is managed. Furthermore, such efforts work against the logic of the political 
system and are likely to be destabilising. 
 
Military responses can crowd out other forms of interventions and leave baleful legacies  
265. External military interventions are highly disruptive and commonly generate unintended 
deleterious consequences. They typically crowd out other diplomatic and political interventions, 
undermine local capacities to address violent conflict, and foster dependent relationships 
between domestic and external actors that weaken domestic bargaining processes. 
Furthermore, eventual withdrawal of military forces can be highly destabilising and set off 
further rounds of violent contestation. External actors should pay greater heed to these baleful 
legacies and overcome the temptation of deploying violence as a ‘first resort’, especially in the 
absence of a clear political strategy to address the volatility of underlying political settlements. 
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The endless peacekeeping trap 
266. Where armed conflict has no end in sight, efforts to re-work political settlements may only be 
sustainable with an open-ended commitment to external backing – what has been called 
‘endless peacekeeping’.91 In such cases, elite bargains may be extremely fragile and dependent 
upon huge amounts of aid (which prop up the rents and patronage networks that hold the elite 
bargain together), and/or external peacekeeping forces. External interveners can become 
‘entrapped’: pulling out risks reigniting instability, but preserving the current status quo 
perpetuates elite capture and high levels of political exclusion.  
 
Diplomatic intervention is not costless 
267. Diplomatic interventions may be less disruptive than military interventions but they can still do 
appreciable damage by distorting power relations between competing elites in ways that can 
rupture political settlements and increase the incentives of one side to return to war. For 
example, elites may take substantial risks committing to peace negotiations and where these 
fail, hard-line stances within organisations may gain greater legitimacy and more moderate 
voices may become sidelined. Failed peace processes change the trajectory of conflict and add 
new layers of complexity, and a flawed peace process may cause more damage than the 
absence of one.  
 
All good things do not come together: Acknowledging difficult trade-offs 
268. Interventions in fragile and conflict-affected states are often underpinned by the assumption 
that ‘stabilisation’ and ‘good governance’ policies are mutually reinforcing and can work in 
tandem to enable countries to escape the ‘conflict trap’. The cases, however, reveal significant 
tensions and trade-offs.     
 
Stabilising large-scale armed conflict may entail bargains that come at the cost of more 
developmental post-conflict transitions 
269. The political concessions and rent-sharing arrangements that may be necessary to co-opt 
competing elites into a stable coalition can entrench inequality and exclusion. Tensions exist 
between the need to ensure the interests of powerful elites are incorporated into efforts to 
stabilise violent conflict – i.e., that bargains are not misaligned with the underlying distribution 
of power – and the risk that such compromises make it more difficult to address structural 
dynamics, which can sow the seeds for future conflicts.  
 
Working with the grain of politics often conflicts with a ‘good governance agenda’  
270. Efforts to promote democratisation, reduce corruption, strengthen judicial autonomy and 
dismantle war economies may be viewed by external actors as essential policies for promoting 
inclusive development and alleviating poverty. However, they often contradict the logic that 
underpins processes of elite bargaining in fragile states, which is about providing elites with 
more stable and predictable power and giving preferential access to valued resources (such as 
control over parts of the economy or providing political positions). 
 
271. Stabilising violent conflict does not necessarily offer opportunities to promote inclusive 
economic growth 
 
                                                          
 
91
 De Waal, A. (2009). “Mission without end? Peacekeeping in the African political marketplace”, International Affairs 85(1): 
99–113. 
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272. Stabilising violent conflict is typically viewed as an important first step towards improving levels 
of economic development. However, in fragile states economic policy is inevitably highly 
‘political’ and maximising economic efficiency is unlikely to be a priority. Elites use their control 
over the economy to create ‘rents’ by manipulating access to certain economic opportunities 
(such as control over natural resources, import licenses, state procurement contracts). Elites 
with the ability to challenge state authority (often through violence) are allocated rents in an 
attempt to gain their loyalty and encourage them to co-operate with the state and with each 
other rather than to fight. Managing violence may thus be founded upon establishing highly 
inefficient economic structures. Efforts to dismantle such structures risk destabilising the 
foundations of elite coalitions. 
 
5.3 Implications for analysis 
Building evidence and research-policy synergies 
273. Interventions have tended to be driven less by evidence, than a combination of ideology, 
institutional interests and external pressures. Although there has been a growing interest in 
political economy approaches, external actors still find it difficult to absorb and act upon the 
implications of such an approach – in part due to internal constraints including disbursement 
pressures, a dearth of regional or country-based expertise, the speed of policy making cycles 
and so forth. However, these limitations are also because of deficiencies and gaps in research 
and evidence, which impede the development of more contextually attuned approaches. These 
include problems of access and security, the relative invisibility of elite bargaining processes 
especially below the national level, the lack of reliable longitudinal data that captures complex 
chains of bargaining over time and the lack of comparative work on political settlements that 
allows generalisations that can be incorporated into policy. 
  
274. Investing in research that addresses these gaps is one thing, but the problem is also one of 
‘translation’ and researchers not being sufficiently attuned to the decision making processes 
and pressures faced by policy makers. There is scope to think more creatively about how to 
strengthen capacities to conduct longitudinal research in areas of protracted conflict and 
secondly how to strengthen policy-researcher linkages to overcome the problem of ‘translation’. 
Otherwise there is a danger that a more sophisticated political economy approach simply places 
unrealistic expectations on policy makers in terms of their time and analytical capacities. 
 
Turning the mirror inwards 
275. Interventions aimed at stabilising violent conflict are often framed as external solutions to 
internal problems. Interveners typically perceive themselves as external to the conflicts they are 
engaged with, in a way that prevents them from assessing their own position within, and 
influence on, political settlements and bargaining processes. A political economy analysis forces 
international actors to confront their own influence. Flowing out of this is the need for an 
explicit focus on the institutional interests, conflicts, and trade-offs that exist within and 
between external actors as they pursue multiple objectives when engaging in conflict. 
Commonly, what worked – and what hasn’t worked – regarding efforts to stabilise violent 
conflict has been shaped by the conflicts and bargains made between and within intervening 
powers, how domestic political considerations shape (in)action, and the influence that hubris, 
emotions, rivalries, and loyalties within these organisations has had on shaping interventions. 
 
Moving beyond national frameworks 
276. Political and military networks, economic resources, ideas and ideology all span international 
borders and pathways out of conflict, and political settlements in one country are commonly 
interconnected with those of neighbouring and intervening powers. Borderlands are central to 
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elite bargaining and brokers who mediate between centre and periphery are often central to 
the making and unmaking of political settlements. For example, growing inclusion at the 
national level may occur alongside – and sometimes be causally related to – increased exclusion 
and conflict at subnational/transnational levels. These dynamics are frequently invisible to 
policy makers who are constrained by state-centric thinking and policy frameworks. The focus 
on elite bargaining requires policymakers to develop a frame of reference that goes beyond the 
borders of the nation state and is more attuned to the specific dynamics of borderland regions. 
 
5.4 Implications for policy and practice 
Precautionary principles and restraint 
277. The invocation that interventions should ‘do no harm’ is unrealistic; they inevitably create 
winners and losers. The challenge is therefore one of developing an approach that is more 
attuned to risks: What are the risks? What is their magnitude? Who bears them and at what 
cost? Precautionary principles that address these challenges are necessary so as to restrain the 
impulse to automatically ‘do something’, but also to provide clear guidelines for action. These 
guidelines should be less about how to micro-manage or engineer bargains, than about how to 
shape the risk environment in order to nudge elite bargaining processes in a more 
developmental direction.  
 
Assessing the costs of non-intervention 
278. Whilst numerous examples of deleterious external interventions have been identified, it is also 
important to note that the costs of not intervening to address escalating conflict and growing 
humanitarian crises may be very grave – both in the immediate term in relation to loss of life 
and suffering and in the long term as a result of new sets of grievances and new conflict 
dynamics. There is a danger that ‘working with the grain’ encourages a conservative or realist 
approach, which involves either letting domestic dynamics play themselves out, or supporting 
powerful incumbents who can impose a settlement.  
 
279.  Greater emphasis must therefore be placed on the tensions and trade-offs between the scope 
that interveners have to reduce violent conflict versus the damage they may cause by blocking 
or distorting domestic bargaining processes and further destabilising volatile power dynamics. 
There is a need to widen understandings of the influence that external actors have on conflict-
affected countries beyond the parameters that usually frame conflict analysis. None of the 
cases provide an example of ‘non-intervention’ given the reality that all countries – even those 
where interventions explicitly aimed at tackling violent conflict have been limited – have been 
shaped by their external environment, and a mix of international policies related to trade, 
development, migration and so forth. This emphasises the need for greater engagement in how 
such policies impact upon conflict dynamics and how they work in tandem with – or at cross-
purposes to – interventions directly aimed at reducing violent conflict.  
 
Working towards doorstep conditions for a developmental peace 
280. The cases make clear that there are no ‘quick-fixes’ or ‘templates’ for successful stabilisation 
interventions that can be applied off the shelf. Where external actors helped stabilise conflict it 
was rarely due, either to a single intervention, or to a panoply of measures linked to ‘wide 
spectrum’ peacebuilding. Efforts to push for rapid change within short timeframes have often 
proved destabilising by creating sudden shocks that destabilise fragile political settlements, 
rather than deliver their intended aims. Instead, success was the result of specific policy 
combinations that created (particularly during moments of change) an enabling environment 
for political bargaining and negotiations and were calibrated to the dynamics of elite bargaining 
in particular contexts, over time.  
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281. Shifts towards a more stable progressive peace in the initial post-conflict period may thus be 
less about initiating large-scale transformational outcomes – due to the risks this entails of 
creating a destabilising disjuncture between the formal peace and the underlying political 
settlement.  Rather they may be grounded more in instigating a series of evolving mini-bargains 
or temporary ‘fixes’ that begin to shift the parameters of negotiations and work towards 
establishing the ‘doorstep conditions’ that may make more equitable and inclusive 
development possible. These doorstep conditions may revolve around extending the issues up 
for negotiation, the scope for what can be demanded, and expanding the circle of interests 
taken into consideration, while at the same time ensuring that the failure of negotiations does 
not entail the risk of renewed violence. These conditions can also be instrumental in enabling a 
shift from ‘elite capture’ of the benefits of peace, to the ‘capture of elites’. Elites become 
required to act increasingly within structures where power and legitimacy becomes founded 
upon delivering growth, services and representation, and opportunities to pursue their own 
exclusive interests are constrained. The key challenge for diplomatic and political interventions 
is to find ways that create space for meaningful political dialogue and can support momentum 
for more developmental post-war outcomes without pushing too hard against the existing 
political settlement and against the kinds of deal-based mechanisms upon which elite bargains 
are founded.  
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Democratic Republic of Congo (M23)   Ben Shepherd 
Ethiopia-Eritrea       Richard Reid 
Guatemala      Sebastian Elgueta 
Indonesia (Aceh)     Edward Aspinall 
Iraq’s Sunni Insurgency (2003-2013)   Greg Shapland 
Malaya       David H. Ucko 
Mali       Yvan Guichaoua & Nicolas Desgrais 
Mozambique      Alex Vines 
Nepal       Author name withheld 
Northern Ireland     Roger Mac Ginty 
Philippines      Armi Beatriz E. Bayot 
Sierra Leone      Kieran Mitton 
Somalia      Ken Menkhaus 
South Sudan      Naomi Pendle 
Sri Lanka      Bart Klem 
Tajikistan      John Heathershaw & Parviz Mullojonov 
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